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THE MYTH OF THE STUDENT-ATHLETE: THE 
COLLEGE ATHLETE AS EMPLOYEE 
Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick* 
Abstract: Grant-in-aid athletes in revenue-generating sports at Division I National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) institutions are not "student-athletes" as the NCAA 
asserts, but are, instead, "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). To be 
an employee under that Act, these athletes must meet both the common law test and a 
statutory test applicable to university students. In applying the common law test to athletes, 
we describe their daily lives through interviews with current and former Division I grant-in-
aid athletes. These interviews demonstrate that their daily burdens and obligations not only 
meet the legal standard of employee, but far exceed the burdens and obligations of most 
university employees. In addressing the statutory definition of the term employee, we 
demonstrate that the relationship between these athletes and their universities is not primarily 
academic, but is, instead, undeniably commercial. As employees under the NLRA, these 
athletes are entitled "to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Consequently, they 
will be able to acquire bargaining power through collective association and to negotiate their 
terms and conditions of employment, including wages not arbitrarily limited to the level of 
athletic scholarships. 
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The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands ... are 
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that 
Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour 
with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the 
common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of 
other Men.' 
* * * 
Every time I try and call it a business you say it's a game and 
every time I say it should be a game you call it a business? 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a voluntary 
I. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press Student ed. 1988) ( 1690) (emphasis in original). 
2. PETER GENT, NORTH DALLAS fORTY 276 (1973) (E.W. Meadows, the fictional defensive 
tackle, injured and high on dexamyl spansules, violently confronting his defensive line coach after 
his team's defeat). 
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association of approximately 1,200 colleges and universities, 3 has among 
its stated purposes promoting amateur athletics.4 Towards that end, the 
first stated purpose in its Division I Manual is "[t]o initiate ... and 
improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student-athletes and to 
promote ... athletics participation as a recreational pursuit."5 Despite 
the prominence of this assertion, the NCAA has failed to realize this 
ideal for athletes in the most commercially lucrative college sports. 
For fifty years, the NCAA has used the term "student-athlete" to 
describe the young men and women who are athletes at its member 
schools.6 Of late, its insistence that college athletes be so characterized 
has reached a fevered pitch. One need only consider the recent NCAA 
men's basketball tournaments-the self-styled "March Madness"-
when for several years the NCAA's constant and insistent media 
message has been that these young men and women are learning 
important life lessons by engaging in intercollegiate athletics and are, 
therefore, student-athletes, not mere athletes.7 The shrill urgency of the 
3. See NCAA, What Is the NCAA?, http://www.ncaa.org/about/what_is_the_ncaa.html (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2006); NCAA, 2004 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 18 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/membership_report/2004/2004_ncaa_membership_report. 
pdf[hereinafter MEMBERSHIP REPORT]. Member colleges and universities establish NCAA policies 
and rules at annual NCAA Conventions. See Christopher L. Chin, Comment, lllegal Procedures: 
The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the Student-Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1213, 1215 (1993); 
NCAA, 2004-{)5 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 5.01.1 (2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/ 
library/membership/division_i_manual/2004-05/2004-05_dl_manual.pdf [hereinafter DIY. I 
MANUAL]. 
4. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 1.2(a), (c), (g). The NCAA has three separate divisions, 
each with its own rules. Division I includes universities with the most aggressive athletic programs, 
the largest athletic budgets, and the greatest revenues. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1216 n.25. For 
football, Division I is divided into two groups, Divisions I-A and I-AA. Division II colleges have 
less costly athletic programs. Division I and II universities consider an applicant's athletic ability 
when deciding whether to offer aid. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1; NCAA, 2004-05 
NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL art. 15.01.5 (2004). Division III schools, by contrast, place the least 
emphasis on athletic programs, and, as a group, have elected not to grant scholarships on the basis 
of athletic ability. See NCAA, 2004-05 NCAA DIVISION III MANUAL art. 15.01.3 (2004). 
5. DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 1.2(a). 
6. See WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 69-70 (1995). 
7. See NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2005) [hereinafter 
NCAA PSA 2005]; NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2004) 
[hereinafter NCAA PSA 2004]; NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar. 
2003) [hereinafter NCAA PSA 2003]. Typical of the NCAA advertising campaign is an ad with a 
young man practicing the shot put while he describes his thoughts: 
I have to focus, gather everything I've learned, all my successes, all my sacrifices, all my pain, 
and concentrate that energy into one moment. That's a moment I'll use every single day of my 
life. There are 360,000 NCAA student-athletes, and just about all of us will be "going pro" in 
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NCAA's "student-athlete" media campaign evokes Queen Gertrude's 
damning observation to Hamlet: "The lady doth protest too much, 
methinks. "8 
Why, a half century after adopting this term, should the NCAA 
unceasingly intone to millions of viewers that these young men and 
women are "student-athletes"? The NCAA's purpose in this message is 
to shore up a crumbling fa9ade, a myth in America, that these young 
athletes in NCAA-member sports programs are properly characterized 
only as "student-athletes." This characterization-that athletes at 
NCAA-member schools are student-athletes-is essential to the NCAA 
because it obscures the legal reality that some of these athletes, in fact, 
are also employees.9 By creating and fostering the myth that football and 
men's basketball players at Division I universities are something other 
than employees, the NCAA and its member institutions obtain the 
astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the athletes' talents, 
time, and energy-that is, their labor-while severely curtailing the 
costs associated with such labor. 10 The advantages to these institutions 
from fixing and suppressing labor costs in this manner have enabled 
them to reap a fantastic surfeit of riches. 11 
The NCAA's characterization of these athletes as student-athletes, 
and not employees, lies at the core of another, broader, fallacy: that 
something other than sports. 
!d. Additional ads featuring a basketball player, a swimmer, and others, aired constantly throughout 
the 2003, 2004, and 2005 three-week NCAA Division I men's basketball tournaments. See NCAA 
PSA 2005, supra; NCAA PSA 2004, supra, NCAA PSA 2003, supra; see also NCAA, NCAA 
Television and Print Campaign for 2005, available at http://www2.ncaa.org/portallflash_content/ 
sniffer.html [hereinafter NCAA, Public Service Campaign] (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2. 
9. As discussed below and for reasons described throughout this Article, our thesis is limited to 
those athletes in Division I revenue-generating sports, that is, to football and men's basketball 
players. 
I 0. The real cost to the university-employer of extending a tuition waiver for an athlete is 
substantially less than tuition. It is, instead, only the cost to the university of another seat in the 
classroom. See Alfred D. Mathewson, The Eligibility Paradox, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 84 
& n.S (2000). 
II. College sports is a multi-billion-dollar industry. See infra Part JII.B.2.a. By way of one 
example, CBS is paying the NCAA $6 billion for the right to broadcast the annual men's basketball 
tournament, March Madness, over an eleven-year period, 2003 through 2013. See MEMBERSHIP 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 22; Tim Martin, Cash Up for Grabs: MSU Likely Will Receive at Least $2 
Million from the Tourney Plus Increased Donations and Publicity, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 9, 2003, 
available at http://www.greenandwhite.com/mens_basketball/p_030309_ncaa_l-8a.html; Welch 
Suggs, Big Money in College Sports Flows to the Few, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Oct. 29, 2004, at 
A46. 
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NCAA Division I football and men's basketball are, in fact, amateur. On 
the contrary, these sports are not amateur except in the pernicious sense 
that the "employee-athletes"12 who produce the product receive no 
market wage. In fact, these major college sports have not been truly 
amateur for many years, if ever. 13 
By virtue of this camouflage, the NCAA and its members are 
permitted, like no other association of institutions or businesses in this 
country, to employ one type of labor without paying a competitive wage 
for it. 14 At least some of these athletes, however-specifically those who 
receive athletic grants-in-aid in revenue-generating sports at Division I 
NCAA institutions15-are employees under the law, and their 
relationship with the colleges and universities for which they labor is an 
employer-employee relationship. 
A broad array of participants in college sports harvests a wealth of 
riches. Colleges and universities, of course, enjoy enormous revenues 
and other important indirect benefits from their athletics programs. 16 
Corporations that sponsor and underwrite the athletic contests gain 
12. We define the term "employee-athlete" to be those students in NCAA Division I schools in 
revenue-generating sports who receive athletic grants-in-aid, i.e., compensation for athletic services. 
We use that term rather than the NCAA-mandated term "student-athlete" to label these athletes 
accurately and to highlight the persuasive effect of NCAA propaganda. See infra Part I. 
13. As early as 1915, William Foster wrote: 
Only childlike innocence or willful blindness need prevent American colleges from seeing that 
the rules which aim to maintain athletics on what is called an 'amateur' basis, by forbidding 
players to receive pay in money, are worse than useless because, while failing to prevent men 
from playing for pay, they breed deceit and hypocrisy. 
William T. Foster, An Indictment of Intercollegiate Athletics, 116 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 577, 579 
(1915). Scholarships awarded solely on the basis of athletic ability were technically banned by the 
NCAA only from 1948 through 1951. This ban, however, was never successfully enforced, and 
athletic scholarships flourished both before and after that period. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 53-55, 
67. 
14. See ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE 
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA'S AMATEUR MYTH ix-x, xii-xiii, 4, 6--8 (1998); ANDREW 
ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
SPORTS 6 (1999) ("Big-time intercollegiate athletics is a unique industry. No other industry in the 
United States manages not to pay its principal producers a wage or salary."); Kenneth L. Shropshire, 
The Erosion of the NCAA Amateurism Model, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 46. 
15. Football and men's basketball at Division I institutions are the significant revenue-generating 
sports. These are the sports that have become by far the most commercialized. See infra Part 
III.B.2.a. "Men's basketball and football generate 97 percent of [Big Ten college athletics 
revenues)." Lori Hayes, College Sports Need Big Business, Delany Says, LANSING ST. J., Jan. 24, 
2003, at 3C. 
16. See infra Part 111.8.2.a. 
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unparalleled exposure for their products and services. 17 The NCAA 
supports itself entirely by the revenues generated from the sports 
activities of its member institutions. 18 Coaches are paid lavishly for 
recruiting and training winning teams. 19 Media corporations like CBS 
and ESPN generate huge advertising revenues by airing college athletic 
events.20 Even high school coaches have found illicit ways to profit from 
the enterprise of college sports.Z1 College athletics has been estimated to 
be a $60 billion industry.22 
Only one group of persons is denied the full financial fruit of the 
bountiful enterprise known as college sports-the players themselves. 
Ironically, these are the very individuals who create the product and its 
attendant riches. 23 In fact, it could fairly be said that these persons often 
are the product. 24 They labor in the demanding, and often brutal, 25 
17. High Nielsen ratings for athletic events are evidence of their popularity. Such ratings 
guarantee corporate sponsors a large audience for their heavily advertised products. See, e.g., Bowl 
Championship Series, 2004--05 Bowl Game TV Ratings, http://www.bcsfootball.org/ 
index.cfm?page=tvratings (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter BCS, TV Ratings] (providing 
Nielsen ratings for various post-season college football bowl games); see also Martin, supra note II 
(describing the increasing popularity of revenue-generating college sports). 
18. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 22-23. 
19. Annual compensation for top football coaches will soon exceed $3 million. See Dennis Dodd, 
Notebook: Price Tags for Top Coaches Reaching Stratosphere, CBS SPORTSLINE.COM, Jan. 25, 
2005, http://www.sportsline.com/collegefootball!story/8133032/l; see also Mike Fish, Sign of the 
Times: College Football Coaching Contracts Filled with Lucrative Incentives, SI.COM, Dec. 23, 
2003, http:// sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/writers/mike _fish/12/ 19/ coaching.contracts/index .html 
[hereinafter Fish, Sign of the Times] (describing lucrative college football coaching contracts); Mike 
Fish, Sweet Deals: More and More College Coaches are Making CEO Money, SI.COM, June 2, 
2003, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.cornlbasketball/college/news/2003/06/02/contracts/#kentucky 
[hereinafter Fish, Sweet Deals] (describing lucrative college basketball coaching contracts). 
20. Coca-Cola alone will pay CBS at least a half-billion dollars over the eleven-year period from 
2003 through 2013 for the right to advertise its beverages during the NCAA men's basketball 
tournament. Scott Graham, Call Me Mad, But NCAA Bandwagon is Running Out of Room for 
Businesses, BALT. Bus. J., Mar. 26, 2004, available at http:/lbaltimore.bizjoumals.cornlbaltimore/ 
stories/2004/03/2 9/ editorial3. html. 
21. Memphis-area high school football coach Lynn Lang recently pled guilty to racketeering 
conspiracy after it was revealed that he accepted $150,000 from a University of Alabama booster to 
convince his star player, Albert Means, to sign with the Crimson Tide. See Mark Schlabach, 
Alabama Booster Convicted: Guilty Verdict Sets Precedent in Wake of $150K in Improper 
Payments, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2005, at Dl. 
22. The News Hour: Dollars, Dunks and Diplomas (PBS television broadcast July 9, 2001), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshourlbb/education/july-dec01/ncaa_07-09.html (discussing the 
prospect of reforming college athletics). 
23. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 3, at 1214 (characterizing student-athletes as "the main producer(s] 
of revenues in intercollegiate athletics"). 
24. In 2001, the University of Oregon paid $250,000 to purchase a seven-story billboard in New 
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college sports vineyard, sometimes risking life26 and limb, and are 
York City's Times Square, featuring star quarterback Joey Harrington, to promote its football 
program and Harrington's candidacy for the Heisman Trophy. See Jodi Wilgoren, Spiraling Sports 
Budgets Draw Fire from Faculties, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2001, at 12; 60 Minutes: Here's Ours? 
(CBS television broadcast Jan. 6, 2002), transcript at 14. The following year it paid $300,000 for a 
similar ad, featuring football player Keenan Howry, at 47th and Broadway. See William C. Rhoden, 
Oregon Likes the Visibility of Broadway, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,2002, at 01. 
The athlete himself, as much as the games, has become the product. The "college 
athlete ... becomes ... a promotional tool for the university." Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What 
They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for Participation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 
SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 27 (1996); see also JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND 
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT'S PERSPECTIVE 76, 152 (2000) (the media 
have "repackaged athletic events, coaches, and players as entertainment products" and universities 
have "willing[ly] ... oblige[ d)"); Tanyon T. Lynch, Quid Pro Quo: Restoring Educational Primacy 
to College Basketball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 595, 605 (2002) (noting that athletes and coaches 
"are viewed as entertainment products"); Tim Wendel, Pay the Players, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 
2005, at 23A (noting that the "game is nothing without the players"). As the athlete becomes the 
product, the college game looks more and more like a professional event adopting the trappings of 
the professional leagues. 
25. Participation in college football often impairs an athlete's long-term physical health. "They're 
giving a big chunk of their life for this education. They're giving up a big chunk of their health." 60 
Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 16 (statement of Leo Gerard, President, United Steelworkers of 
America). From 1977 through 2004, thirty-one college football players received cervical cord 
injuries, and from 1984 though 2004, ten received cerebral injuries from which they never 
completely recovered. Nat'l Ctr. for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research, Data Tables, Annual 
Survey of Catastrophic Football Injuries 1977-2004, http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/CataFootball 
Data.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
In one stunning example, University of Miami tailback and Heisman Trophy finalist Willis 
McGahee suffered a severe knee injury in the fourth quarter of the last football game in his college 
career, the national championship Fiesta Bowl. See Kelly Whiteside, Status of Miami's McGahee 
Uncertain After Surgery, USA Today, Jan. 6, 2003, at IC. In another graphic instance, San Jose 
State University football player Neil Parry's lower right leg was amputated after a 1999 compound 
fracture and twenty surgeries. See Mike Lopresti, Season to Have its High Points, Lansing St. J., 
Aug. 23, 2002, at Cl. 
26. In 200 I, Eraste Autin, an 18-year-old freshman at the University of Florida, collapsed during 
a pre-season workout and died after lying comatose for a week. See Jamal Thalji, Six Schools Will 
Start Playing it Cool, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Pasco Times ed.), Apr. 13, 2004, at 4; 60 Minutes, 
supra note 24, transcript at 17. Northwestern University player Rashidi Wheeler died in August 
2001 during a preseason conditioning workout. See Skip Myslenski, Football Player Dies at NV: 
Wheeler, 22, Collapses During Conditioning Test, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 200 I, at I. 
From 1931 through 2004, eighty-six college football players died from direct injuries sustained 
from playing or practicing football and another I 02 died from indirect injuries. Nat' I Ctr. for 
Catastrophic Sport Injury Research, Data Tables, Annual Survey of Football Injury Research: 1931-
2004, http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/FootballlnjuryData.htm#TABLE%201 (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006); see also Nat'l Ctr. for Catastrophic Sport Injury Research, Glossary of Injury Terms, 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/InjuryTerms.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (defining direct injuries 
as those resulting directly from participation in the skills of the sport and indirect ones as those 
caused by systemic failure resulting from exertion or by a complication secondary to a non-fatal 
injury). 
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entitled, as a matter of right and law, to a just portion of the fruits of 
their toil. Indeed, in that the athletes alone do not profit from this 
fabulously rich enterprise, their status plainly carries vestiges of 
servitude where men labor for enterprises that conspire, under sanction 
oflaw, to limit their wages. 
Emblematic of the regime under which these employee-athletes 
currently labor, the college and university employers have also agreed 
among themselves to require these particular employees to spend their 
artificially limited wages only at the "company store"27-the institutions 
themselves. 28 By this last arrangement, then, these athletes, unlike any 
other working people, are not free to spend their limited wages where 
they choose, but must spend them on college tuition, books, and other 
institutionally related expenses, regardless of their real needs or those of 
their families. 29 Indeed, many full-scholarship athletes live below the 
27. The "company store," vividly recalled in Tennessee Ernie Ford's ballad, "Sixteen Tons," was 
an infamous part of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American labor history. See TENNESSEE 
ERNIE FORD, Sixteen Tons, on 16 TONS OF BOOGIE: THE BEST OF TENNESSEE ERNIE FORD (Rhino 
Records 1990) ( 1955). It was usually part of a "company town"-a "feudal domain," FOSTER R. 
DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 172 (3d ed. 1966)--where employees were required as a 
condition of employment to live in company-owned housing and to purchase company-provided 
goods and services at grossly inflated prices. See THOMAS R. BROOKS, TOIL AND TROUBLE: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 92-93 (1964); DULLES, supra. A classic form of exploitation, the 
company store was often "(b ]ound up with ... the scrip or truck system: payment of wages in the 
form of scrip or draft redeemable only at the company outlets." GEORGE S. McGOVERN & 
LEONARD F. GUTTRIDGE, THE GREAT COALFIELD WAR 23 (1972). 
28. No Division I rule explicitly requires players to use their limited compensation to purchase 
goods and services from their educational employers, but the requirement that compensation be 
provided only in the form of "financial aid" to offset the player's educational and living expenses 
effectively mandates this result. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.02.4. 
29. A common reason basketball and football players offer for leaving college before their 
eligibility expires, and instead attempting to play professionally, is the desire to support themselves 
and their families. See Malcolm Moran, League, Colleges Fret as Players Go Pro Early: 
Multimillion-dollar Deals, Peer Pressure Lure Youths, USA TODAY, May 17, 2001, at lA; Matt 
Myftiu, Money Draws Athletes Away from Degree, ST. NEWS (Mich. St. Univ.), Dec. 8, 1999, 
available at http://www.statenews.com/editions/120899/pl_sport.html (noting that many players' 
families desperately need money, a significant consideration for players debating whether to turn 
professional early). 
Although athletes are not compensated in a form that permits them to support their families, they 
are commonly thought to receive a valuable degree or education in exchange for their athletic 
services. A variety of factors, however-including the admission of athletes who are academically 
unprepared to do college-level work, the coach's plenary authority not to renew annual scholarships, 
inadequate progress requirements under NCAA rules, and the unending demands on the athlete's 
time and energy-frequently combine to prevent many athletes from having any real chance of 
completing their degrees. See infra Parts III.A.I-2, III.B.2.b.(l), (7). The abundance of 
educationally empty curricula for athletes, even at otherwise elite institutions, often renders 
worthless the education received by those athletes who do graduate. See infra Part III.B.2.b.(4). 
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poverty line. 30 
Our thesis is straightforward: grant-in-aid athletes in revenue-
generating sports at Division I NCAA schools are "employee-athletes," 
not merely "student-athletes."31 Under the foundational pillar of U.S. 
labor policy-the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)32-
the relationship between scholarship athletes and their colleges and 
universities can no longer be fairly characterized as anything other than 
an employment relationship in which the athletes serve as employees 
and the institutions for which they labor as their employers. By this basic 
measure, 33 the relationship between these athletes and their institutions is 
plainly one of employer and employee. 
We understand that legal recognition of some of these young men as 
"employees" would carry profound implications for the NCAA, its 
member schools, and the future of major college sports.34 College 
30. For example, in the year 2000, full-scholarship athletes at UCLA received $7,380, nearly 
$1,000 less than the $8,350 designated by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services as the 
poverty line for a single person household for that year. Collegiate Athletes Coal., Living Below the 
Poverty Line ... , http://www.cacnow.org/living.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). For a scholarship 
athlete at UCLA, financial aid leaves the athlete approximately "$2,250 short of what is [sic] 
actually costs to live as an undergraduate student at UCLA." /d.; see also 60 Minutes, supra note 24, 
transcript at 15 (former football player Ramogi Huma asserting that "the vast majority [of players] 
live under the poverty line"); id., transcript at 16 (discussing the NCAA concession "that a 
scholarship falls $2,000 a year short of what it really costs to get by"). 
It is commonly believed that college athletes need not be treated as employees and paid a 
competitive market wage because soon enough they will be wealthy professional athletes, and 
therefore their economic injury is merely one of compensation delayed, not denied. In reality, the 
vast majority of college athletes do not become professional athletes. Only 2% of NCAA football 
players and 1.3% of men's basketball players join professional leagues. NCAA, Estimated 
Probability of Competing in Athletics Beyond the High School Interscholastic Level, 
http://www.ncaa.org/researchlprob_of_competing/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA, 
Estimated Probability]. Some will never become professionals because of injuries sustained in 
college. 
31. Our thesis extends only to football and men's basketball scholarship athletes at Division I 
institutions because only their relationships with their universities can be said to be plainly 
commercial and not primarily academic-a necessary showing under the law. See irifra Parts II.B, 
III.B. Athletes in the non-revenue-generating sports and those at Division II and III institutions have 
relationships with their universities that are characterized less by commercial incentives. 
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000); see also irifra Part II. 
33. The NLRA standard for "employee" has two components-a common law test and a special 
statutory standard for students in the university setting. See infra Part II.A-B. 
34. As employees, these athletes may be entitled to the panoply of rights accorded employees 
under the many federal and state laws that govern the employment relationship. For example, 
"employees" have the right to earn a minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 201-219, the right to a safe workplace under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 
id. §§ 651-678, and the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and 
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football and basketball, however, will not perish as a result of an 
insistence upon justice for the people who produce these great sources of 
pleasure and profit. The importance of these sports in America is too 
great. They provide fantastic entertainment and constitute a source of 
interest, pride, identity, and deep loyaltY5 for millions of Americans,36 
ourselves included. 
While some outcomes of this revolution cannot be fully known, many 
can. Among other things, these employee-athletes would earn a 
negotiated wage, like other employees. 37 They would also be entitled to 
national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-15. Indeed, "[t]he United States Department of Labor, alone, is charged with administering 
some 180 federal statutes governing the employment relationship." ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS I (13th ed. 2001). Many state laws also regulate the employment 
relationship. See infra note 66. Determining the applicability of legislation such as Title VII, the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), OSHA, and state workers' compensation statutes would require an analysis of each federal, 
state, and local statute that grants benefits based upon status as an "employee" and is beyond the 
scope of this Article. At the same time, however, many employment statutes are modeled upon the 
NLRA. Accordingly, the proper recognition of the status of employee-athletes under the NLRA 
would likely eventually alter their status under other legal regimes as well. 
Acceptance of our thesis would also have important practical implications. For example, given 
the dependence of all other collegiate sports upon the revenue generated by football and men's 
basketball, how would these other sports be funded? How would universities comply with other 
laws, such as Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000), requiring equal treatment of women's 
sports? The practical reverberations of our thesis are many, and plainly beyond the scope of this 
Article. It seems fair to say, however, that most involve a reslicing of the rich pie of college 
athletics. 
35. It has been observed that sport "is infused with themes consistent with the American Dream." 
HOWARD L. NIXON, II & JAMES H. FREY, A SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 41 (1996). Among these values 
are "competition, individualism, [and] achievement." D. STANLEY EITZEN & GEORGE H. SAGE, 
SOCIOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICAN SPORT 13 (5th ed. 1993). 
36. Total attendance at NCAA football and men's basketball games in 2003-04 exceeded 76.9 
million. NCAA, OFFICIAL 2005 NCAA MEN'S BASKETBALL RECORDS 262 (2004), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/library/records/m_basketball_records_book/2005/2005_m_basketball_records. 
pdf [hereinafter BASKETBALL RECORDS] (showing that total attendance in 2004 for NCAA 
basketball games was 30,760,510); NCAA, 2003 NCAA COLLEGE FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE 2, 
http://www.ncaa.org/stats/football/attendance/2003/2003footballattendance.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006) [hereinafter FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE] (reporting 46,144,539 total football attendees in 2003). 
Of these, 25,548,468 individuals attended Division I men's basketball games, BASKETBALL 
RECORDS, supra, and 35,085,646 attended Division I-A football games. FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE, 
supra, at I. 
37. Currently, under the aegis of the NCAA, colleges and universities violate U.S. antitrust law 
by agreeing to limit the maximum compensation these employee-athletes may earn to the level of 
"tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, [and necessary] transportation." DIV. I 
MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.7, .02.2; see Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College 
Students be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 206 (1990); Chad W. Pekron, The Professional 
Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation 
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form themselves into unions to bargain collectively with their employers 
through representatives of their own choosing, and their right to strike 
would be federally protected.38 And while the challenges of reforming 
college sports to meet the commands of the law would necessarily be 
great, they are by no means insurmountable. In fact, wisely applying the 
law and properly characterizing the labor that produces this uniquely 
American product would place college athletics upon a more just, 
Challenges, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 24 (2000); Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. 
REv. 802, 817-18 (1981); Nelson 0. Fitts, Note, A Critique of Noncommercial Justifications for 
Sherman Act Violations, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 478 (1999) (arguing that the purported non-
commercial nature of nonprofit institutions should not render them exempt from antitrust laws); 
Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 659-60 (1978); 
Robert D. Tollison, Understanding the Antitrust Economics of Sports Leagues, ANTITRUST, Spring 
2000, at 21, 22-24; Murray Sperber, In Praise of 'Student-Athletes': The NCAA Is Haunted by Its 
Past, CHRON. HIGHER Enuc., Jan. 8, 1999, at A 76. NCAA Division I members engage in classic, 
illegal price-fixing by agreeing among themselves to limit the wages of employee-athletes. See DIV. 
I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.1-.2, .7, 15.02.2, .5. Ultimately, it is through this naked price-
fixing arrangement that colleges and universities have conspired to suppress the wages of their 
employee-athletes and thereby to maximize the financial fruits of college sports for themselves. 
Technically, establishing players as "employees" would not be required to prevail in a price-
fixing antitrust claim against the NCAA and its member institutions. Such employee-athletes have 
antitrust standing because they suffer antitrust injury, not because they are employees. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has explained, the antitrust injury requirement "ensures that the harm claimed by the 
plaintiff," in this case, price-fixing, "corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the 
antitrust laws in the first place," that is, "if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or 
effect of the defendant's behavior." Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342-44 
(1990) (emphasis in original). Naturally, the NCAA's limitation of compensation to tuition, room, 
board, and books reduces competition among universities in the market for player services. 
Nevertheless, a showing that athletes are employees under the law would be useful to convince a 
reluctant public and judiciary that the compensation paid to these young men ought to be a market-
based wage, not an artificial one limited to the cost of tuition, room, board, and books. See DIV. I 
MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.7, 15.02.2, .5 (limiting compensation to that level of support 
needed for tuition, fees, room, board, transportation, and required course-related books and 
supplies). 
This Article does not seek to establish antitrust violations, but rather to demonstrate that so-called 
student-athletes are actually employees of their universities and colleges and, therefore, are entitled 
to the benefits that this legal characterization affords. 
38. It should be noted that the ability of employee-athletes to form a union may well provide a 
perfect opportunity for the NCAA, its member schools, and the union representing the employee-
athletes to regulate the "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158( d), of the employee-athletes in a collective bargaining agreement. By so doing, the NCAA 
and an athlete union could shelter otherwise anticompetitive practices through the non-statutory 
labor exemption to the antitrust laws, as do all major professional sports leagues in the United States 
and the player associations representing their employees. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 
231, 235-36 (1996); Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2004); Wood v. 
Nat'! Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959-61 (2d Cir. !987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 
F .2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. Nat'] Football League, 543 F .2d 606, 611-12 (8th 
Cir. 1976). 
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honest, and ultimately sane path than the one it is currently taking.39 
Part I of this Article reviews the history of the "student-athlete" 
concept as an unabashed mechanism for the NCAA to avoid an 
employment relationship between its members and their athletes. Part II 
describes the legal standards for "employee" under the NLRA, setting 
forth two legal tests required for that status. First, Part II.A identifies the 
common law test for "employee" while Part II.B identifies the NLRA's 
special statutory test for "employee" as it applies to students in the 
university setting. Part III applies these tests to employee-athletes. 
Part liLA applies the common law test to college athletes. First, Part 
III.A.1 recounts the pervasive ..:ontrol exercised by universities over 
athletes' daily lives to demonstrate the control element of the common 
law test. Second, Part III.A.2 analyzes the athletic grant-in-aid to 
demonstrate that the compensation element of the common law test is 
satisfied and to further reveal the employer's control over these athletes. 
Finally, Part III.A.3 addresses the last element of the common law test, 
showing athletes' economic dependence upon their university-
employers. 
Part III.B then applies the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB 
or the Board) statutory test for "employee" to college athletes. Part 
III.B.l illustrates that the four criteria announced by the NLRB in Brown 
University40 (Brown) strongly support the classification of these athletes 
as "employees." Finally, as required by Brown, Part III.B.2 establishes 
that the relationship between the university and these athletes is not 
primarily academic but is deeply commercial and that, as a consequence, 
a fair-minded judiciary can no longer deny these athletes their employee 
status. 
39. See Rick Telander, Something Must Be Done, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 2, 1989, at 94, 94, 
reprinted from RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE 
FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN Do TO STOP IT (1989). 
!d. 
The criminal behavior of the players, the rampant pursuit of money, the tunnel vision of the 
coaches, the complacency of the fans, the sliminess of the boosters, the sanctimonious 
platitudes of the NCAA pooh-bahs, the exploitation of the players, the desire to expand the 
season and to televise everything, the brutality on the field, ... the lack of anything remotely 
resembling an ethical anchor holding big-time football programs and their patrons to the 
ground .... And the ugliest part was that these sins were being committed in a world--our 
universities-that Americans have always assumed to be a realm of virtue and idealism. 
40. 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42,2004 WL 1588744 (July 13, 2004). 
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I. THE NCAA CREATED THE TERM "STUDENT-ATHLETE" 
TO DENY ATHLETES EMPLOYEE STATUS 
The NCAA's fevered insistence on the use of the term "student-
athlete" begs the question: what led it to adopt this term in the first 
place? The history of the NCAA's extraordinary and continuing effort to 
mask the true nature of the university-athlete relationship bears exquisite 
witness to its purpose in inventing the term "student-athlete.'.41 From the 
beginning, more than a half-century ago, the NCAA utilized the term 
"student-athlete" to cloak the actual relationship between the parties.42 
Indeed, the term itself was born of the NCAA's swift and alarmed 
reaction to a judicial determination in 1953 that, consistent with our 
thesis, certain college athletes were employees and entitled to statutory 
benefits under state law. 
In 1953, in University of Denver v. Nemeth,43 the Colorado Supreme 
Court upheld a determination by the state Industrial Commission that 
Ernest Nemeth, a football player at the University of Denver, was an 
"employee" within the meaning of the Colorado workers' compensation 
statute.44 Thus, the university was obligated to provide workers' 
compensation for his football injuries.45 Stunned by the Nemeth decision, 
41. This Part of the Article explains how two workers' compensation cases, both holding football 
players to be "employees," motivated the NCAA a half-century ago to undertake their ongoing, 
vigorous public-relations campaign to convince the judiciary and the community at large otherwise. 
We recount these cases only to demonstrate the NCAA's motive in adopting the term "student-
athlete," not as support for our thesis that such athletes are "employees" under the NLRA. Indeed, 
most recent workers' compensation cases hold to the contrary. See, e.g., Rensing v. Ind. State Univ., 
444 N .E.2d 1170, II 75 (Ind. 1983) (holding that college athletes are not employees under state 
workers' compensation laws and, therefore, are not entitled to workers' compensation for 
athletically related injuries); Coleman v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1983) (same). 
42. As such, the use of the term "student-athlete" is classic propaganda, defined as "doctrines, 
ideas, arguments, facts, or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of 
communication in order to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause." WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1817 (3d ed. 1986). 
For a thorough chronicle of the genesis of the term "student-athlete," see BYERS, supra note 6, at 
69-76; MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 
445-57 (1998); Sperber, supra note 37, at A76. 
43. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953). 
44. See id. at 429-30. 
45. Also apropos to our thesis here, more than a half-century ago the Colorado Supreme Court 
noted that 
[h)igher education in this day is a business, and a big one. The University of Denver with its 
ten thousand students has, as the record discloses, hundreds of jobs for students and non-
students. A student employed by the University to discharge certain duties, not a part of his 
education program, is no different than the employee who is taking no course of instruction so 
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the NCAA responded by commg the term "student-athlete" and 
requiring its exclusive use thereafter.46 By emphasizing the identity of 
athletes as "students," the NCAA endeavored to diminish any tendency 
to characterize them as "employees."47 As then-NCAA Executive 
Director Walter Byers later wrote: 
[The] threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes 
could be identified as employees by state industrial commissions 
and the courts. 
[To address that threat, w ]e crafted the term student-athlete, 
and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations 
as a mandated substitute for such words as players and athletes. 
We told college publicists to speak of "college teams," not 
football or basketball "clubs," a word common to the pros.48 
The NCAA adopted and mandated the term "student-athlete" purposely 
to buttress the notion that such individuals should be considered students 
rather than employees. 
At the same time, however, universities were widely endorsing full 
athletic grants-in-aid to recruit the best athletes, formally sanctioning 
such grants in 1956.49 Allowing full scholarships as compensation for 
athletic services, however, could reveal the employer-employee-like 
nature of the university-athlete relationship at a time when doing so 
would more likely expose these universities to liability for workers' 
compensation. 5° Given this trend, it became even more important for the 
NCAA to obscure the actual nature of the relationship, and thereafter it 
far as the Workmen's Compensation Act is concerned. 
ld. at 425-26. 
46. BYERS, supra note 6, at 69-76, 371-72; SPERBER, supra note 42, at 445--46. 
47. See Tom Farrey, Pay-for-Play: Not Yet, But Soon?, ESPN.COM, Mar. 28, 2003, 
http://espn.go.com/ncb/ncaatourney01/s/2001/0326/1162258.html (quoting Professor Andrew 
Zimbalist's assertion that if athletes were treated as employees, athletic department costs would 
increase by some $2 million annually for such items as extra insurance, taxes, and workers' 
compensation); accord Allen L. Sack & Ellen J. Staurowsky, A Rejoinder to Timothy Davis, 
Intercollegiate Athletics in the Next Millennium: A Framework for Evaluating Proposals, 9 Marq. 
Sports L.J. 253, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 117, 117-18 (1999) (suggesting that the historical record 
demonstrates that the NCAA fashioned and maintained the illusion of amateurism to avoid taxation, 
antitrust scrutiny, workers' compensation laws, and player demands for a share in revenues). 
48. BYERS, supra note 6, at 69 (emphasis in original); see Farrey, supra note 47. 
49. See BYERS, supra note 6, at I 0, 72. 
50. See id. at 69 ("It was [when more and more colleges offered full athletic grants-in-
aid] ... that they came face to face with a serious, external threat that prompted most of the colleges 
to unite and insist with one voice that, grant-in-aid or not, college sports still were only for 
'amateurs.'"). 
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embarked on its long, fervent public relations campaign to persuade the 
public that these athletes are students, not employees. 51 
In 1963, a California workers' compensation case again heightened 
NCAA concerns that courts might view athletes as employees. 52 Edward 
Gary Van Horn, an athletic grant-in-aid football player at California 
State Polytechnic College, was killed in a 1960 plane crash while 
returning home with his team from a game. The California Industrial 
Accident Commission subsequently ruled that Van Horn had not been an 
employee of the college, and so his widow and minor dependent children 
were ineligible for death benefits under the state's workers' 
compensation law.53 In Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission,54 
however, the California Court of Appeals reversed, stating that "[t]he 
only inference to be drawn from the evidence is that decedent received 
the 'scholarship' because of his athletic prowess and participation. The 
form of remuneration is immaterial."55 The case established that a 
college football player could have a contract of employment with a 
university in which a scholarship served as compensation for athletic 
services. 56 
Coincidentally, this case emerged during a period when NCAA 
universities were moving away from four-year guaranteed athletic 
scholarships and towards one-year scholarships, renewable at the 
coach's option.57 And, given the likely inference that such one-year, 
renewable scholarships constituted pay for services, the NCAA member 
institutions were "deeply concerned" about the Van Horn case. 58 Instead 
of eliminating athletic scholarships altogether or requiring full, four-year 
scholarships, however, the NCAA responded by encouraging its 
members to use the following language in their athletic grant-in-aid 
forms: 
"This award is made in accordance with the provisions of the 
51. See Farrey, supra note 47. 
52. See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) 
(finding a contract of employment between a football player and a state college). 
53. See id. at 172. 
54. 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963). 
55. /d. at 174. 
56. See id. at 172-74. 
57. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 75. The initial grant-in-aid commonly guaranteed the athlete four 
full years of scholarship, regardless of whether he was successful as a player or even whether he 
remained with the team. See infra Part III.A.2. 
58. BYERS, supra note 6, at 75. 
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Constitution of the [NCAA] pertaining to the principles of 
amateurism, sound academic standards, and financial aid to 
student athletes .... Your acceptance of the award means that 
you agree with these principles and are bound by them."59 
Setting aside the irony that athletes would receive compensation only by 
renouncing the commercial, pecuniary nature of their relationship with 
their universities, this insistence on characterizing athletes as amateurs 
was again used to mask the reality of the NCAA members' activities-
employing players to provide athletic services in exchange for 
compensation. 
The NCAA purposely created the term "student-athlete" as 
propaganda, solely to obscure the reality of the university-athlete 
employment relationship and to avoid universities' legal responsibilities 
as employers.60 In the ensuing fifty years, the NCAA, colleges, and 
universities have profited immensely from the vigorous defense and 
preservation of this myth. 
II. A COMMON LAW AND A STATUTORY TEST ESTABLISH 
THE "EMPLOYEE" STATUS OF STUDENTS 
Our thesis is that Division I athletic grant-in-aid students in revenue-
generating sports are employees under both the NLRA-the 
foundational labor relations statute in the United States-and under 
numerous applicable state laws. The characterization of an individual as 
an employee under the law, as distinct from some other status, is 
essential in drawing necessary delineations throughout American 
industry. Such a characterization confers many rights upon that person 
59. Id. (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Robert L. Ray, NCAA 
President, and Everett D. Barnes, NCAA Secretary-Treasurer, to NCAA membership (Dec. 21, 
1964)). 
60. See id.; see also Te\ander, supra note 39, at 107 (noting generally the NCAA's role "as a 
public relations outlet"); Farrey, supra note 47; cf Telander, supra note 39, at 94 (noting the 
"absurdity of the 'student-athlete' notion" and that amateurism is "the rottenest block in the 
foundation of big-time college football"). Former University of Alabama head football coach Paul 
"Bear" Bryant laid bare the "student-athlete" myth: 
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship were "student-athletes," 
which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning a student first, an athlete second. We were 
kidding ourselves, trying to make it more palatable to the academicians. We don't have to say 
that and we shouldn't. At the level we play, the boy is really an athlete first and a student 
second. 
DONALD CHU, THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 
190 (1989). 
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under federal and state law.61 And because the question of whether an 
individual is an employee has been elemental in the development of 
American labor law,62 ample guideposts have evolved by which to assess 
whether the scholarship athletes in revenue-generating NCAA programs 
are employees. 
For seventy years the NLRA has served as the cornerstone of U.S. 
labor policy. It provides the best template for distinguishing between 
labor and capital and for determining the circumstances under which a 
person should be characterized as an employee. The Act's purpose is to 
regulate the inherent conflict between capital and labor in America.63 For 
this reason, drawing appropriate lines between those two adversaries was 
an early and essential task under the statute. 64 
Given the primacy of the NLRA in defining the employment relation 
under federal law,65 any analysis of the status of college athletes as 
61. See supra note 34 for a description of some employee rights under federal law. Under 
numerous state laws, employee status confers similar rights. For example, Michigan's Elliott-Larsen 
Civil Rights Act protects employees in Michigan from discrimination on the basis of "religion, race, 
color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, familial status, or marital status." MICH. COMP. 
LAWS§ 37.2102 (2001); see generally id. §§ 37.2101-.2804. 
62. See infra Part II. A (discussing the development of the common law test for "employee" in the 
context of differentiating employees from independent contractors). 
63. See generally 29 U.S.C. § !51 (2000) (providing findings and policies in the preamble to the 
NLRA). 
64. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. F!NKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: 
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 37-38 (2d ed. 2004) (describing courts' early efforts 
to distinguish between employees under the Act and other persons). Compare Field Packing Co., 48 
N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (demonstrating the Board's early adoption of the common law test for 
employee), with NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 128-29 (1944) (illustrating the 
Supreme Court's acceptance of additional considerations, including the economic realities of the 
employer-employee relationship). 
65. For example, "Section 7 rights to form and join labor organizations and to engage in 
collective bargaining and concerted activities are given to statutorily defined 'employees.'" 
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 32. The meaning of the term "employee" has also recently 
arisen under another federal employment statute, the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621~34. In EEOC v. 
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.Jd 696 (7th Cir. 2002), the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that partners at a law firm could be "employees," rather than 
employers, within the meaning of the ADEA. If a partner's role in running the firm were minimal 
and if a small coterie of managing partners exercised an overwhelming degree of control over him, 
he could potentially be deemed an "employee" under the AD EA. See id. at 707. 
The U.S. Supreme Court faced a similar problem when it considered the meaning of"employee" 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318,323-25 (1992). There, the Court wrote: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished .... " Since the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or 
magic phrase that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship 
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employees requires an examination of that legislation's view of the term 
"employee." While the NLRA governs only private enterprises and thus 
would not apply directly to public universities, it remains the starting, 
and usually ending, point for this inquiry. This is because the various 
state statutes governing the employment relationship among public 
employers and employees66 are modeled after the NLRA and usually 
draw their meanings from the interpretations given the NLRA by the 
NLRB67 and the federal courts. 68 Therefore, an analysis of the NLRA 
must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." 
!d. at 323-24 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) and NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 
258 (1968)). 
66. Some thirty-two states have public employment relations statutes which grant employees 
rights to organize and bargain collectively and which could be applied to employee-athletes. See, 
e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3512-3524 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005) (State Employer-Employee 
Relations); id. §§ 3560--3596 (West 1995 & Supp. 2005) (Higher Education Employer-Employee 
Relations); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1-315/27 (West 2005) (Illinois Public Labor Relations 
Act); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 423.201-.217 (West 2001) (Public Employment Relations Act); 
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW §§ 200--214 (Consol. 1999 & Supp. 2005) (Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 4117.01-.24 (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2005) (Public 
Employees' Collective Bargaining); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1101.101-.2301 (West 1999 & Supp. 
2005) (Public Employe [sic] Relations); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 41.56.010--.950 (2004 & Supp. 
2005) (Public Employees' Collective Bargaining); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.80--.97 (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2004) (State Employees' Bargaining Rights). 
67. Congress created the NLRB in 1935 to prevent the commission of unfair labor practices, 29 
U.S.C. § 160(a), and to resolve questions concerning the representation of employees, see id. § 159. 
See also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 9. 
68. See DONALD H. WOLLETT ET AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 25 (4th 
ed. 1993) ("Nearly all state public employee labor relations statutes contain declarations of 
organizational rights, and prohibitions against interference and discrimination, though there is some 
variation in language. The similarity in language between these public sector statutory provisions 
and ... the National Labor Relations Act has led to extensive reliance upon federal precedents."); 
Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1680 (1984) ("Many 
statutes draw heavily on the NLRA in their definitions .... "). "Virtually all of the public sector 
collective bargaining statutes set forth the rights of public employees. This statutory statement 
frequently parallels the statement of the rights of employees in §7 of the National Labor Relations 
Act, as amended." HARRY T. EDWARDS ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 139 (4th ed. 1991); see also Goolsby v. City of Detroit, 358 N.W.2d 856, 
861 n.5 (Mich. 1984) (basing construction of state labor statutes on NLRB and federal court 
interpretations of analogous NLRA provisions). Other state courts also commonly look to federal 
interpretations of the NLRA in construing their state public employment relations statutes. See, e.g., 
United Faculty of Fla. v. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 898 So. 2d 96, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2005) (quoting Pasco County Sch. Bd. v. Fla. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So. 2d 
108, 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)); State Employment Relations Bd. v. Miami Univ., 643 N.E.2d 
1113, 1116 (Ohio 1994); Portland Ass'n ofTeachers v. Multnomah Sch. Dist. No. I, 16 P.3d 1189, 
1200 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Phila. Hous. Auth. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 620 A.2d 594, 598 n.9 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). 
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sheds light not only upon the employee status of athletes at private 
universities,69 but also upon their status at public institutions as we11.70 
Parts II.A and II.B of this Article identify the two tests for "employee" 
that must be met under the NLRA, a common law test and a special 
statutory test for university students seeking coverage under the Act. 
A. The Standard for "Employee" Under the NLRA Is Based upon Its 
Common Law Meaning 
In the NLRA, Congress identified labor as a discrete category, 
separate and distinct from its partner and adversary, capital.71 The Act 
conferred federal rights upon labor, which it described as "employees" 
and granted only to employees "the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection."72 Because the NLRA gave organizing and collective 
bargaining rights only to employees, the question of whether a particular 
person was or was not an employee was plainly of central importance in 
administering the statute. 
Unhelpfully, the Act defines both "employer"73 and "employee"74 by 
69. These universities include: Boston College; Brigham Young; Duke; Georgetown; Miami 
(Florida); Northwestern; Notre Dame; Rice; Southern California; Stanford; Syracuse; Tulane; 
Vanderbilt; Villanova; Wake Forest; and others. As regards these private universities, of course, our 
analysis would apply directly. 
70. In fact, state laws governing public employment often broaden the coverages and protections 
of the federal law, expanding the range of individuals considered to be "employees." For example, 
unlike under the NLRA, supervisors employed by public institutions have organizing and collective 
bargaining rights under Michigan's Public Employee Relations Act (PERA). See MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 423.201(1)(e) (West 2001) (defining "(p]ublic employee" broadly to include 
supervisors). More to the point, the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC), the 
agency that administers PERA, and Michigan courts interpret PERA to permit graduate students at 
public universities to organize and bargain collectively. See Macomb Cmty. Coli., 1988 M.E.R.C. 
Lab. Op. 741, 743-44. In Macomb Community College, MERC adhered to the Michigan Supreme 
Court's opinion in Regents of University of Michigan v. Michigan Employment Relations 
Commission, 204 N.W.2d 218,226 (Mich. 1973). 
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)--(3); Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 
1588744, at *8 (July 13, 2004) (describing how the Act was premised on the view of a fundamental 
conflict between employers and employees). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 151 (citing the inequality of 
bargaining power between employees and employers and the denial by some employers of the right 
of employees to organize as sources of depressed wage rates and industrial strife). 
72. 29 u.s.c. § 157. 
73. "The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or 
indirectly ... . "!d. § 152(2). 
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reference only to the very terms being defined, distinguishing employer 
only from employee and vice versa. Because the statutory language itself 
fails to distinguish the salient characteristics of either employer or 
employee from other classes of entities or persons, the judiciary and the 
NLRB have been guided primarily by common law principles in 
determining the meaning of the term "employee."75 
The debate over the meaning of "employee" first crystallized in the 
form of the question as to whether certain persons were employees, and, 
therefore, imbued with organizing rights under the law, or independent 
contractors, and, therefore, without such rights. 76 While the original Act 
did not expressly exclude independent contractors, the Board 
nevertheless commonly found such persons were not "employees."77 To 
distinguish between the two categories, the Board adopted the common 
law approach for defining employee, the so-called "right of control" 
test.78 Under this standard, the most important factor distinguishing 
employees from independent contractors was the degree of control the 
alleged employer maintained over the working life of the alleged 
employee.79 Thus, the Board found an employer-employee relationship 
where the employer's control or right of control included "both the end 
74. "The term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees 
of a particular employer, . . . but shall not include any individual ... having the status of an 
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor .... " /d. § 152(3). 
75. E.g., Klement Timber Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 681, 683 (1944); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, 
at 38. 
76. While no argument exists that athletes are independent contractors, the reasoning of the 
NLRB and the courts in distinguishing independent contractors from employees gives residual 
meaning to the term "employee." Many precedents addressing the meaning of"employee" under the 
NLRA focus on distinguishing employees from others who are also paid for their work, but are not 
covered by the Act, such as independent contractors. See GoRMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 37-
40. This Article examines that distinction to identify the residual meaning of "employee" and then 
assesses the applicability of that meaning to athletes who are paid for their work in a non-traditional 
manner, that is, through scholarships. As such, two sets of precedents inform our analysis: those that 
distinguish employees from groups such as independent contractors, see Part II. A (discussing the 
common law test), and others that determine whether an individual paid in a non-traditional manner, 
such as a trainee, a student, or an apprentice is properly characterized as an "employee," see infra 
Part II.B (discussing the statutory test). 
77. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38. 
78. See Field Packing Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 850, 852-53 (1943) (holding that truck drivers were 
employees and, therefore, not independent contractors because the employer had not fully divested 
itself of the right to control drivers' work); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38. 
79. See Klement Timber, 59 N.L.R.B. at 683; Butler Bros., 41 N.L.R.B. 843, 855 (1942); Seattle 
Post-lntelligencer Dep't of Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1275 (1938); 2 THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAw 2131 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 200 I). 
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result and the manner of achieving it. "80 
In its 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act, Congress expressly 
excluded independent contractors from the definition of employee81 and 
emphatically endorsed the common law right of control test as the 
proper measure of statutory coverage. 82 This right of control test 
examines the degree to which the employer controls the daily lives of its 
putative employees, including the manner in which they carry out their 
work. 83 The Board and the courts have since repeatedly referred to the 
right of control as the basic measure for determining whether individuals 
are "employees" under the Act. 84 As the NLRB has underscored, 
"[u]nder the common law, an employee is a person who performs 
services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other's 
control or right of control, and in return for payment."85 
Over time, the Board's reasoning has occasionally been influenced by 
80. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38; see Nat'\ Freight, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 
( \964 ). The right of control test was derived from the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, 
which determines whether a master might be liable for the torts of his servant. See Carnation Co., 
172 N.L.R.B. 1882, 1888 (1968); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38. Under this measure, a 
person who performs a particular task by his own methods, not subject to the control of the alleged 
employer, is an independent contractor, while a person who is subject to the control of the 
employer, not only as to the ends to be accomplished, but also as to the methods and means of 
performing the work, is an employee. See id. 
81. "The term 'employee' ... shall not include any individual ... having the status of an 
independent contractor .... " 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). 
82. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 38-39. 
83. See, e.g., NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983,986 (7th Cir. 1948) (stating that 
"the employer-employee relationship exists when the person for whom the work is done has the 
right to control and direct the work, not only as to the result accomplished by the work, but also as 
to the details and means by which that result is accomplished"); Teamsters Nat'l Auto. Transp. 
Indus. Negotiating Comm., 335 N.L.R.B. 830, 832 (2001) ("[T]he contracting employer must have 
the power to give the employees the work in question-the so-called 'right of control' test.") 
(footnote omitted); Loca\636, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe 
Fitting Indus., 177 N.L.R.B. 189, 190 (1969) (describing the "right to control" test as "the most 
readily available analytical tool"); United Ins. Co. of Am., 162 N.L.R.B. 439,455-56 (1966) ("[A]n 
employer-employee relationship has been found where the person for whom the work is to be 
done ... retains control over, or the right to control, the significant portions of the details and means 
by which the desired result is to be accomplished."). In an analogous case testing the reach of the 
term "employee" under the ADEA, Judge Richard Posner wrote that "the most important factor in 
deciding whether a worker was an employee ... was the employer's right to control the worker's 
work." EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 3\5 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Ost v. W. 
Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc., 88 F .3d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
84. See cases cited supra note 83. 
85. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *II n.27 (July 
13, 2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 516 U.S. 85,94 (1995)); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 2(2) (1958). 
91 
HeinOnline -- 81 Wash. L. Rev. 92 2006
Washington Law Review Vol. 81:71,2006 
consideration of the "economic realities" of the relationship, that is, the 
degree to which putative employees are economically dependent upon 
an employer.86 Thus, since Taft-Hartley, the Board and courts have 
sometimes used a blended approach, measuring the degree of control an 
alleged employer may exercise over an alleged employee alongside a 
consideration of the alleged employee's economic dependence upon the 
employer.87 While the right-of-control standard remains the primary 
measure for differentiating employees from non-employees,88 we will 
demonstrate that under either approach-the right of control standard or 
one also influenced by economic realities-athletic grant-in-aid students 
are employees under the NLRA. 
B. In Brown University the NLRB Reestablished a Statutory Test for 
Students Seeking Status as Employees 
Because university students who receive academic scholarships and 
perform services as teaching or research assistants appear to satisfy the 
common law test for "employee," the question has arisen whether they 
are such under the NLRA. To analyze this question, the Board has 
developed an additional statutory test for this setting.89 Under this test, 
86. See A. Paladini, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 952, 952 (1967) (applying right-of-control test "in light of 
the economic realities"); ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 30 (1976). 
87. See. e.g., Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 130, slip op. at 10-11,2004 
WL 2203013, at *17-20 (Sept. 28, 2004) (finding that cab drivers were not employees due to their 
high degree of independence from the fleet owners); Comedy Store, 265 N.L.R.B. 1422, 1441-42 
(1982) (considering the "economic realities" of comedic performers' relationships with a comedy 
club and stating that the economic realities of the relationship, alone, cannot be dispositive of the 
question of employee status); Drukker Commc'ns, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 734, 744 (1981) (noting that 
the right-of-control "test is not mechanically applied, and is applied in the light of the economic 
realities of the situation"). A recent example of the use of the blended approach has arisen in EEOC 
v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002). At issue in that case was whether law 
firm partners were "employees" and, therefore, protected under the ADEA. See id. at 705, 706--07 
(citing Ost, 88 F.3d at 438, for the proposition that right-of-control is the most important factor in 
assessing employee status under the ADEA but also acknowledging the existence of the economic-
realities test and enforcing an EEOC subpoena seeking related economic information about the 
concentration and distribution of profits among law firm partners). 
88. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 64, at 40 (implying that the touchstone for NLRA 
coverage is the right of control, not economic dependence). 
89. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7 (July 13, 
2004) (stating that "attempting to force the student-university relationship into the traditional 
employer-employee framework" is problematic and that "principles developed for use in the 
industrial setting cannot be 'imposed blindly on the academic world"') (quoting NLRB v. Yeshiva 
Univ., 444 U.S. 672,680-81 (1980)). 
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students are deemed employees only if they satisfy both the common 
law right of control test and the Board's additional statutory test.90 
For many years, graduate assistants at American colleges and 
universities have sought to organize and bargain collectively, arguing 
that they are "employees" under the Act. And, just as the NCAA seeks 
to characterize grant-in-aid athletes as something other than 
employees,91 so, too, universities have sought to classify graduate 
assistants as something other than employees. During this period, a body 
of analogous doctrine, culminating in Brown, has addressed whether 
students who receive compensation from universities for services while 
also enrolled as students are employees under the NLRA. 
In its 1974 Leland Stanford Junior University92 decision, the Board 
directly addressed whether graduate research assistants were 
"employees" within the meaning of§ 2(3) of the Act and held they were 
"primarily students" and, therefore, not employees.93 In support of this 
conclusion, the Board looked to four criteria: the persons in question 
were graduate students enrolled in the Stanford physics department as 
Ph.D. candidates; they were required to perform research to obtain their 
degree; they received academic credit for their research work; and their 
stipend from the university was not dependent upon the nature or value 
of the services they performed.94 
During this same period, the Board analyzed student-like 
relationships in the health-care industry and reached decisions parallel to 
that in Stanford. In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center95 and St. Clare's 
Hospital,96 the Board considered whether medical students who were 
interns, residents, and clinical fellows, collectively known as house staff, 
were employees under the Act.97 Drawing on Stanford,98 the St. Clare's 
Hospital Board found that medical interns who "perform services at their 
educational institutions which are directly related to their educational 
90. See Brown, slip op. at 9, 2004 WL 1588744, at *12 (stating that the statutory test is required 
and that "[t]he issue is not to be decided purely on the basis of older common-law concepts"). 
91. See supra Part I (describing the origin of the term "student-athlete"). 
92. 214 N .L.R.B. 621 ( 1974). 
93. See id. at 621,623. 
94. See id. at 621-22. 
95. 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976). 
96. 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977). 
97. !d. at 1002; Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253. 
98. St. Clare's, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002 nn.l9-20. 
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program,"99 are "serving primarily as students and not primarily as 
employees"100 within the meaning of the Act. As an equally compelling 
factor, the Board found that "the mutual interests of the students and the 
educational institution in the services being rendered are predominantly 
academic rather than economic in nature."101 
By the late 1990s, however, the Board's view of graduate assistants 
and house staff had changed dramatically. In its 1999 decision in Boston 
Medical Center, 102 the Board overruled Cedars-Sinai and St. Clare's and 
found house staff to fall within the meaning of the term employee, 
notwithstanding their simultaneous status as students. 103 
The following year, the Board followed suit in New York University 
(NYU), 104 finding non-medical graduate students to be employees and, 
therefore, within the Act's reach. 105 Like the hospital in Boston Medical, 
the university contended that as "students," these persons were not 
"employees" and, therefore, were outside the reach and protections of 
the Act. 106 The Board flatly disagreed with the university's contention 
and, consistent with its ruling in Boston Medical, held graduate 
assistants to be employees under the Act. 107 In NYU, the Board wrote 
that the term "employee" "reflects the common law agency doctrine of 
the conventional master-servant relationship,"108 and that "[t]his 
relationship exists when a servant performs services for another, under 
the other's control or right of control, and in return for payment."109 
Noting "graduate assistants perform services under the control and 
direction of the Employer"110 and "are compensated for these services by 
the Employer,"111 the Board found their relationship with the employer 
99. ld. at 1002. 
100. ld. 
101. ld. 
102. 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999). 
103. See id. at 159, 161. 
104. 332 N.L.R.B. 1205 (2000). 
105. See id. at 1205. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. ld. (citing NLRB v. Town & Country E1ec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85,93-95 (1995)). 
109. ld. at 1206 (citing Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 90-91, 93-95); see Seattle Opera Ass'n, 
331 N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (2000) (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1999)); Boston 
Med. Ctr., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 160 (1999). 
110. NYU, 332 N.L.R.B. at 1206. 
111. ld. 
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"indistinguishable from a traditional master-servant relationship,"112 and, 
therefore, they were employees under the Act. 113 
The status of graduate assistants at universities as "employees" under 
NYU, however, was short-lived. In July 2004, the Board issued its most 
recent decision on the matter in Brown, explicitly overruling NYU. 114 In 
Brown, as in NYU, the issue was whether teaching assistants, research 
assistants, and proctors were "employees" under the NLRA. 115 In 
concluding that they were not, the Board analyzed facts fitting into four 
specific categories: 
Thus, in light of [(1 )] the status of graduate student assistants 
as students, [(2)] the role of graduate student assistantships in 
graduate education, [(3)] the graduate student assistants' 
relationship with the faculty, and [(4)] the financial support they 
receive to attend Brown, we conclude that the overall 
relationship between the graduate student assistants and Brown 
is primarily an educational one, rather than an economic one. 116 
The Brown Board thus returned to Stanford, which had held graduate 
research assistants were not statutory employees because they 
"perform[ed] services at a university in connection with their studies, 
[and had] ... a predominantly academic, rather than economic, 
relationship with their school."117 The Board in Brown grounded its 
decision on precisely that same footing, that "graduate student 
assistants ... are primarily students and have a primarily educational, 
not economic, relationship with their university."118 
Brown is thus grounded on two core principles: students who work 
for their universities are not employees, first, if their work is primarily 
educational and, second, if their relationship with the university is not an 
economic one. When these two conditions characterize the student-
university relationship, that is, when the students' efforts are 
predominantly academic and not economic, then those individuals are 
not employees within the meaning of the Act. Conversely, when a 
student who works for his university performs services that are not 
112. !d. 
113. Seeid. 
114. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at I, 2004 WL 1588744, at *I (July 13, 
2004). 
115. See id. 
116. !d., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10. 
117. !d., slip op. at I, 2004 WL 1588744, at *I (describing Stanford). 
118. !d., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7. 
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primarily educational or academic and his relationship to the university 
with respect to those services is an economic one, then the student may 
be an employee under the Act, provided that he also meets the common 
law test for that term. 119 
III. UNDER THE NLRA'S LEGAL STANDARDS, CERTAIN 
UNIVERSITY ATHLETES ARE EMPLOYEES 
While primarily serving the purpose of higher education, American 
colleges and universities also act as employers with respect to hundreds 
of thousands of faculty and staff, including many students who are 
enrolled in classes and simultaneously perform certain services for their 
universities. 120 Indeed, at many state universities, even graduate 
assistants who teach and perform services as part of their academic 
programs are recognized as employees under the laws in those states. 121 
There being no dispute that universities are employers, the only question 
is whether the relationship between the universities and their athletic 
grant-in-aid students is an employment relation in which the athletes are 
employees. 
119. Significantly, the Brown Board did not overrule NYU's use of the common law test for 
"employee" as applicable under the NLRA. See id., slip op. at I, 2004 WL 1588744, at *I 
(returning to pre-NYU precedent that included the common law test); id., slip op. at 9, 2004 WL 
1588744, at *12 (declining to abandon the common law test by indicating that common law 
concepts could be considered in part); id., slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at* II n.27 (finding 
that the common law test is still relevant, and noting Member Peter Schaumber's separate analysis 
that graduate student assistants fail to be employees under that common law test). Because the 
Brown majority found that graduate assistants were not employees by virtue of failing the NLRA's 
statutory definition of employee, and not because they failed the common law test, see id., slip op. 
at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *II n.27 (noting that Member Schaumber believed graduate 
assistants had failed the common law test and declining to state that any other member of the Board 
was in agreement with him), Brown does not eliminate that common Jaw standard. 
The applicability of the common Jaw test to employee-athletes is addressed in Part II I.A. 
120. For example, students who work for an hourly wage in the library, the bookstore, and 
administrative offices, would unquestionably be considered employees of their universities. 
121. See Brown, slip op. at 17 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *25 n.27 (Liebman & Walsh, 
dissenting). Graduate assistants at public universities in the following states have organized under 
state Jaws granting bargaining rights: California; Florida; Iowa; Kansas; Massachusetts; Michigan; 
New Jersey; New York; Oregon; Pennsylvania; and Wisconsin. See Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J. 
Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization: Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 
187, 192-93 tbl. I (2002) ("The Status of Graduate Student Unions in U.S. Institutions"). 
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A. Certain College Athletes Meet the Common Law Standard for 
"Employee " 
Grant-in-aid athletes in revenue-generating sports at NCAA Division 
I institutions are employees under the common law. They perform 
services for the benefit of their universities under an agreement setting 
forth their responsibilities and compensation, are economically 
dependent upon their universities, and are subject virtually every day of 
the year to pervasive control by the athletic department and coaches. Put 
somewhat differently, employee-athletes perform services for their 
universities under a contract of hire which subjects them to the 
universities' control and in return for payment. Thus, employee-athletes 
meet the common law definition of employee. Having described the 
common law standard by which to assess our thesis, we next examine 
the actual degree of control exercised by university-employers over 
employee-athletes, 122 the compensation paid them, and the economic 
realities ofthe lives of those employee-athletes. 
1. Right of Control: The Daily Lives of Employee-Athletes 
Demonstrate that They Are Controlled by the University 
Employee-athletes are subject to an extraordinary degree of control 
by their universities. Indeed, employee-athletes are subject to more 
control by their universities than is any other employee or group of 
employees at their institutions. 123 Part III.A.l of this Article describes a 
composite view of the daily life of the football and men's basketball 
employee-athlete at different universities and illustrates graphically the 
pervasive and virtually constant control university-employers exercise 
over employee-athletes. We gathered this evidence through interviews 
with four current and former grant-in-aid athletes from three different 
NCAA Division I and Division 1-A universities. 124 All play or played in 
122. It is the reality of the athlete's relationship to his university that governs his legal status as an 
employee or otherwise. In language beautifully apropos to our thesis, Judge Posner has written that 
the resolution of the question of whether law firm partners were, in fact, employees turned on the 
actual circumstances of the relationship and not upon "the tyranny of labels." EEOC v. Sidley 
Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002). So, here, whether athletes are properly 
deemed employees depends not upon their label as "student-athletes," but rather upon the reality of 
their lives, especially the degree of control exercised over them. 
123. What other university employee is subject to such control by his supervisor that he must lift 
weights at 5:30 a.m., run in the summer sun, and seek permission to leave campus during 
summertime off hours, or risk termination? See Part III.A.l-2. 
124. We conducted lengthy interviews with these athletes. All information regarding athletes' 
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revenue-generating sports, that is, football and men's basketball, at their 
institutions. Given the vital economic importance of a full grant-in-aid to 
the players, the precariousness of that financial aid, 125 the importance of 
the player-coach relationship to the continuance of that aid as well as to 
the players' development, and, hence, to their financial potential, we 
offered all interviewees anonymity. All accepted it. 
a. Football Players' Daily Lives Illustrate the Great Control 
Universities Exercise over Those Players 
The actual life of the athlete contrasts dramatically with the image 
portrayed in the NCAA's rules and media messages. Drawing upon data 
from personal interviews, this Section chronicles the daily existence of 
Division 1-A football players throughout the football season, the 
remaining academic year, and the summer. The extent to which coaches 
exercise control over players supports the conclusion that these athletes 
are employees under the NLRA's common law test. 
(1) Coaches Exercise Inordinate Control over the Football 
Athlete During the Season 
The regular football season begins on the Thursday preceding Labor 
Day and ends on the second Saturday or Sunday in December, lasting 
experiences in Part lll.A.l arises from these interviews. Interviews were conducted by Robert A. 
McCormick and Amy Christian McCormick with four anonymous athletes on September 7, 2003 
(football player), September 25, 2003 (former basketball player), October 15, 2003 (former football 
player), and November 10, 2003 (former basketball player). Through these interviews, we provide 
qualitative data regarding the daily lives of employee-athletes to illustrate university control and do 
not here purport to provide a quantitative analysis. 
Finding athletes to interview was challenging because, as we discovered, many fear reprisals 
from their coaches. We scheduled interviews with other athletes as well, but those arrangements 
were unilaterally cancelled by the players and were not rescheduled. Cf BYERS, supra note 6, at 14 
(describing athletes' similar reluctance to talk to NCAA investigators about activities taking place at 
their colleges because of intimidation by coaches). Athletes are commonly instructed not to give 
interviews to members of the media, and that interviews may be approved only by the university's 
sports-information department. See Ted Gup, Losses Surpass Victories, by Far, in Big-Time College 
Sports, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Dec. 18, 1998, at A52. With regard to whether the experiences of 
these four athletes are representative of life for all Division I football and men's basketball players, 
published information confirms much of what the interviews revealed and is noted where 
applicable. Moreover, the information provided by each athlete was independently corroborated by 
the descriptions of the others. That is, although minor details varied, the stories were uniform and 
consistent. 
125. See irifra notes 183-88, 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing the conditions under 
which athletes can lose their scholarships). 
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more than fourteen weeks, but as many as nineteen weeks if the team 
plays in a January bowl game. 126 During this period, a conservative 
estimate of a player's time commitment to football during the week of a 
home game is approximately fifty-three hours. 127 Daily afternoon 
126. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 17 .11.3-.4. 
127. This computation assumes that players report to the training facility at I :00 p.m. from 
Monday through Friday where they practice until 5:30 p.m.; that they lift weights twice a week for 
ninety minutes; that mandatory training table dinners last an hour each evening, Monday through 
Thursday; that on Friday before the game, they stay together from 5:30 p.m. until bedtime at 
approximately 10:00 p.m.; that on game day they are controlled from 8:00a.m. until approximately 
7:00p.m. when the game ends; and that on Sunday, their time is directed from 10:00 a.m. until2:00 
p.m. and again from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. A player who is "red-shirted," however, must lift 
weights at least three times each week, not twice. Under "red-shirting" rules, a player practices with 
and is retained on the team, but does not play. By this device, the university may extend players' 
servitude with an apprenticeship because, under NCAA rules, a red-shirt year does not count 
towards the player's four years of playing eligibility. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.2.1 
(explaining the five-year rule). By the end of a Saturday football game, when the players may 
finally leave, they will have spent nearly thirty consecutive hours under the direction and control of 
their coaches. 
Evaluating the Pac-1 0 football programs, noted sociologist Professor Harry Edwards found that 
football players spent an average of forty hours per week, year round, meeting all the obligations for 
their athletic scholarships. See RICHARD E. LAPCHICK & JOHN B. SLAUGHTER, THE RULES OF THE 
GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE SPORT 116 (1989) (detailing Professor Edwards' findings); Chin, supra 
note 3, at 1247 n.274; accord Ted Gup, Foul!, TIME, Apr. 3, 1989, at 54, 55 (asserting that athletes 
commonly practice as many as thirty hours per week). The total time commitment amounted to 
approximately eighty hours a week during away-game weeks. See LAPCHICK & SLAUGHTER, supra, 
at 116; Lynch, supra note 24, at 602, 604 (estimating athletic commitments of from forty to sixty 
hours per week). 
The following discussion about players' time commitment was part of a recent 60 Minutes 
episode: 
Stahl: No money, but between the workouts, practices, games and travel, being a big-time 
athlete amounts to a full-time job and more. 
Huma: The NCAA official rulebook reads that a student athlete isn't supposed to put in more 
than 20 hours of mandatory service a week. 
Stahl: If they say it's 20 hours a week, what is it really? 
Huma: Anywhere between 30 and 60 hours. I think it can get that high. 
60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 17 (Lesley Stahl interviewing Ramogi Huma, former UCLA 
linebacker). John Square, a football player at the University of Miami, started his Tuesdays with a 
7:00 a.m. defensive line meeting, after which he lifted weights for an hour, attended classes until a 
2:00p.m. team meeting, practiced from 3:20p.m. until 5:30p.m., gulped down dinner, and went to 
class from 6:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. See Joe Drape, A Full Ride Can Have Its Bumps: Scholarships 
Often Leave Athletes Looking/or More Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2003, at Dl. 
The above description of the daily experience of football players during the season mirrors 
published accounts of off-season life. Dominick Brown, a former Michigan State University and 
Northern Iowa University football player described his typical day: "Every day it's football when 
you get up at 6 in the morning till 9 at night." Geoff Kimmerly, Winston Could See Much Playing 
Time Early in his Career: Coaches Impressed by Recruit's Ability Beyond Linebacker, LANSING Sr. 
J., Feb. 23, 2004, at 6C. Michigan State University football player Brian Davies reported 
"conditioning is at 5:30a.m., throughout the whole winter. After that, we have to go to class, finish 
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practice is one significant component of this time commitment. Arriving 
late for practice is not permitted and may result in sanctions as moderate 
as additional running, weightlifting, or other exercises, to those as severe 
as demotion to a lower string. 128 For repeat offenders, outright dismissal 
from the team and withdrawal of the grant-in-aid can and does result. 
One consequence of daily required practice is that football players are 
foreclosed from taking afternoon classes, although they are 
simultaneously required by NCAA rules and by their universities to 
carry full academic loads. 129 The highly regimented nature of practice 
and training schedules and the excessive number of hours required of 
athletes are important elements showing the extreme control coaches 
exercise over athletes as to both the ends sought and the means of 
achieving them. The athletes are controlled to such a degree that they are 
commonly foreclosed from certain classes and majors. 130 
The fifty-three hours required each week for football, of course, is in 
addition to class time, study time, and ten hours per week of mandatory 
study hall time in academic-support facilities. Thus, although the 
primary job of the players is to win football games, even studying has 
become part of their jobs as universities and the NCAA seek to deflect 
criticism over low graduation rates. 131 And the university-employers 
all of our homework, ... and you might be running on five hours of sleep per night." Adrienne 
Lafrance, Davies Invests in His, Football Program's Future: Senior Defensive Tackle Brian Davies 
Reflects on the Opportunities for Success that Emerge from Change, on the Field and off. at 
Michigan State and Beyond, SPARTANS ONLINE, July 7, 2004, http://msuspartans.collegesports.com/ 
sports/m-footbl/spec-rel/070704aaa.html. Jeremy Bloom described the experience of football 
players at the University of Colorado: 
We football players get up at dawn, do an hour of wind sprints, go to classes, spend two hours 
in the weight room, devote a couple of hours to seven-on-seven drills, study for school, and try 
to have something of a social life. And this is our off-season-the hours only increase after the 
games start. 
Jeremy Bloom, Op-Ed., Show Us the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, at A21. 
128. Interviews reveal that while such disciplinary measures are common, they are not uniformly 
applied. Favored players are regularly given special dispensation. 
129. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 24, at 23A (noting that athletes are advised not to take classes 
that conflict with practice time); AM 870 SportsTalk with Earle Robinson (WKAR public radio 
broadcast Sept. 29, 2003) (university professor calling in and reporting that an athlete requested 
permission to miss half of his scheduled classes and that his coach had suggested he change his 
major because classes conflicted with practice). NCAA rules state: 'To be eligible for competition, 
a student-athlete shall be enrolled in at least a minimum full-time program of studies leading to a 
baccalaureate or equivalent degree as defined by the institution, which shall not be less than 12 
semester or quarter hours." DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.1.8.2. 
130. See infra notes 326-28 and accompanying text. 
131. See infra Part III.B.2.b.(7) (describing progress requirements), Part III.B.2.b.(8) (describing 
the Academic Performance Program). 
100 
HeinOnline -- 81 Wash. L. Rev. 101 2006
Myth ofthe Student-Athlete 
exercise control over the location, duration, and manner in which the 
employee-athletes carry out even these academic commitments. 
The time required of players is even greater during away-game 
weeks. Their schedule depends upon how far away the opposing team is 
located, and thus upon the mode of transportation used for travel. On a 
typical Friday preceding an away game, players must report to the 
stadium by noon where the team assembles and is transported to the 
airport. Upon arrival at the destination, the athletes are transported to a 
hotel where the team checks in, holds team meetings, and eats dinner 
together. On game day, usually Saturday, they are controlled from 8:00 
a.m. until the game ends. After the game, the team travels home 
together, and the following day, Sunday, their time is directed from 
10:00 a.m. until2:00 p.m. and from 4:00p.m. until8:00 p.m. 
NCAA rules require players to take twelve credit hours-a full 
academic load-each term, 132 and some universities require their players 
to take a minimum of fifteen credit hours to bolster flagging graduation 
rates. Players are required to attend class and sometimes even to sit as 
near the front of the classroom as possible. Athletic department student 
tutors police these rules and monitor the athletes to ensure their 
compliance. Thus, virtually every aspect ofthe athletes' lives on campus 
is regulated by their university-employers. 
(2) Coaches' Control over Players' Lives Extends to the Rest of 
the Academic Year as Well 
Even during the off-season, football players are under the regular 
direction and control of their coaches. In early spring, for six weeks prior 
to the NCAA-sanctioned spring training season, 133 football players 
undergo a rigorous conditioning period. Three conditioning workouts are 
required each week, beginning promptly at 5:30a.m. Players often arise 
at 4:30 a.m. to be punctual because, as one player put it, "you can't be 
late." These one- to two-hour workouts often include running, agility 
drills, and vigorous cardiovascular conditioning. Furthermore, on three 
or four additional days per week during this period, players must also 
report for weightlifting for at least sixty to ninety minutes each session. 
In addition, players must attend team meetings for forty-five minutes 
132. See DIV.l MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.1.8.2. 
133. See id. art. 17.11.6(b) (describing sanctioned spring practice period); Interview with 
anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003) (describing early spring practice period); Interview 
with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) (same). 
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each day, Monday through Friday. Freshmen and those having academic 
difficulty continue to have mandatory study hall. During this period, 
when classes are also considered, players' lives are essentially regulated 
from 5:30a.m. to 10:00 p.m., four days per week. 
Once spring practice ensues, the regimented nature of the players' 
schedules continues, but is accompanied by an even more demanding set 
of workouts. Like regular-season practice, spring practice involves 
physically draining and strenuous full-contact drills. In April, the 
grueling nature of practice escalates as the team undergoes fifteen days 
of full-contact practices which culminate in the spring intra-squad game. 
This spring practice period, like the period immediately preceding the 
season, consumes virtually all of the players' waking hours. 
(3) During the Summer Term, Coaches Continue to Control the 
Lives of Football Athletes 
Even in the summer, players are controlled by their university-
employers. They are required to remain on campus during the week, 
Monday through Friday. Indeed, if a player wishes to leave campus 
during the week, he must obtain advance permission from a coach. The 
coach grants permission, it was reported, only if he deems the proffered 
reason for leaving significant. On summer weekends, players who can 
arrange transportation are allowed to leave campus and visit their homes. 
During summer months, players are "strongly encouraged" to be 
present for weightlifting sessions from 6:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. every 
weekday. On four of those days, the players must also run in the 
afternoon for two to two and one-half hours each day. 134 Running takes 
place in the summer heat, humidity, and sun, not in an air-conditioned 
facility. Players are also encouraged to take summer classes, but may not 
do so during the second summer session because those classes conflict 
with official practices, which begin in the first week of August. 
(4) Coaches' Control Intensifies During Summer Pre-Season 
Practice 
Pre-season "camp" opens in early August and begins the annual cycle 
again. 135 During this most intensive training period, players are 
134. "[T]o be a good player, you should spend most of your summer working out, not working [at 
a job]." Telander, supra note 39, at 97. 
135. Under NCAA bylaws, pre-season football practice may begin as early as thirty-five days 
prior to the first scheduled game. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 17.02.11, 17 .11.2.1. 
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effectively "on duty" from 6:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. six days a week. 
They must participate in three arduous full-contact practices every two 
days. The physical regimen during this pre-season period is legendary. 
Designed to harden the players for the rigors of the upcoming season, 
this boot-camp-like experience includes weightlifting, running, 
meetings, and group meals and is universally considered to be 
exhausting and brutal. 
From the commencement of pre-season practice, attendance at all 
practices and other scheduled events is mandatory and recorded. 
Moreover, players are required to sign a statement each week describing 
the number of hours they practiced. These statements, prepared by team 
personnel, are maintained to comply with NCAA rules limiting total 
practice time and often falsely understate the amount of time the players 
actually spend.136 
(5) Other Information Also Demonstrates Universities' Extensive 
Control over Football Players 
In years in which the team does not attend a post-season bowl game, 
demands are placed upon these athletes for approximately 240 days. 137 If 
a team plays a bowl game, this increases to as many as 262 days. 
136. Under NCAA rules, records documenting the amount of time each athlete engages in 
required athletically related activities must be maintained. ld. art. 17.1.5.3.4. Athletes must receive 
one day off per week during the regular playing season. !d. art. 17 .1.5.4. NCAA rules require them 
to spend no more than four hours per day and twenty hours per week engaging in required 
athletically related activities, id. art. 17.1.5.1, but certain meetings and so-called "voluntary" 
workouts, at which coaches may be present, are not counted in these limits. See id. arts. 17.02.1, .13. 
Athletes uniformly commented that so-called "voluntary" workouts are, in reality, required. See 
infra note 325 and accompanying text. 
NCAA hours limitations similarly do not count as days used to travel to an athletic event. DIY. I 
MANUAL, supra note 3, art. I 7.1.5.4. Moreover, the university may treat travel days as a "day oft'' 
provided the athletic contest occurs the day preceding or following the day of travel. !d. art. 
17.1.5.4.1. Therefore, the time an athlete must actually commit to his sport is significantly greater 
than the NCAA limits suggest. 
137. A published account describes the Ohio State University football calendar. The football year 
commences in the second week of January and does not end until December or the following 
January. The training schedule begins in January with eight weeks of weight-lifting, four days a 
week. Spring football practice begins in mid-March and lasts for six weeks. After a week off, 
players continue their conditioning regimen throughout the summer. Athletes' conditioning peaks 
by mid-August when pre-season practice begins. Thereafter, the fourteen-week season begins. 
Welch Suggs, How Gears Tum at a Sports Factory: Running Ohio State's $79-Mi/lion Athletics 
Program Is a Major Endeavor, with Huge Payoffs and Costs, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Nov. 29, 
2002, at A32. According to one football athlete we interviewed, his athletic obligations span 330 
days each year. 
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Notably, this time commitment approximates or exceeds the 250 days an 
average American works each year. 
Coaches place tremendous pressure on the players throughout the 
year, and many transfer or quit before exhausting their eligibility. If a 
player falls into disfavor with the coaching staff, he may be "recruited 
over," that is, replaced by a newer player. 138 Coaches often encourage 
players who have been recruited over to quit the team or to transfer. By 
this, the coach may terminate a player by refusing to renew his 
scholarship, reserving it instead for another player. 139 If a player 
transfers, he loses one of his four years of NCAA eligibility. 140 
Moreover, if a new player transfers without permission from his 
university after having signed a National Letter of Intent, he loses two of 
his four years of eligibility. 141 This regime often induces players who are 
"recruited over" to give up and withdraw from school altogether. 142 In 
138. For a published account of football player Sammy Maldonado being recruited over at Ohio 
State University, see Ryan Hockensmith, Extra Credit, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Nov. 12, 2004, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id= 1919255. See also infra note 142. 
139. See infra Part III.A.2 and sources cited therein. NCAA rules limit the number of 
scholarships available in a given sport. Each scholarship, thus, is a valuable resource to the 
university. The number of scholarships available at any given time for a Division I-A football 
program is eighty-five. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.02.3, 15.02.3.1, 15.5.5.1. 
140. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 14.5.1, 14.5.5.1 (requiring an athlete to complete one full 
academic year of residency at the new institution before becoming eligible to compete); id. art. 
14.2.1; NCAA, 2004--05 TRANSFER GUIDE: DIVISION 1111/IIl 25 (2004) [hereinafter NCAA, 
TRANSFER GUIDE] (indicating that once an athlete begins competing, the five-year clock for using 
four eligibility years does not pause). These two sets of rules function together to cause the 
transferring athlete to lose one of his four years of eligibility completely. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra 
note 3, art. 14.2. 
141. See Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, Text of the National Letter of Intent, paras. 4-5, 
http://www.national-letter.org/guidelines/nli_text.php (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (charging an athlete 
who transfers before completing one year with a year of eligibility at his subsequent institution, 
which is in addition to the year lost under NCAA rules); see also NCAA, TRANSFER GUIDE, supra 
note 140, at 7; Chin, supra note 3, at 1239; Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, Administrative Guidelines & 
Interpretations for the National Letter of Intent, http://www.national-letter.org/docurnents/ 
AdminGuide.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006); Collegiate Comm'rs Ass'n, National Letter of Intent 
Penalty Provisions & Appeals Process, http://www.national-letter.org/documents/ Appeals 
Process. pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006); Collegiate Comm 'rs Ass 'n, Release Request Form, 
http://www.national-letter.org/documents/ReleaseRequest.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
142. One player told the following story. He was recruited from a California junior college to a 
Midwestern university. He started for the team immediately and was very successful, earning 
conference player-of-the-week honors. At the conclusion of the season, the university fired his 
coach. During the following spring practice, it became apparent that his new coach wanted to "weed 
him out." Despite carrying a 3.7 grade point average and never missing a practice, the coach 
ridiculed the player, calling him "lazy," "unmotivated," and unwilling to listen to directions. 
Assistant coaches, he reported, refused to help him, train him, or otherwise coach him. 
Understanding that the head coach wanted him to quit the team to recoup his scholarship, see DIV. I 
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such a system, coaches exert plenary control over athletes. 
Many other rules restrict even the private lives of the athletes. At 
some schools, athletes may not use tobacco products or alcohol at any 
time, nor may they frequent any alcohol-serving establishment. 
Breaching these rules results in discipline. With few exceptions, no other 
university employees in America are controlled by their employers to 
this degree. 143 And while alcohol and illegal drugs are prohibited, the use 
of protein supplements, by contrast, is encouraged. One athlete reported 
that at his school some ninety percent of the players take creatine. 144 
Random drug testing is carried out, but is administered by the coaching 
staff and is loosely executed to make evasion possible. 145 
b. The Daily Lives of Men 's Basketball Players Demonstrate the 
Pervasive Control Universities Exercise over Them 
Like football players, men's basketball players at NCAA Division I 
MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.5.5.1, but not wishing to relinquish it, he continued to practice and to 
comply with team rules. In June, however, he received a letter saying that, by the coach's decision, 
his scholarship would not be renewed. He had been "recruited over," and thereafter was forced to 
pay out-of-state tuition to remain in school. 
143. Faculty members and staff at Brigham Young University, for example, may not drink 
alcoholic beverages at any time or any place. Brigham Young Univ., Church Educational System 
Honor Code, http://campuslife.byu.edu/HONORCODE/honor_code.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2005) 
(making it a "condition of employment" to "[a]bstain from alcohol[] ... [and] tobacco" "at all times 
and ... in all places"). 
144. Creatine is a chemical dietary supplement that some athletes use to promote muscle strength 
and bulk. 
145. See Brent Schrotenboer, Tested ... and then Discarded: Trainer Says Aztecs Dump Some 
Samples Taken for Drug Screens, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 3, 2005, at Cl (describing other 
questionable drug-testing procedures employed at San Diego State University that may permit 
athlete drug use to go undetected; criticizing in-house drug-testing programs as less reliable than 
those of independent labs; noting that the NCAA does not monitor or regulate universities' 
independent drug-testing programs and suggesting those programs may be administered loosely; 
criticizing an NCAA drug-testing program for frequently notifying coaches in advance as to which 
athletes will be tested and implying that coaches may warn athletes; and describing 
acknowledgement among several former players of steroid use on a university football team and 
recounting one's sworn declaration that the coach "encouraged steroid use"); Chad Starkey et a!., 
Athletic Trainers' Attitudes Toward Drug Screening of Intercollegiate Athletes, 29 J. ATHLETIC 
TRAINING 120, 120 (I 994) (confirming that athletic trainers administer the drug-screening process 
for athletes at NCAA institutions); cf Ed Garvey, University Athletics Contain Incentives for Abuse, 
CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Mar. 2, 2004, at 9A (describing a Baylor University coach's refusal to 
allow the results of failed drug tests to be reported); Mark Winitz, Drugs in Sports: An Ethical 
Maze, AM. TRACK & FIELD, Winter 2002, at 38, 41, available at http://www.american-
trackandfield.com/features/winter02_drugs.html (stating that athletes in general often get drugs and 
training supplements from coaches and other support staff). 
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universities live lives much more akin to employees than to students. 
Their lives are highly regimented and subject to detailed control by the 
coaching staff which regulates the manner in which they perform their 
athletic and other duties. Drawing upon information gathered through 
interviews, Part III.A.1.b describes the daily lives of basketball players 
during the season and the remainder of the year. The pervasive control 
coaches exercise over these players supports the conclusion that these 
athletes are employees under the NLRA. 
(1) Coaches Exercise Extensive Control over Men's Basketball 
Players During the Season 
During basketball season, one athlete said, "life revolves around the 
athletic schedule." From mid-October until the end of the season, 
sometime in March, players are required to spend four to five hours per 
day, six days a week, wholly devoted to basketball. In mid-October, 
official practices begin with a "midnight madness" celebration. This 
period, one player said, is "pure misery." Monday through Friday he 
awakens at 6:00 a.m. to report to the gym at 7:00 a.m. for a grueling 
workout of running, weight training, and cardiovascular conditioning, 
including long-distance running and wind sprints. The team eats 
breakfast together at 8:30 a.m. Classes start at 9:00 a.m. and last until 
early afternoon. Like football players, basketball players are not 
permitted to enroll in afternoon classes because teams devote afternoon 
and early evening hours to required practice and related activities. From 
2:30p.m. to 5:00p.m. the team practices and watches film of past games 
or future opponents' games. The team then eats dinner together, after 
which freshmen and players whose academic performance is deemed 
deficient attend mandatory study hall. On Saturdays, as one player said, 
"some kind of meeting or practice" takes place, "especially if we lost the 
previous game." There is no Sunday obligation, although "most of us are 
there on Sunday for [treatment of our] aches and pains."146 
146. This description echoes a published account of a: typical day in the life of Alan Anderson, a 
member of the Michigan State University men's basketball team. See Joe Rexrode, Playing It 
Smart: Proposed NCAA Rule Demands Higher Grades, Better Graduation Rates: A Day in the Life, 
LANSING ST. J., Mar. 14, 2004, at lA. On January 29, 2004 at 3:00 a.m. Anderson and the team 
arrived at the Lansing airport after having played the University of Minnesota the previous evening. 
He returned horne, took a nap, and arose in time to attend his 8:00 a.m. health psychology class until 
9:20 a.m. From I 0:20 a.m. until II :40 a.m. and then again from 12:40 p.m. until 2:00 p.m., he 
attended two family child ecology classes. After class, he rushed to the Breslin Center, the MSU 
basketball arena, where he got taped up for practice. From 3:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m., he practiced, 
lifted weights, and ate dinner with the team. During this period, he was also available for university-
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The game schedule begins in early November with the conference 
season starting a month later. For most away games, the team is bussed 
to and from the game site the day of the game. For an eight-hour trip, the 
team departs at 6:00 a.m. Occasionally, the group spends the night, 
returning the following morning and arriving back at the campus in the 
afternoon. Games, both at home and away, are often played during the 
week.J47 
Athletes with whom we spoke make their "best attempt" to select 
classes so as to not miss many. Despite this, one said, it is "impossible 
not to miss class." One player estimated that he is typically absent from 
fifteen to twenty percent of his classes. While he is not "forgiven from 
any of the academic requirements," he said, "the professors are 
extremely accommodating" and excuse his absences due to basketball-
related activities. Professors fill out progress reports chronicling the 
athletes' classroom performance. Athletes who miss class or who fail to 
maintain adequate grades are reported to the coaching staff and must 
"run wind sprints or bleachers." 
The holiday season revolves around basketball. Indeed, for one 
player, Thanksgiving dinner is at the coach's house. While players may 
leave campus during this period "for a couple of days here and there," 
that, too, depends upon "being in good stead with the coach" and is the 
"exception rather than the rule." In all cases, players play in tournaments 
during the holidays, some at very long distances from home. Players 
have little time to spend with family during the holidays and are assured 
only two days off, Christmas Day and New Year's Day. During this 
holiday period, when they are not competing, players are required to lift 
weights in the morning and practice in the afternoon for two hours, 
followed by film sessions and meetings. From October to March, one 
player said, there was much we "were obligated to do and obligated to 
not do." 
approved media interviews. From 7:30p.m. to 9:00p.m., he studied in the athlete study facility, and 
then from 9:00 p.m. until II :00 p.m., he reviewed game film and practiced shooting at the gym. See 
id. 
147. During the 2004--{)5 season, for example, the MSU basketball team played twenty-nine 
regular-season games, twelve of which were played away from campus and thirteen of which were 
played during the week-Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday. See Men's Basketball Mich. State 
Univ. Spartans, 2004--{)5 Results/News Releases, http://msuspartans.collegesports.com/sports/m-
baskbllarchive/msu-m-baskbl-sched-2004.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). Post-season Big-10 and 
NCAA tournament games, not included in these figures, were all away from campus. See Wendel, 
supra note 24 (noting that several times in a basketball season, one team played two games in three 
days to facilitate national media coverage). 
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(2) Off-Season Life and Ancillary Issues Also Demonstrate the 
Control the University Exercises over Basketball Athletes 
After the season ends in March, study hall hours are still required, and 
progress reports must be completed. During this off-season period, 
players may devote more time to school. 148 At the same time, as one 
player commented, players are required to stay in shape and in contact 
with the coaching staff. It is "understood" that an athlete will practice on 
his own and lift weights, and that his failure to do so may result in him 
being "replaced." Thus, even during the off-season, one athlete works 
out a minimum of three hours per day, seven days a week. In the 
summer, he explained, most players attend summer school, work, and 
continue their spring workout schedule. At least two to three days per 
week, they have pick-up games and run wind sprints. They also perform, 
and are given training in, weightlifting and cardiovascular conditioning. 
As this athlete recounted, toward the end of the summer, the workout 
schedule intensifies. 
The remarkable degree of control exercised by the coaching staff 
throughout the athlete's daily life in both football and basketball shows 
that they are directed not only as to the end-winning games-but also 
as to the means for doing so. Our data suggest, and other sources 
confirm, that no other university employee is even remotely subject to 
the degree of control, day by day, hour by hour, minute by minute, as the 
employee-athlete. Coaches and administrators exercise pervasive control 
over the manner in which athletes undertake their athletic and other 
responsibilities and even over their daily lives. The exercise of this 
degree of control over any other employee at the university would be 
unimaginable. Indeed, if any group of persons may be called 
"employees" based upon the degree of control exercised by a university, 
it must be the employee-athletes enrolled there. 
2. The Athletic Grant-in-Aid Functions as Compensation for Athletic 
Services and Illustrates Additional Control by Coaches over 
Athletes 
The common law definition of employee requires that the employer 
148. Very little of the academic year occurs outside of the basketball season. Only the periods 
from late August to mid-October and from the end of March through the end of April fall squarely 
outside of the season. Thus, during the vast majority of the regular academic year, players have little 
time to devote to class or study. 
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compensate the alleged employee for services rendered, 149 and the 
athletic grant-in-aid fulfills this role. 150 The athletic grant-in-aid is 
unquestionably a transfer of economic value to the employee-athlete in 
return for his athletic services. 151 For their service, players receive 
grants-in-aid to cover tuition, housing, books, and a meal plan for the 
term. Players whom we interviewed told us they also receive four free 
tickets for each home game.152 
Athletic grants-in-aid are strictly regulated by NCAA rules, 153 and 
constitute a central feature in the economic regime by which the NCAA 
governs the university-athlete relationship. NCAA Division I institutions 
may award scholarships solely on the basis of athletic ability or 
achievement, irrespective of the student's academic promise or financial 
need. 154 Denominated "grants-in-aid," athletic scholarships function as 
contracts of employment, setting forth the obligations of employee-
athletes and defining the resulting economic compensation to be 
provided.155 
149. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *II n.27 
(July 13, 2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85,94 (1995)) (noting that 
an employee must perform service "in return for payment" under the common Jaw). 
150. The terms "grant-in-aid" and "scholarship" will be used interchangeably throughout this 
Section. 
151. See NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVICES, 200!--{)2 NCAA GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID 87-88 
[hereinafter NCAA, Am GUIDE] (providing a Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement to be 
signed by the athlete and his university and setting forth the dollar amount and duration of the 
award); BYERS, supra note 6, at 373; Lynch, supra note 24, at 608--{)9, 617 (asserting that grant-in-
aid constitutes compensation for services); Stephen L. Ukeiley, No Salary, No Union, No Collective 
Bargaining: Scholarship Athletes Are an Employer's Dream Come True, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 
167, 191-92 (1996); Orion Riggs, Note, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-
College Athletics, KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, Spring 1996, at 137, 143 (asserting that the grant-in-aid 
is a contract for hire); Rhoden, supra note 24; General Release, Rev. E. William Beauchamp, 
Executive Vice President, Univ. of Notre Dame, College Athletes Already Are Fairly Compensated 
(Mar. I 0, 1997), available at http://und.collegesports.com/genrellnd-genreleases06.html 
(characterizing athlrtic grants-in-aid as compensation for entertainment and athletic services). 
152. This number of university-provided tickets was not enough for all of the immediate family 
members of one interviewee to attend. He noted that the price of each ticket-more than $40 at that 
time-represented more than his remaining family members could afford to pay. Interview with 
anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). 
153. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15. 
154. See id. art. 15 .I. 
155. See NCAA, Am GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (providing a Sample Athletics Financial Aid 
Agreement). The financial value of the athletic grant-in-aid is capped by NCAA rule at the cost of 
attendance at the university. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1. That amount varies, of 
course, from institution to institution. At Michigan State University, for example, the estimated cost 
of attendance for in-state students in 2004--{)5 was $12,545. Mich. State Univ., Estimated Annual 
Expenses (2004-05), SPARTAN SPORTSZONE MAG., Oct. 9, 2004, at 46. At Duke University, the 
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NCAA rules governing athletic grants-in-aid are also highly 
detailed. 156 Compensating an athlete in excess of the maximum 
permissible scholarship results in NCAA penalties upon the institution 
and the athlete. 15 i Excess compensation or payments to athletes, such as 
cash or cars, 158 are prohibited whether provided directly by the 
university or indirectly by alumni or other "boosters"159 and constitute a 
significant source ofNCAA violations. 160 
cost of attendance that same year was $41,820. Duke Univ., Financial Aid Statistics for Duke, 
http://www.finaid.duke.edu/prospect_statistics.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). At the University of 
Florida, the cost of attendance was $12,715. Univ. of Fla., Tuition and Annual Cost of Attendance, 
http://www.admissions.ufl.edu/annualcosts.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). Of course, these 
amounts are significantly more than the real cost to the university of providing another seat in the 
classroom, see supra note 10, and significantly less than the value to the university of athletes' 
services. See infra note 298. The Reverend Edmund Joyce of Notre Dame has conceded that 
"'[parents realize] that their son's effort will generate far more revenue for the school than the cost 
of his grant-in-aid."' BYERS, supra note 6, at 233 (quoting Rev. Joyce). 
156. The rules governing athletic scholarships span twenty-three pages of the 2004-05 Division I 
Manual. See DIV.I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15. 
157. See generally id., arts. 15.1, 19. 
158. Covert booster gifts of new cars or their use has long been widespread. See, e.g., BYERS, 
supra note 6, at 124-28, 171-72. 
159. See DIV.I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.01.4. 
160. Most NCAA rules violations are for impermissible recruiting, misuse of athletic funds, or 
improper aid to student-athletes. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 6, at 23-24, 27-28, 31 (documenting 
examples of excessive, prohibited payments to athletes at Southern Methodist University and Texas 
Christian University, such as gifts of cars, rent-free apartments, a $25,000 signing bonus, and annual 
stipends of approximately $30,000); id. at 62 (referring to impermissible cash payments to 
basketball recruits at the University of Kentucky); id. at 124-28, 171-72, 208 (discussing the 
common but prohibited practice of providing a new car to star athletes); id. at 154 (discussing the 
increasing use of modest cash payments when predominantly white universities began recruiting 
black athletes in the late 1960s); id. at 160, 182, 198-201, 208-09 (describing impermissible 
financial benefits for athletes as commonplace); DICK DEVENZIO, RIP-OFF U.: THE ANNUAL THEFT 
AND EXPLOITATION OF MAJOR COLLEGE REVENUE PRODUCING STUDENT-ATHLETES 104, 115-16, 
118, 146-48, 153-54, 164-67 (1986) (describing numerous examples of covert benefits being paid 
to athletes in violation of NCAA rules); MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC 
DEPARTMENT VS THE UNIVERSITY 250--51 (1990) (describing covert payments in many fonns, 
including jobs for parents); ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 24 (reporting 1982 "signing bonuses" in 
the five figures); Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA 
Regulatory Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 223-24 (1996) (describing factors among 
African-American players, such as poverty, that further their incentive to accept prohibited financial 
benefits); Harrick Steps Down as Coach of Georgia, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 28, 2003, at 
D3 (reporting on allegations that a former Rhode Island basketball coach arranged for players to 
receive lodging, cars, and money from boosters); Welch Suggs, College Basketball on the Line, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 26, 1999, at A53 (noting that "coaches continue to offer improper 
inducements to recruits"); Tim Sullivan, Coaches' Payoffs Spur Pay-for-Play Movement, ENQUIRER 
ONLINE EDITION, Jan. 20, 2001, http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/0I/20/spt_coaches.html 
(estimating the black-market rate for top college football players at $200,000 in 200 I); Ryan 
Hockensmith, Buckeyes Chime In, ESPN THE MAG., Nov. 9, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/ 
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The history and development of the grant-in-aid shows that players 
receive such compensation only in return for athletic services. In 1948, 
the NCAA membership adopted the so-called "Sanity Code," which 
formally outlawed scholarships based solely on athletic ability. 161 
Scholarships under the Sanity Code were to be based instead only upon 
financial need and/or academic ability, criteria both independent of 
athletic skill. And significantly, once such scholarships were granted, 
they could not be withdrawn by the institution, even if the student later 
decided not to participate in intercollegiate athletics at all. 162 
At the 1956 NCAA Convention, however, the membership officially 
sanctioned, for the first time, 163 scholarships based solely on athletic 
ability. It amended the NCAA's Constitution to authorize "schools to 
pay ... regardless of need, ... [or] of academic potential ... all 
'commonly accepted educational expenses' for the undergraduate 
athlete."164 By this, the delegates explicitly authorized, formalized, and 
legitimized the practice of using scholarships to compensate college 
athletes for their athletic services alone. 
This official sanctioning of athletic scholarships began the modem era 
news/story?id=1919258 (describing improper payments to members of the Ohio State University 
football team including cash, cars, furniture, meals, additional cash in exchange for athlete-signed 
OSU memorabilia, and payments received in jobs for which work was never performed); cf Lynch, 
supra note 24, at 618 (noting that under the current NCAA regime, athletes may not receive market-
value compensation, and that this encourages "covert payments"). 
Such payments constitute compensation to athletes for their athletic services and demonstrate to 
some degree the actual market value of these athletes' services. The amount of covert payment to an 
athlete generally corresponds to his perceived athletic value to the team, and in this manner the 
quantity of compensation roughly reflects the quality of athletic services rendered. See Tom Friend, 
My Side, ESPN THE MAG., Nov. 9, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1919246 
(noting that cash payments to OSU football players varied in direct proportion to the quality of play 
on the field). It bears noting, therefore, that prohibited compensation more accurately reflects the 
athlete's actual worth to the university than does sanctioned compensation in the form of financial 
aid. 
161. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 43-44; Lynch, supra note 24, at 617; Gary T. 
Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform: The 'Sanity Code' Leads Association Down Path to 
Enforcement Program, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/ 
19991122/active/3624n24.html (noting that the Sanity Code adopted the principle of "awarding 
financial aid without consideration for athletics ability"). 
162. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 67; SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 44; Allen L. Sack, 
Big-Time Athletics vs. Academic Values: It's a Rout, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Jan. 26, 2001, at B7. 
163. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 10, 72. 
164. !d. at 72. Later, in 1957, "commonly accepted educational expenses ... were defined as 
tuition, fees, room and board, books, and $15 per month for nine months for laundry money." /d. 
Cash stipends for laundry or other purposes are no longer permitted. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 
3, art. 15.2. 
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of college sports in which universities openly and unabashedly pay 
players for their athletic services in abrogation of the amateurism 
principles the NCAA professes to uphold. Former NCAA Executive 
Director Byers described this change as "forswearing old amateur 
principles without admitting it."165 It "was an act of administrative 
convenience for college management and a recruiting bonanza for 
coaches. It ... sanctified an industry-wide, common pay scheme based 
on athletic skill."166 Equally pointedly, Fritz Crisler, former head 
football coach at the University of Michigan, described it as 
"professionaliz[ing]"167 the college athlete. Once universities began 
compensating students solely for their athletic services, they fulfilled the 
compensation requirement of the common law test, 168 thereby 
propagating the employment relation with their athletes. 
Initially, NCAA rules safeguarded the athletes to some degree. For 
example, an athletic grant-in-aid could be awarded for up to four full 
years, 169 guaranteeing a gifted athlete four years of education and giving 
him a significant incentive to select a university offering a four-year aid 
package over other schools offering only one-year scholarships with 
merely the possibility for renewal. Under the initial legislation, such a 
four-year grant-in-aid could not be withdrawn by the university even if 
the athlete elected not to play. 17° Finally, a university scholarship 
committee, not the athlete's coach, made determinations regarding the 
165. BYERS, supra note 6, at 74. 
166. !d. at 338-39; see also id. at 65 (noting that "in 1956 the colleges, acting through the NCAA 
in the name of 'amateurism,' installed their own pay system called the athletics grant-in-aid or 
athletics 'scholarship"'). Former NCAA director Byers stated that 
[t]he colleges are already paying their athletes. The grant-in-aid established that .... The 
uniform stipend is awarded without regard to the financial need or the academic attainment of 
the recipient .... College leaders argue that a free education is sufficient pay for a varsity 
athlete, even though it is subject to being terminated or renewed annually, based on what the 
coaching staff decides. 
ld. at 373 (emphasis in original); see SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14; JOHN SAYLE 
WATTERSON, COLLEGE FOOTBALL 287-307 (2000); Chin, supra note 3, at 1236 (arguing that each 
annual scholarship constitutes pay to the athlete); Sack, supra note 162. 
167. BYERS, supra note 6, at 74. 
168. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *II n.27 
(July 13, 2004) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85,94 (1995)) (describing 
the common law test, which includes a compensation element); supra Part II.A. 
169. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 72; Sack, supra note 162. 
170. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 72; Louis Hakim, The Student-Athlete vs. the Athlete Student: 
Has the Time Arrived for an Extended-Term Scholarship Contract?, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 145, 158 
(2000); Sack, supra note 162. 
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renewal or non-renewal of a one-year athletic grant-in-aid. 171 
Over time, however, these initial safeguards were repealed, rendering 
the athletic grant-in-aid even more obviously compensatory. The most 
significant erosion in player protection occurred at the 1973 NCAA 
Convention with the adoption of Proposal 39.172 Under that legislation, 
athletically related aid could "not be awarded for a period in excess of 
one academic year."173 The proffered rationale for the change from four-
year scholarships to one-year renewable grants was to treat athletes like 
non-athlete students whose scholarships, it was claimed, were awarded 
on a year-by-year basis. 174 In fact, however, institutions often awarded 
non-athletes scholarships on a multi-year basis, 175 and the real reason for 
the shift from four-year to one-year athletics scholarships was, instead, 
to create a mechanism by which university athletic programs could 
maintain pressure on the scholarship athlete throughout his college 
career.
176 
The shift from multi-year to one-year athletic scholarships was an 
important step in the evolution of the university-athlete relationship to an 
employment relationship. For the first time, the NCAA tied 
compensation directly to the athletes' performance of athletic services, 
not merely to athletic promise, and NCAA rules no longer allowed the 
athletic scholarship to be guaranteed regardless of whether or not the 
171. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 73, 76. 
172. See id. at 163--64; Hakim, supra note 170, at 158. 
173. BYERS, supra note 6, at 163; see also Sack, supra note 162. This rule is still in place today. 
See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.3.1; NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (showing 
a Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement, stating that the period of the award may either be an 
"academic year" or a "semester/quarter," and providing no option for multi-year aid grants). The 
rejection of multiple-year scholarships in favor of a rule restricting members to one-year contracts 
likely offends the Sherman Act, which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ... , or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states." 15 U.S.C. § I (2000). 
174. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 163; Hakim, supra note 170, at 158. 
175. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 163. 
176. See id. (describing the view of former NCAA President Alan J. Chapman that proffered 
justifications for Proposal 39 were "bogus"); Hakim, supra note 170, at 148; AM 870 SportsTalk 
with Earle Robinson, supra note 129 (host interviewing Professor Robert A. McCormick and 
discussing use of the one-year scholarship to "run oft'' players "all the time"). 
When Proposal 39 was under consideration, proponents "complained that some athletes, once 
they had the four-year award in hand, decided not to play or at least not to give their best efforts. 
Such players were cheating the college, they pointed out, and young people should not be permitted 
to learn bad habits." BYERS, supra note 6, at 163. How could refusal to participate in athletics 
constitute "cheating the college" unless the four-year grant was considered compensation for those 
as yet unprovided services? 
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athlete performed those services. 177 The one-year limit on grants-in-aid 
thus rendered that aid even more clearly compensation for athletic 
services. 178 
Shortly after the NCAA limited scholarships to one year, it 
transferred authority over decisions to continue or terminate scholarships 
from university committees to coaches. 179 Under this regime, any 
athlete's ability to retain a scholarship depended in substantial part upon 
his athletic performance the previous year, 180 and coaches gained 
unparalleled power over the athlete. 181 This transfer of scholarship-
renewal authority from faculty to coaches cemented the employment 
nature of the relationship because the athlete's continued compensation 
depended upon performing to the satisfaction of the athletic supervisor 
rather than academic personnel who, in theory, would be disinterested in 
athletic performance.182 Thus, the coach's power not to renew the one-
177. See DUDERSTADT, supra note 24, at 197; SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 84. 
178. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1237 (noting that the one-year limit on grants-in-aid illustrates the 
university's preference for "fielding a superior sports team" and thereby increasing revenue over 
concern for an athlete's education which would be better served by a scholarship guaranteed for 
four years). See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the relevance of commercialism in establishing 
an employer-employee relationship and infra Part Ill.B.2.a for an examination of the entrenched 
commercial nature of the university-athlete relationship. 
179. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 76, 164 (noting that even though Proposition 39 passed because 
of a promise that university committees, rather than coaches, would make scholarship decisions, 
"[t]he exigencies of big-time athletics-the need to win and survive-in time would also strip away 
the safeguards promised in the one-year grant legislation"); id. at 232-34 (describing an 
unsuccessful attempt in 1976 to wrest control of the full grant-in-aid away from coaches and to give 
it back to university scholarship committees); id. at 103 (noting that the coach controls the 
renewals); NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 100 (demonstrating through hypothetical case 
studies that it is the coach who decides whether aid will be renewed); Sack, supra note 162. 
180. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 164, 165-66. 
181. See id. at I 03 ("Both parties understand the grant-in-aid is given on a year-to-year basis, 
sometimes semester-to-semester .... The coaches, in fact, control the renewals .... If the player 
does not conform to the demanding college practice and game schedule [whether denoted as 
mandatory or voluntary], his or her grant-in-aid is not renewed and can be terminated [early] for 
disciplinary reasons."); see also Murray Sperber, The NCAA's Last Chance to Reform College 
Sports: An Open Letter to the Next President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Apr. 19, 2002, at Bl2 (asserting that one-year scholarships are often not 
renewed due to unsatisfactory athletic performance). 
182. In 1976, several NCAA member schools proposed to limit athletic scholarships to tuition 
only, reserving additional stipends covering lodging, food, and books to financially needy students 
exclusively. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 231-34, 340; Hakim, supra note 170, at 159; Timeline-
1940 to 1979, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/ 
19991122/active/3624n27.htrnl. This measure would have prevented schools from offering a full 
ride to gifted athletes whose families could afford to pay for living expenses. At the 1976 NCAA 
Convention, however, this initiative was defeated. Schools opposing it grounded their position, 
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year athletic grant-in-aid further demonstrates that the control element 
required by the common law test for employee is satisfied. 
Other features of NCAA Division I rules underscore that the athletic 
grant-in-aid gives coaches leverage over athletes and is compensation 
for athletic services rendered. For example, under current NCAA rules, 
an athlete's financial "aid may be immediately reduced or canceled"I 83 
during the quarter, semester, or year it covers if, among other reasons, 
the athlete "voluntarily withdraw[s] from the sport for personal 
reasons."I 84 The fact that a university can terminate financial aid to a 
player immediately upon the athlete's refusal to play demonstrates that 
such aid is compensation and a quid pro quo for athletic services 
rendered. 
While the athlete's scholarship may not be immediately reduced or 
cancelled mid-term "on the basis of ... athletics ability, performance or 
contribution to [the] team's success, because of an injury or illness that 
prevents [the athlete] from participating in athletics, or for any other 
athletics reason,"I 85 nothing bars a coach from refusing to renew the 
athletic grant-in-aid for the ensuing quarter, semester, or year.I 86 In other 
words, if an athlete does not play well enough or hard enough, or if a 
ironically, upon arguments that reinforce the very idea we advance: that athletic scholarships are 
compensation paid in exchange for athletic services performed. First, they argued, "[s]tudents in 
big-time revenue sports return huge benefits to their institutions in terms of money, morale, and 
publicity." BYERS, supra note 6, at 234. In other words, they urged, the athletes should continue to 
receive additional compensation beyond tuition because they perform services which add significant 
value to their employers-the universities in question. 
Second, they asserted, "[t]he all-encompassing commitment required of student-athletes to 
survive in the major revenue sports should merit a full ride." /d. at 234. This argument candidly 
recognized the commitment required of athletes and suggested that institutions should fully 
compensate them for that commitment. In retaining the full athletic scholarship in 1976, Division I 
institutions conceded it was a quid pro quo for athletic services. 
183. NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (bold in original) (Sample Athletics Financial Aid 
Agreement). 
184. Jd. at 87 (Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement that is provided for use at schools in all 
three NCAA divisions); see also DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.4.1; NCAA, AID GUIDE, 
supra note 151, at 95 (providing a Sample Cancellation of Award During the Academic Year Letter 
and incorporating justifications for a mid-term cancellation of financial aid including withdrawal 
from the sport "for personal reasons"); id. at 101 (illustrating through a hypothetical case study that 
a university may cancel Anne's financial aid immediately if she decides to quit her sport midway 
through the season). 
185. NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 87 (Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement); see 
also DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.4.3. 
186. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.5; NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 96 
(providing a Sample Nonrenewal of Award Letter and requiring no reasons to justify the 
nonrenewal of an award for a subsequent academic term). 
115 
HeinOnline -- 81 Wash. L. Rev. 116 2006
Washington Law Review Vol. 81:71,2006 
better athlete arrives, or even if the athlete is injured in the course of his 
sport, the coach may refuse to renew the athlete's grant-in-aid. 187 One 
athlete told us that his quality of life depends much upon how well he 
plays. "Those who perform well get away with more. If you are on the 
bubble, you best behave yourself." "There are," the coaches remind 
them, "plenty to step into your shoes."188 Again, the coaches exercise 
unparalleled control over athletes by having the power not to renew their 
scholarships. This paradigm matches that of the employment relation in 
which an employer may terminate an employee once he is no longer 
useful. 189 
In short, the relationship between the university and the scholarship 
athlete is that of employer and employee. 190 Employers pay their 
employees in exchange for services. Universities likewise award grants-
in-aid to athletes in exchange for the athletes' services in their sports. 191 
187. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.3.5; NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra note 151, at 100 
(illustrating through a hypothetical case study how a coach may not reduce or cancel player Max's 
aid during the period of the award for athletics reasons but may do so at the end of the year by 
refusing to renew the award for the subsequent period). 
While coaches at some schools sometimes voluntarily renew an athletic scholarship in the event 
of injury, NCAA rules do not require that result. Moreover, NCAA rules limit the number of 
scholarships Division I member schools may grant. In Division I-A football, a university may award 
up to eighty-five scholarships at any one time. For men's basketball, the number of scholarships is 
limited to thirteen. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.5.4.1, 15.5.5.1; BYERS, supra note 6, 
at 355. Such limitations on the number of scholarships dramatically increase a coach's incentive to 
allocate these valuable resources only to the best athletes available. Therefore, even if a coach 
would like to renew a player's scholarship, he will be hard-pressed to do so when the player is 
unable to contribute to the success of the team. Allocating resources to under-performers would 
allow other colleges a competitive advantage on the playing field. See id. at 76 ("The law of 
survival quickly dictated that the colleges' money for full rides should go only to players who help 
the team."); Hakim, supra note 170, at 148, 159. The financial importance of winning, see Robert 
H. Frank, Challenging the Myth: A Review of the Links Among College Athletic Success, Student 
Quality, and Donations 3 (May 2004), http://www.knightfdn.org/athletics/reports/2004_frankreport/ 
KCIA_Frank_report_2004.pdf; infra Part III.B.2.a (describing the financial benefits of winning), 
places enormous pressure on coaches not to allocate awards to unproductive players. Hakim, supra 
note 170, at 159. 
188. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003). 
189. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 5 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the at-will doctrine). 
190. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 24, at 608--09, 617; Ukeiley, supra note 151; Riggs, supra note 
151, at 143 (asserting that the grant-in-aid is a contract for hire); Rhoden, supra note 24. 
191. Indeed, the public commonly perceives that college athletes receive compensation for their 
athletic services because they "get a free college education." Given low graduation rates, see infra 
Part III.B.2.b.(8), diluted curricula, see infra Part III.B.2.b.(4), and extraordinary demands on the 
athletes' time and energy, see supra Part III.A.l, however, even this promise of an education is not 
fulfilled in many cases. Thus, in many instances, athlete compensation falls woefully short of that 
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In effect, the athlete is an employee with a one-year, renewable contract 
of employment. Universities may terminate these employees for any 
reason, or no reason, at the end of the year through nonrenewal of their 
contracts. 192 Furthermore, like an employee who may be terminated 
during the period of a contract for reasons stated therein, an athlete may 
be terminated mid-season for certain behavior, such as becoming 
academically ineligible, engaging in serious misconduct that brings 
disciplinary action from the school, withdrawing from the sport, or even 
refusing to follow the coach's rules. 193 Termination occurs in the athletic 
context via immediate cancellation of the athlete's compensation, or 
athletic scholarship. 
Under the common law standard, an employee must be compensated 
for services rendered. Given the history and structure of the athletic 
grant-in-aid and the policy choices made by the NCAA in its 
development, grants-in-aid transparently serve as compensation for 
athletic services. Moreover, the coach's ability to cancel or not to renew 
a grant-in-aid fixes his control over athletes, another element required 
under the common law test. 
3. Athletes Are Economically Dependent upon Their Universities 
In addition to a right of control and compensation, the common law 
test for "employee" sometimes also refers to the putative employee's 
economic dependence upon the employer. 194 Grant-in-aid athletes at 
Division I NCAA institutions are deeply economically dependent upon 
their universities. In fact, their primary requirements for survival-food 
and shelter-are met by their university-employers through grants-in-
aid.195 Interviews and secondary sources suggest that many athletes 
come from impoverished or humble backgrounds and cannot afford 
which seems to be promised them, a college education. This inadequacy of player compensation is 
not entirely the athlete's fault if he is not capable of doing college-level work, see infra Part 
III.B.2.b.(l), when he lacks the time needed to do so, see supra Part III.A.l, or when his scholarship 
is not renewed because he has been injured or his performance falls short of the coach's wishes, see 
Part Ili.A.2. 
192. See, e.g., Schott, supra note 24, at 35 (noting that the university can dismiss the athlete by 
failing to renew his one-year scholarship); see also supra notes 186-87. 
193. See Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); NCAA, AID GUIDE, supra 
note 151, at 87 (Sample Athletics Financial Aid Agreement); see also supra notes 183-84 and 
accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
195. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.2.2 (permitting financial aid to cover room and 
board in addition to tuition, fees, and books). 
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school, food, or lodging without the grant-in-aid. 196 Although athletes 
are permitted under current NCAA rules to take part-time 
employment, 197 the extraordinary demands on their time and energy 
from their athletic obligations necessarily preclude outside employment 
as a meaningful means of self-support. 198 And, because they may not 
profit from their reputation as athletes, 199 any earnings from such 
employment are likely to be minimal, again leaving them fully 
economically dependent upon their universities. 
Moreover, NCAA rules forbid players from accepting cash or other 
gifts from non-family members/00 and even gifts from family and 
guardians are limited to an amount which, when combined with any 
grant-in-aid, covers only the cost of attendance.201 Despite providing 
valuable services, players whose families cannot afford to provide them 
196. Athletes commonly describe lacking resources for basic necessities. "There are 
days ... when training table is the only thing I eat all day." Irvin Muchnick, Welcome to Plantation 
Football: The Financial Rewards for a Winning College Program Have Never Been Greater. Yet 
Most of the Athletes Who Make it Happen are Living in Grinding Poverty. How Fair is That?, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, (Magazine), at 114 (quoting James Bethea, a U.C. Berkeley football player). 
"Athletes don't have the money to live the normal life of a student. They don't have the money to 
buy toothpaste. They don't have the money to buy toilet paper." /d. (quoting Kevin Murray, 
California state senator). Quinn Dorsey, a University of Oregon football player, was suspended for 
the first four games of the 2003 season when he traded his complimentary game tickets for rent. !d. 
197. Before August 1998, the NCAA completely prohibited scholarship athletes from holding 
part-time jobs during the academic year. See Greg Skidmore, Recent Development: Payment for 
College Football Players in Nebraska, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319,321 n.l5 (2004). From August 
1998 until the 2003-04 academic year, they could earn no more than $2,000 from a job during the 
academic year without correspondingly diminishing their financial aid. NCAA, 2002-03 NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL (2002), arts. 15.2.6, I 5.2.6.1. Since 2003, athletes can take legitimate 
employment, and their earnings do not affect their financial aid. NCAA, 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL (2003), art. 15.2.6; DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.2.7. The athletes, however, may 
not accept compensation for their fame as athletes and may receive pay only for work actually 
performed at levels commensurate with the prevailing rate for that work in that community. /d. arts. 
12.4.1, 12.4.1.1, 15.2.7(a)-{c). Thus, while the rules now permit employment, they still prohibit the 
athlete from profiting from the one real source of value he possesses-his fame as an athlete. See 
generally id. arts. 12.5 .2-.4. 
198. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 618; Drape, supra note 127. 
199. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 12.5.2, 15.2.7. 
200. See id. arts. 12.1.1, 15.01.2 (rendering ineligible for athletic competition any athlete who 
receives financial aid from sources other than those permitted under NCAA rules); id. art. 15.2.6 
(allowing athletes to receive "financial aid from anyone upon whom the ... athlete is naturally or 
legally dependent"); 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 16 (describing the suspension of 
former UCLA football player Donnie Edwards for accepting food); see also Muchnick, supra note 
196 (noting that accepting lunch "from anyone other than an immediate family member can be 
construed as a gratuity from a booster-punishable by Joss of eligibility"). 
201. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.2, 15.1, 15.2.6.1. 
118 
HeinOnline -- 81 Wash. L. Rev. 119 2006
Myth ofthe Student-Athlete 
with extra money struggle financially throughout their college 
experience. That athletes commonly leave their universities without 
graduating when coaches do not renew their grants-in-aid202 also 
demonstrates their high level of economic dependence upon those 
institutions. Unable to earn significant outside income, forbidden from 
accepting gifts other than limited amounts from parents, and with 
primary living expenses covered by the university through the grant-in-
aid, scholarship athletes are utterly economically dependent upon their 
universities. 
The foregoing demonstrates that athletic grant-in-aid students are 
employees. As the NLRB has underscored, "[u]nder the common law, an 
employee is a person who performs services for another under a contract 
of hire, subject to the other's control or right of control, and in return for 
payment."203 Athletic grant-in-aid students are employees under the 
common law because they serve under the substantial control of their 
university-employers204 in return for compensation and are economically 
dependent upon them. 
B. College Athletes Are Employees Under the NLRB 's Statutory Test 
from Brown 
Having shown that grant-in-aid athletes are employees under the 
common law test, we must nevertheless establish that they likewise meet 
the NLRA' s statutory definition of that term. That is, we must also show 
202. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003) (former basketball player 
attesting that athletes commonly leave the university when coaches do not renew grants-in-aid); 
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) (football player attesting to same). 
Nonrenewal of the grant-in-aid can occur either because the athlete exhausts his four years of 
eligibility before completing the course requirements for his degree, see infra Part III.B.2.b.(7), or 
because the coach decides not to renew the scholarship, opting to use it instead for another athlete. 
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with anonymous 
employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003); see also supra Part III.A.2 and note 187. 
203. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *II n.27 (July 
13, 2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec. Inc., 516 U.S. 85,94 (1995)) (emphasis omitted). 
204. NCAA regulations govern myriad aspects of the athletes' lives: 
Encyclopedic regulations will govern their lives, on and off campus, for the next four to six 
years, starting with the first recruiting contact while they are high school students. The 
youngsters have no choice in the matter. You can't play in college unless you pledge allegiance 
to the rules, they are told. Then they are warned that the NCAA can rule them permanently 
ineligible at all 900-plus NCAA colleges for violations of marginal substance. 
BYERS, supra note 6, at 365. Employee manuals in most industries establish the employer's right to 
control how the employee performs his job. The employee manual in college sports, the 487-page 
NCAA Division I Manual, however, goes much further in controlling virtually all aspects of 
employee-athletes' lives. 
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that employee-athletes are not foreclosed from being employees by 
virtue of their simultaneous status as students.205 To do so requires an 
analysis of the NLRB' s most recent pronouncement on the status of 
students as employees, Brown University. 
1. Brown Identifies Four Factors in Assessing Students' Employee 
Status 
As discussed previously, in Brown, the Board examined four factual 
criteria to decide whether graduate assistants were statutory employees: 
"[(1)] the status of graduate assistants as students, [(2)] the role of 
graduate student assistantships in graduate education, [(3)] the graduate 
student assistants' relationship with the faculty, and [(4)] the financial 
support they receive to attend Brown."206 Applying this test to 
employee-athletes yields the conclusion that they are not primarily 
students and that their relationship with their universities is an economic 
one. With respect to these four areas of inquiry, employee-athletes are 
employees under the first three criteria. The logic underlying the fourth 
criterion is fallacious, and even if the fourth factor is valid, it, too, results 
in employee status for athletes. For these reasons, and because they also 
meet the common law test for employees,207 employee-athletes are 
employees under the NLRA. 
a. Under the First Factor, Athletf!S Play a Limited Role as Students 
In Brown, the first factor upon which the Board relied to hold that 
graduate assistants were not employees was their status as students.208 
The Board noted the graduate assistants at Brown University were all 
enrolled as students, 209 their status as teaching assistants (T As), research 
assistants (RAs), and proctors was contingent upon being enrolled as 
students,210 and they were unlike others previously held to be employees 
because they were still students. 211 
205. See Brown, slip op. at 5, 8, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7, *II (requiring that students pass both 
the common law test and a special statutory test to acquire employee status). 
206. /d., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744 at *10. 
207. See supra Part liLA. 
208. Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10. 
209. See id., slip op. at 6, 10,2004 WL 1588744 at *9, *14. 
210. See id. 
211. See id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744 at *6 (distinguishing the research associates at issue 
in C. W. Post Center of Long Island University, 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1971), who had already obtained 
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At the outset, it bears remembering that the Board in Brown did not 
foreclose graduate student assistants from employee status solely 
because they were students. That is, the Board did not rule in Brown that 
students and employees are two mutually exclusive categories. 
Otherwise, its analysis of and reliance on the second, third, and fourth 
criteria would have been superfluous. Rather, the Brown Board 
concluded that graduate assistants fell outside the Act because they were 
''primarily students."212 The necessary inference is that other students 
compensated by universities whose services are not primarily 
educational may still be treated as employees. This reasoning is further 
supported through the Brown Board's acknowledgment that students 
who perform services unrelated to their educational programs may 
properly be characterized as employees.213 As we will show below, the 
athletic services provided by employee-athletes are predominantly 
unrelated to their educational programs;214 consequently, these athletes 
may properly be viewed as employees. 
Importantly, the Board in Brown looked to the substance, not merely 
the form, of whether the persons in question were students. It analyzed 
whether the graduate assistants were students in reality, not simply 
whether they were students in name only. In this respect the Board 
considered the amount of time the assistants spent performing their 
duties compared to the amount of time they spent otherwise as students 
and found that "students serving as graduate student assistants spend 
only a limited number of hours performing their duties, and it is beyond 
dispute that their principal time commitment at Brown is focused on 
obtaining a degree and, thus, [on] being a student."215 As demonstrated 
above, the same cannot be said of employee-athletes. On the contrary, 
the onerous time commitments imposed on athletes make it evident that 
their degrees). 
212. !d., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7 (emphasis added). 
213. See id., slip op. at 9 n.29, 2004 WL 1588744, at *12 n.29 ("Although the dissent cites 
language from Cedars-Sinai ... to the effect that the Board has included students in some 
bargaining units and in a few instances, authorized elections in units composed solely of students, 
the Board clarified this general assertion in St. Clare's by making clear that this does not include the 
category of students who perform services at their university related to their educational 
programs."). The necessary inference is that students whose services are unrelated to their 
educational programs may be employees and may organize. 
214. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
215. Brown, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9; see also id., slip op. at I 0, 2004 WL 
1588744, at *14 (stating that graduate assistants' "principal time commitment ... is focused on 
obtaining a degree, and, thus, being a student") (emphasis in original). 
121 
HeinOnline -- 81 Wash. L. Rev. 122 2006
Washington Law Review Vol. 81:71,2006 
their primary focus is on athletic, not academic, responsibilities. 216 
The Board also identified "[b ]eing a student" as "synonymous with 
learning, education, and academic pursuits,"217 strongly suggesting that 
being a student requires more than mere enrollment, but also 
encompasses actually engaging in these activities. Under Brown, then, to 
conclude that an individual is a student, not an employee, he must be 
actually engaged in learning, education, and academic pursuits. 
Lamentably, a great many NCAA Division I football and men's 
basketball players are students in name only. They do not spend the 
majority of their time engaged in learning, education, and academic 
inquiry, but rather in furtherance of their work as athletes.218 
b. The Second Factor Considers the Role of Athletic Participation in 
Education 
The second criterion relied upon in Brown was the "role of graduate 
student assistantships in graduate education."219 With this factor, the 
Board sought to measure the degree to which the graduate assistants' 
work furthered their education. It found that the graduate assistants' 
services constituted a required component of their courses of study, and, 
thus, that they were serving as students, not employees, when 
performing that work.220 Moreover, the Board noted that graduate 
student assistants "received academic credit for their research work."221 
Finally, the Board emphasized that the assistants' services in teaching 
and research were directly related to their courses of study.222 Because 
216. See supra Part III.A.I. 
217. Brown, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9. 
218. See supra Part II I.A. I; see also infra Part III.B.2.b. 
219. Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *I 0. 
220. Throughout the Brown opinion, the Board emphasized that serving as a T A, RA, or proctor 
was a required condition for obtaining a Ph.D. degree. See id., slip op. at 2 & n.ll, 4-5, 6--7, 10, 
2004 WL 1588744, at *2 & n.ll, *5-6, *9, *14. As the Board noted, for most graduate assistants 
"teaching is so integral to their education that they will not get the degree until they satisfY that 
requirement." !d., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9. 
221. !d., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *6 (citing Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 
621 (1974)). 
222. The Board repeatedly emphasized the close relationship between the assistants' services and 
their courses of study. Students are not employees when they perform "services ... which are 
directly related to their educational program." !d., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744 at *7 (citing St. 
Clare's Hosp., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977), and Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976) 
with approval). "[T]heir service as a graduate student assistant is part and parcel of the core 
elements of the Ph.D. degree." !d., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9; see also id., slip op. at 10, 
2004 WL 1588744, at *14. "Graduate student assistant positions are, therefore, directly related to 
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the graduate assistants' services were an integral component of their 
degrees, the Board concluded that the university-graduate assistant 
relationship was an academic, not an economic, one.223 
In the case of employee-athletes, the services they perform for their 
university employers-playing football and basketball-are wholly 
unrelated to their education and their degrees. 224 Those services are not 
the core elements of the Ph.D. degree and the educational reasons that students attend Brown." Id., 
slip op. at 6-7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9. The Board also wrote that "[t]he relationship between 
being a graduate student assistant and the pursuit of the Ph.D. is inextricably linked, and thus, that 
relationship is clearly educational." !d., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9; see also id., slip op. 
at 7, 2004 WL 1588744 at *10. 
223. See id., slip op. at 7, 10,2004 WL 1588744, at *10, *14. 
224. The official game program sold at fall 2004 Michigan State University football games lists 
I 03 undergraduate players. Of those, thirty-five had not yet selected a major when the booklet was 
printed. Of the sixty-eight players with declared majors, only nine had selected a major, like 
Kinesiology (the study of the mechanics of human motion), that might conceivably be related to 
football activities. The other fifty-nine athletes, however, majored in courses of study to which their 
football activities bore no relation whatsoever. These majors included: Agribusiness Management; 
Communication; Community Relations; Criminal Justice; Economics; Education; Engineering, 
including Civil, Computer, General, and Mechanical; English; Family Community Services; 
Finance; Fisheries & Wildlife; Food Industry Management; General Business; General 
Management; Hospitality Business; Human Biology; Human Resources; Humanities; Landscape 
Architecture; Law and Society; Marketing; Merchandise Management; Pre-Law; Psychology; 
Sociology; Spanish; Studio Art; Supply Chain Management; and Telecommunication. Mich. State 
Univ., supra note 155, at 11-16. 
While some universities have recently awarded academic credit for playing on the football or 
basketball teams, see Mark Schlabach, Varsity Athletes Get Class Credit; Some Colleges Give 
Grades for Playing, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2004, at AI; Lexus Halftime Show: Michigan-Notre 
Dame Game (NBC television broadcast Sept. II, 2004), doing so violates NCAA rules. Offering 
such credit is an impermissible extra benefit under Article 16.02.3, which defines such a benefit as 
any special arrangement ... to provide a student-athlete ... a benefit not expressly authorized 
by NCAA legislation. Receipt of a benefit by student-athletes ... is not a violation of NCAA 
legislation if it is demonstrated that the same benefit is generally available to the institution's 
students ... or to a particular segment of the student body (e.g., foreign students, minority 
students) determined on a basis unrelated to athletics ability. 
DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 16.02.3; see id. arts. 2.5, 16.12.1.1, 16.12.2.1; Mathewson, supra 
note 10, at 100 & n.89 (asserting that a university may not provide any benefit to student-athletes, 
including special courses, that are not provided to students in general); accord BYERS, supra note 6, 
at 103 (describing requirement that courses such as weight-lifting classes must be posted and open 
to all students). Because participation in varsity football or basketball is limited to NCAA athletes, 
offering academic credit for that participation violates these provisions. Even though some 
universities have impermissibly awarded credit for being an athlete, to our knowledge, no university 
confers a degree in football or basketball. 
We do not suggest athletes gain nothing by playing sports. Teamwork, discipline, and dedication 
are all undeniably important aspects of character, and are arguably strengthened through athletic 
preparation and competition. But character development is distinct from education and learning and 
is neither what we mean nor what the Brown Board meant by "education." No doubt the NCAA 
hopes to persuade the public that athletics participation is a core component of athletes' educations 
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required elements of any course of study at any university, nor are they 
requirements for the completion of any degree. 225 In short, playing 
football or basketball is completely unrelated to the vast majority of 
athletes' courses of study. As a consequence, the services employee-
athletes perform are not educational but are, instead, economic; the 
athletes do not serve primarily as students, but rather as employees. 
The Board also used this second factor as support for its conclusion 
that the relationship between Brown University and its graduate students 
was primarily academic and not economic.226 That is, the fact that their 
work as graduate assistants was part of their degree requirements 
supported not only the idea that they were primarily students, but also 
and, for this reason, insists that "student-athletes" learn so-called life skills by participating in their 
sports. See NCAA, Public Service Campaign, supra note 7. Such potential for character 
development, however, is completely unrelated to their degrees, and, apart from the one to two 
percent of college athletes who become professional athletes, this learning is also unrelated to their 
future professions. See NCAA, Estimated Probability, supra note 30 (stating that only 2% of 
football players and 1.3% of men's basketball players later play professionally). 
Moreover, although the NCAA emphasizes the life lessons athletes may learn through their 
athletic training and participation, the reality may be far different. See JAMES L. SCHULMAN & 
WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LiFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 265 
(200 I) (finding that athletes are no more likely to provide leadership than are their non-athlete 
peers). Many coaches, in fact, socialize their players "into young men with warped perspectives on 
obedience, morality and competition. These young men are often unable to function appropriately in 
the real world ... until they learn new methods of behavior and thought." Telander, supra note 39, 
at 98. Sociologists studying this phenomenon have concluded that coaches often 
educate participants in a "dysfunctional manner." ... [T]he things players are taught are not 
what they need to learn to be good citizens .... "How often is blind obedience taught in place 
of the courage of conviction? How often is intimidation taught under the guise of tenacity? 
How often is manipulation and deliberate rule violation taught as strategy? How often is 
composure and sportsmanship mistaken for lack of effort?" 
Id. at 98-99 (quoting sociologists John Massengale and James Frey of the University of Nevada at 
Las Vegas, who noted that coaches are "experts at brainwashing, at keeping their players 
subservient, thankful for the simplest of rewards," and explaining that many former football players 
cannot function "on their own"). 
225. Athletic services on the football and men's basketball teams cannot be required elements of 
any course of study because if they were, regular, non-athlete students could not meet that 
requirement, and as a result could not major in that particular course of study. NCAA rules require 
all courses for which credit may be granted to be open to all students, not solely to athletes. See DIV. 
I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 16.02.3, 16.12.1.1., 16.12.2.1. Consequently, playing football or 
basketball cannot, under NCAA rules, be a requirement for any major. 
226. See Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10 ('"Since the individuals are rendering 
services which are directly related to--and indeed constitute an integral part of-their educational 
program, they are serving primarily as students and not primarily as employees. In our view this is a 
very fundamental distinction for it means that the mutual interests of the students and the 
educational institution in the services being rendered are predominantly academic rather than 
economic in nature."' (quoting St. Clare's Hasp., 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002)); see id., slip op. at 10, 
2004 WL 1588744, at *14. 
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that their relationship with the university was not economic. In the case 
of employee-athletes, the dearth of educational content in their services 
as athletes confirms that their working relationships with their 
universities are economic, not primarily academic.227 
c. Under the Third Factor, Athletes Are Supervised by Coaching 
Staff, Not by Faculty 
The third criterion the Board used in Brown to conclude that graduate 
assistants were not employees was the nature of the "graduate student 
assistants' relationship with the faculty."228 At Brown University, faculty 
oversaw the functions graduate assistants carried out and decided 
whether graduate assistants' scholarships would be renewed.229 In this 
regard, the Board heavily emphasized the supervisory role of faculty, as 
opposed to university administrators, to show that the work of T As, 
RAs, and proctors was part of their education.230 The Board pointedly 
observed that the faculty members who oversaw the teaching and 
research of the graduate assistants were the same individuals who taught 
them, supervised their studies, and evaluated their dissertations.231 
Because the graduate assistants were supervised by faculty members, 
rather than by administrators or other staff, teaching and learning 
functions were occurring through the services being performed, and, 
therefore, graduate assistants were acting as students, not as employees. 
The situation regarding employee-athletes is diametrically opposed to 
that of the graduate assistants in Brown. Faculty have no supervisory 
role whatsoever over the athletic services athletes provide.232 Rather, 
coaches and athletic staff, who are not faculty at those schools, supervise 
athletes.233 The fact that coaches, not faculty members, supervise the 
227. See infra Part 111.8.2.b.(4). 
228. Brown, slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *10. 
229. See id., slip op. at 7, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9. 
230. See id. ("Brown's faculty oversees graduate student assistants in their role as a research or 
teaching assistant. ... [M]ost [graduate student assistants] perform under the direction and control 
of faculty members ... [and] generally do not teach independently .... RAs performing research 
do so under grants applied for by faculty members, ... [who] are often the same faculty that teach 
or advise the graduate assistant student in their [sic] coursework or dissertation preparation."). 
231. See id. 
232. Faculty do not review a player's athletic contribution to the university and usually may not 
even observe practice, let alone comment upon an athlete's performance or make suggestions for 
improvement. 
233. Coaches are not eligible for tenure, they do not engage in scholarly research or publication, 
and they rarely, if ever, teach courses that are open to the general student body. See Steven G. 
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athletes' services demonstrates that players' work as athletes is not 
educational in nature. Moreover, university faculty have no authority 
whatsoever over renewal of an athletic grant-in-aid; that decision lies 
solely in the hands of the coach,234 and, therefore, cannot fairly be 
described as academic. Under Brown, these facts establish that 
employee-athletes are not students with respect to their services but are 
employees and that their relationship with their universities regarding 
those services is not primarily academic. 
d. Under the Fourth Factor, Athletic Scholarships Are Compensation 
for Athletic Services, Not Merely Financial Aid 
Finally, the Brown Board relied upon a fourth element in concluding 
that the graduate assistants were primarily students and not employees. 
The financial rewards graduate assistants received were not pay for 
teaching and research services performed, the Board asserted, but were 
merely financial aid to permit attendance at Brown. 235 In support of this 
conclusion, the Board underscored two aspects of graduate assistants' 
financial packages. First, the amount provided to T As and RAs was the 
same as that provided to graduate fellows for whom no teaching or 
Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Box: The Role of the Athletic Coach Within the Academic 
Institution, 16 J.C. & U.L. I, 9-18 (1989) (asking in the 1980s whether coaches may fairly be 
considered faculty and concluding even then that they could not); id. at 18, 28-34 (indicating that 
coaches are not normally placed in the tenure system and arguing that they should not be eligible for 
tenure); Edward N. Stoner II & Arlie R. Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract 
("MCC'}: A Better Starting Point for Your Next Negotiation, 16 J.C. & U.L. 43, 46 (1989) 
(indicating that "[a] coach does not teach in a classroom and the precepts of academic freedom do 
not apply to coaches" and giving reasons why few coaches would request tenure when negotiating 
their contracts) (citation omitted); cf Fish, Sign of the Times, supra note 19 (describing coaches' 
recent contract terms and failing to note that those terms impose teaching or scholarship obligations 
or that they place coaches in the tenure system); Fish, Sweet Deals, supra note 19 (same). As 
college sports have become professionalized, occasional instances in which some coaches 
functioned like faculty have all but disappeared. NCAA policy changes evidence this trend. In the 
1980s the NCAA recommended, but did not require, that institutions' contracts with coaches should 
be "similar to those entered into with the other members of the faculty ... [and] should include the 
assignment of faculty rank, benefits of tenure ... , and such other rights ... as are enjoyed by other 
members of the contracting institution's faculty." NCAA, 1986-87 MANUAL OF THE NATIONAL 
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION 209 (1986). Significantly, not only has this policy never been 
mandated, it is no longer even recommended with respect to Division I institutions. See NCAA, 
2004-05 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL (2004), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/ 
division_i_manuaV2004-05/2004-05_dl_rnanual.pdf (failing to include such language). 
234. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. 
235. See Brown, slip op. at 6-7,2004 WL 1588744, at *9-10. 
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research activity was required.236 Second, the fact that financial aid 
awarded to graduate assistants was unrelated to the quality or value of 
services they rendered indicated that the payment was not compensation 
for services rendered, but was financial assistance to attend school.237 
At first blush, it might appear as though the Board's reasoning with 
respect to this fourth factor would equally apply to grant-in-aid athletes. 
After all, such athletes receive the same amount of financial aid, i.e., full 
tuition, room, board, and books, 238 as do non-athlete full-scholarship 
students. In addition, the amount of scholarship each athlete receives 
does not necessarily depend upon his intrinsic value as a football or 
basketball player. Thus, a journeyman offensive lineman can receive the 
same full scholarship as a star quarterback. From this, the NCAA could 
argue, as did Brown University with regard to graduate assistants, that 
"grants-in-aid"239 are merely fmancial assistance enabling these students 
to attend college. 
In both of the underpinnings for this fourth criterion, however, the 
Board's reasoning is fallacious. First, it does not follow that TAs and 
RAs were not receiving compensation, but merely financial aid, simply 
because they received the same amount as did some other graduate 
fellows. In determining whether a payment is compensation for services 
rendered, the proper inquiry is whether the payment would cease were 
services to be withheld, 240 not whether a third party-a fellow in this 
instance-receives like payment without providing similar services. In 
other words, the fact that Brown University voluntarily supports fellows 
does not mean distributions of similar amounts to T As and RAs are not 
compensation for the services they render. Indeed, were T As and RAs to 
withhold their teaching and research services either collectively or 
236. See id., slip op. at 3, 6-7,2004 WL 1588744, at *3, *9-10. 
237. See id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *6, (referencing Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974)); id., slip op. at 4, 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1488744, at *5, *II n.27. 
238. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.7, 15.02.2, .5. 
239. The NCAA requires schools to refer to the agreement between the university and the athlete 
as a "grant-in-aid" or scholarship, rather than as an employment contract providing pay or other 
compensation. Article 12.1.1 of the Division I Manual makes it clear that an athlete is not permitted 
to receive "pay" for athletic services: "An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be 
eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or her 
athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport." DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 
3, art. 12.1.1. And under NCAA bylaws, the grant-in-aid is not considered "pay" and thus is 
permitted. See id. art. 12.01.4. 
240. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 24, at 608-09 (asserting that grants-in-aid are compensation for 
services because athletes lose scholarships by withdrawing from their sports). 
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individually, it is inconceivable they would continue to recetve full 
"scholarships" and "stipends." Thus, this "financial aid" must be 
. fi . 241 compensation or servtces. 
Additionally, even if the Board in Brown were correct that the proper 
inquiry is whether a third party receives the same financial benefit 
without having to provide services, the athlete situation is vastly 
different. Athletic grants-in-aid are never given without the requirement 
of athletic services being rendered. Even third- or fourth-string athletes 
who do not play during games must still come to practice, abide by team 
rules, undertake required and "voluntary" training, and, in short, perform 
all the services other grant-in-aid athletes must perform?42 In fact, no 
third parties receive athletic grants-in-aid without having to participate 
in the athletic program as a condition of continued receipt. 
Comparing the athletic scholarship with the merit-based or need-
based scholarship awarded to a non-athlete undergraduate also shows 
that the former is compensation. Athletic scholarships are granted only if 
the athlete provides athletic services, while merit- or need-based 
scholarships awarded to non-athletes require no such services in return. 
The latter are given to enable students simply to attend the university. In 
addition, the athletes' situation is distinct from that of graduate assistants 
in that undergraduate employee-athletes often have all costs waived 
while regular undergraduate students rarely receive scholarships 
covering all costs of attendance. 
Likewise, the Board's conclusion that payments to TAs and RAs are 
financial aid, not compensation for services, does not follow from the 
fact that the amount of aid was unrelated to the quality of services 
rendered or to their value on an open market. All over America, where 
employees' wages are set either by collective bargaining agreements 
establishing uniform wages or under federal or state civil service rules 
similarly setting uniform wages within classifications, employees 
receive equivalent compensation regardless of the quality of the services 
each renders or their intrinsic value.243 Notwithstanding their uniform 
241. Similarly, under NCAA rules, college athletes may lose their athletic scholarships if they fail 
to perform their athletic services. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.3.4.l(d), 15.3.5.1; 
Lynch, supra note 24, at 609; Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); 
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). In fact, they may, and often do, lose 
their scholarships merely by failing to perform well athletically. See id.; Interview with anonymous 
employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003). 
242. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); Interview with anonymous 
employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). 
243. Uniform wages are standard in collective bargaining agreements. See United Mine Workers 
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wages, it could hardly be argued that such individuals are not 
employees. 
Even if the Board's reliance on uniformity of wages as evidence that 
service providers are not employees were logically correct, once again, 
the athlete situation is distinctly different from that faced by the graduate 
assistants in Brown. In Brown, the decision to make compensation or 
wages uniform among graduate students was the university's, acting 
independently of any other university.244 In the case of athletes, 
however, the uniformity of compensation for all grant-in-aid athletes is 
mandated by agreement among NCAA member schools.245 More 
specifically, NCAA member institutions made athlete wages uniform by 
agreeing to limit athlete compensation to the level of the cost of 
attending each respective university.246 This anticompetitive and illegal 
arrangement247 can hardly serve as a justification for concluding that 
athletes are not employees any more than a wage-fixing arrangement 
among employers in industry would render their workers non-
employees. Without the NCAA's wage-fixing agreement standardizing 
the price of labor, there is no reason to believe athletes' wages would 
remain uniform. The free market would operate, allowing those athletes 
with the greatest skill to gamer the greatest economic rewards. In 
addition, the fact that the fixed wage for athletes coincides with the cost 
of attending school does not transform what is compensation for services 
into non-compensatory financial aid. The fact that the compensation 
comes in the form of in-kind benefits, e.g., tuition, room, board, and 
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965) ("This Court has recognized that a legitimate aim 
of any national labor organization is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence 
of such union activity may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards." 
(citation omitted)). "Inevitably, this process produces standardization of employment terms for 
particular classes of employees." Robert A. McCormick & Matthew C. McKinnon, Professional 
Football's Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws, 33 EMORY L.J. 375, 
384 (1984); see Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective 
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. I, 8-9 (1971). 
244. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 3-4, 2004 WL 1588744, at *4-5 (July 13, 
2004) (noting that Brown University, not other universities, sets graduate assistant stipends and 
tuition remission levels at Brown). 
245. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1. In actuality, athletes' wages are not uniform 
because superior athletes, those with the most potential earning power, commonly receive illicit 
payments from boosters, and indeed from the universities themselves, in defiance of NCAA rules 
limiting compensation to the grant-in-aid. See supra note 160. This black-market compensation is 
evidence of varying market values for different athletes' services and demonstrates that their actual 
compensation is anything but uniform. 
246. See DIV.l MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
247. See supra note 37. 
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books, likewise makes it no less compensatory.248 
In sum, the Board's decision in Brown was grounded upon the idea 
that the relationship between graduate assistants and the university was 
not an economic one, but rather was primarily an academic one?49 This 
followed from the Board's view of the Act as a "'vision of a 
fundamentally economic relationship between employers and 
employees. "'250 Because the underlying premise of the Act is to cover 
only economic relationships/51 the Board refused to "assert jurisdiction 
over relationships that are 'primarily educational. "'252 
2. Employee-Athletes Are Not Primarily Students and Their 
Relationship with Their Universities Is an Economic One 
Brown stands for the proposition that graduate assistants are not 
employees under the NLRA because their relationship with universities 
is primarily academic and not economic. 253 The relationship between 
employee-athletes and their universities, by contrast, is nearly 
exclusively economic, or commercial, and is decidedly not 
predominantly academic. Thus, by virtue of the Board's own reasoning 
in Brown, employee-athletes are employees under the National Labor 
Relations Act. 
Having shown that employee-athletes meet the common law 
definition of "employee,"254 and that the four factors used in Brown also 
support our thesis, we now proceed to a discussion of the facts 
surrounding the economic and academic status of employee-athletes to 
confirm the applicability of the Brown Board's reasoning to them. The 
248. Under analogous federal income tax principles, both cash and in-kind benefits can be 
compensatory. "Gross income includes income realized in any form, whether in money, property, or 
services. Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, 
or other property, as well as in cash." Treas. Reg. § \.61-l(a) (2005). More specifically, "[i]f 
services are paid for in exchange for other services, the fair market value of such other services 
taken in payment must be included in income as compensation." /d.§ \.61-2(d)(I). 
249. See Brown, slip op. at I, 2004 WL 1588744, at *I. 
250. /d., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *8 (quoting WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 
1273, 1275 (1999)) (alteration in original). 
251. See id., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *8. 
252. /d., slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *8. 
253. See id., slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7. 
254. See supra Part liLA. Significantly, the majority in Brown did not find that graduate 
assistants were not common law employees, only that they were not statutory employees. Only 
Member Schaumber contended that graduate assistants were not common law employees. See 
Brown, slip op. at 8 n.27, 2004 WL 1588744, at *II n.27. 
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remainder of this Article sets out those facts, first focusing in Part 
III.B.2.a on the entrenched economic nature of the college sports 
industry, and then documenting in Part III.B.2.b the lack of genuine 
academic experiences for athletes, while simultaneously revealing that 
even the NCAA's academic rules are designed to further universities' 
economic interests more than athletes' academic needs. 
a. College Sports Are Thoroughly Commercial 
To comply with the teachings of Brown, the NCAA must argue that 
athletes are primarily students and only secondarily athletes. 255 This 
notion, in tum, is grounded upon the related assertion that college sports 
are amateur, not commercial. Neither is true. Many of the athletes in 
revenue-generating sports attend universities not for their intellectual 
development but in the nearly always unrealistic hope they will play 
professionally later.256 More importantly, the college sports industry is 
far from "amateur." Instead, revenue-generating sports are highly 
professional and commercial in every sense save that of their obligations 
to their employees. College sports is a fabulously profitable commercial 
enterprise as well as a lucrative component of the sports entertainment 
industry. Athletes generate great wealth for their university-employers 
through their skill and effort. As a result, their services and their 
relationships with their university-employers are deeply commercial. 
The commercial nature of the college sports industry is illustrated by 
revealing the vast wealth it generates.257 While the $6 billion NCAA-
CBS contract is an exquisite example, 258 it is only one of many. Like the 
NCAA, the conference entities into which the universities group 
themselves also sell rights to broadcast their members' football and 
basketball games.259 In so doing, they, too, profit handsomely. For 
example, the Southeastern Conference generated $122.5 million in the 
2002-03 season/60 largely from the sale of rights to televise regular-
255. See Brown, slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7. 
256. See infra note 399. 
257. The financial structure and size of the college sports industry will be explored in greater 
depth in a forthcoming article. 
258. See supra note II (describing NCAA's $6 billion sale to CBS of the rights to broadcast 
March Madness over an eleven-year period). 
259. See Riggs, supra note 151, at 138. A few universities, like Notre Dame, have remained 
independent, opting not to join a conference, but instead to reserve for themselves the economic 
value of their television rights. See id. 
260. See SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE, IRS FORM 990, EIN 63-0377461 (2003) (on file with 
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season football and men's basketball games, conference basketball 
tournament games, its football championship game, and post-season 
bowl games. 261 Conferences likewise profit when their universities win, 
or even attend, toumaments.262 At the end of the 2003-04 college 
football season, college bowl games generated more than $181 million 
in additional revenue for the conferences of participating universities?63 
The following year, bowls distributed nearly $190 million. 264 Most 
revenues earned by the NCAA and conferences are then distributed to 
their college and university members. 265 
In addition to harvesting the financial benefit of distributions from the 
NCAA and from conferences, colleges and universities with successful 
athletic programs also enjoy significant revenue directly from their 
operations. Ticket sales alone generate substantial income. For the fall 
2003 season, more than 3.6 million fans attended football games at the 
top-five-attended schools.266 In 2004, Division I men's basketball games 
authors). 
261. See id. In another example, the Big Ten Tournament netted $2!.9 million in its first five 
years from the sale of broadcasting rights and tickets as well as from corporate sponsorships. See 
Joe Rexrode, Success Story: Big Ten Event Has Made Money, Helped Teams Get Prepared for 
NCAA Tourney, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, available at http://www.greenandwhite.com/ 
mens_basketball/p_030312_bigtentoumey _l c.html. 
262. See 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 14. One athlete we interviewed commented that 
his school was "compensated well for being invited to the field of sixty-four. We were taken out for 
a steak dinner," he said, "that was our reward .... How much money did the school make?" There is 
an "inequitable relationship between people generating the money and the people who distribute the 
money," another said. 
263. See NCAA, 2003-04 Postseason Football Analysis of Excess Bowl Revenue and Expense 
by Conference, http://www/ncaa.org/financial/postseason_football/2003-04/2003ExcessRevenue 
.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005); NCAA, 2003-04 Postseason Football Summary of Institutional 
Expenses, http://www.ncaa.org/financial/postseason_football/2003-04/2003summarylnstitutional 
Expenses.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
264. See Paul Pedersen, College Bowl Games Spread the Wealth, TREASURE COAST Bus. J., Jan. 
15, 2005, at A\. 
265. Thus, in 2003-04, Division I universities received NCAA distributions totaling more than 
$280.1 million. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 23. Annual conference distributions to 
university members are also significant. In 2002-03, the Southeastern Conference distributed more 
than $103 million to its twelve university members, averaging $8.6 million each. See 
SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE, supra note 260. 
266. See FOOTBALL ATTENDANCE, supra note 36, at 4. The five universities with the highest 
average attendance per football game were Michigan, Penn State, Tennessee, Ohio State, and 
Georgia. !d. The University of Michigan enjoyed the largest per-game attendance in the nation, with 
an average in 2003 of 110,918 fans./d. In fall2005, season tickets there cost $350 per seat. Ticket 
revenues alone could, therefore, exceed $38.5 million for the year. See U-M Reveals Football Ticket 
Prices, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 9, 2005, at 2C. 
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drew more than 25.5 million attendees.267 
Not surprisingly, successful athletic programs derive the most 
income, and the greatest revenue follows particularly successful 
seasons. 
268 Of the $280.1 million the NCAA distributed among member 
conferences in 2004,269 $105.3 million was divided among the 
conferences based upon the teams' tournament performances. 270 That 
year, each conference received approximately $141,000 for every game 
a conference member played in the preceding six tournaments, other 
than for the three final tournament games.271 Thus, as a general rule, the 
greater the number of teams from a given conference participating in the 
tournament, and the further those teams advance, the more money the 
NCAA distributes to that conference.272 In 2005, conferences received 
an estimated $152,000 for each tournament game, other than the three 
final games, that a conference member played in the preceding s1x 
toumaments.273 Total distributions to all conferences based on 
267. See BASKETBALL RECORDS, supra note 36. At the five universities with the highest average 
attendance per men's basketball game, over 1.5 million fans attended games, an average of more 
than 20,500 per game. Id. at 263. The top five programs in per-game attendance were Kentucky, 
Syracuse, North Carolina, Louisville, and Maryland. I d. The University of Kentucky enjoyed the 
largest average per-game attendance. See id. In the 2004-05 season, ticket prices there ranged from 
$22 to $27 per seat. See Univ. of Ky. Athletic Dep't, Men's Basketball Ticket Information, 
http://www .ukathletics.corn/index.php?s=&change_ well_id=2&url_article_id= 11359 [hereinafter 
Kentucky Ticket Information] (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). With an average per-game attendance at 
Kentucky of 22,710, see BASKETBALL RECORDS, supra note 36, at 263, ticket sales generated 
between $499,620 and $613,170 per game, for a total of $8.5 million to $10.4 million for the 
season. See Kentucky Ticket Information, supra (providing University of Kentucky 2004-05 home 
schedule of seventeen games). 
268. See Frank, supra note 187; Telander, supra note 39, at 97; Martin, supra note II. 
269. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 24. 
270. See id.; NCAA, 2004-05 Revenue Distribution Plan, para. 5, http://wwwl.ncaa.org/finance/ 
revenue_distribution_plan (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA, Revenue Distribution 
Plan]; Stefan Fatsis, Money Drives March Madness, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 16,2004, at Cl. 
271. See Tim Martin, Big Ten's Share of NCAA Pot May Dwindle, CENTRE DAILY TIMES (State 
College, Penn.), Mar. 16, 2004, at Bl; see also Tom Lambert, Spartan Fever: March Madness is 
Sweeping East Lansing as MSU Basketball Takes Center Stage at the Final Four: Fans Revel in 
Men's, Women's Success, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 31,2005, at lA; Suggs, supra note II; NCAA, 
Distribution of Basketball-Related Moneys According to Number of Units by Conference, 1999-
2004, http:! /www .ncaa.org/financial/revenue _distribution/ d 1_bkb _distribution. pdf [hereinafter 
NCAA, Distribution Units by Conference] (last visited Mar. 23, 2005); NCAA, Revenue 
Distribution Plan, supra note 270. 
272. See Martin, supra note 271, at B 1; Martin, supra note 11. Conferences have their own 
internal agreements governing the distribution of tournament revenues among their members. The 
Big Ten, for example, divides NCAA tournament receipts evenly among its eleven member schools 
after participating schools' expenses are paid. See id. 
273. See NCAA, Distribution Units by Conference, supra note 271; NCAA, Revenue 
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tournament play alone aggregated approximately $113.7 million.274 
NCAA Division I football programs with the most successful seasons 
may be eligible to compete in the Bowl Championship Series (BCS), 
comprised of the Rose Bowl, the Tostitos Fiesta Bowl, the Nokia Sugar 
Bowl, and the FedEx Orange Bowl. The total revenue from the 2005-06 
championship series, excluding the Rose Bowl, was projected to be 
$93,150,000.275 Of that sum, conferences of participating teams received 
$86,630,000.276 In addition, the fourth BCS game, the Rose Bowl, 
generated nearly $29 million for participating schools in 2003-04.277 
Winning seasons also generate substantial increases in revenues from 
the sale of athletic apparel and other merchandise bearing the logo of the 
school or the number of a star player.278 Athletic success likewise 
stimulates more interest among, and revenue from, schools' corporate 
sponsors or "partners."279 Finally, but not insignificantly, universities 
with successful athletic programs also derive the ancillary fmancial 
benefit of "millions of dollars of indirect revenue from alumni donations 
and increased enrollment."280 
Distribution Plan, supra note 270; see also Lambert, supra note 271 (indicating that conferences 
receive no additional revenue if their teams advance to the final tournament games); Suggs, supra 
note II (explaining which tournament games entitle universities to payment under the NCAA 
formula). 
274. See NCAA, Revenue Distribution Plan, supra note 270; NCAA, Distribution Units by 
Conference, supra note 271. 
275. See Bowl Championship Series, Revenue Distribution, http://www.bcsfootball.org/ 
index.cfm?page=revenue [hereinafter BCS, Revenue Distribution] (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). Rose 
Bowl revenue is excluded because that money is governed under a separate contract and is not 
collected by, or distributed from, the BCS entity. The Rose Bowl organization, not the BCS, pays 
the conferences of Rose Bowl participants directly. See id. 
276. See id. 
277. See NCAA, 2003-04 Distribution of BCS Revenue, http://www.ncaa.org/financiall 
postseason_footbaii/2003-04/2003BcsRevenue.htrnl (last visited Mar. 14, 2005). 
278. See Tim Martin, The Green Machine, LANSING ST. J., Dec. 16, 2001, at lA (noting how 
MSU's licensing revenue reached a record $1.7 million following its NCAA men's basketball title 
in 2000); see also D. Stanley Eitzen, Slaves of Big-Time College Sports, USA TODAY, Sept. I, 
2000, (Magazine), at 27 (estimating $2.5 billion in annual sales of licensed college merchandise, 
generating $100 million for universities annually); id. (noting that the University of Michigan earns 
approximately $6 million annually from sales of merchandise). 
279. Corporate sponsor Comcast Cable, for example, paid the University of Maryland 
$25 million for naming rights to that school's basketball arena. See Student-Athletes, BALT. SUN, 
May 5, 2004, at 18A. Value City will pay $12.5 million over several years for such rights at Ohio 
State University. See Tim Martin, Corporate Sponsorships Net Millions for Ohio St., LANSING ST. 
J., Dec. 16,2001, at 6A. 
280. Schott, supra note 24 (citation omitted); see also PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, 
SPORTS AND THE LAW 796 (2d ed. 1998) (asserting that Patrick Ewing's performance at 
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Under Brown, our thesis requires a showing that the athlete's 
relationship with his university is not primarily academic, but is instead 
commercial in nature.281 The huge financial payoffs universities reap 
from their winning football and men's basketball teams demonstrate that 
these institutions have a powerful incentive to focus on athletic success, 
not on academics. The staggering wealth these sports generate makes 
plain their fundamentally commercial nature. 
b. The University-Athlete Relationship Is an Economic One: 
Academic Standards Are Formulated to Serve Universities' 
Commercial Interests Rather than Bona Fide Academic Values 
Just as the university-athlete relationship is undeniably commercial, it 
is decidedly not primarily academic. To demonstrate this fact, we next 
examine the state of academics for employee-athletes in Division I 
revenue-generating sports. Even NCAA academic standards are 
designed to serve the employers' enormous commercial interests, 
enabling universities to recruit and retain gifted athletes, rather than to 
promote true academic achievement. The weight of the evidence 
demonstrates that the majority of these employee-athletes are not 
primarily students.282 On the contrary, most of them are inadequately 
prepared for academic inquiry and, once enrolled, face enormous 
obstacles to fully experiencing the intellectual aspect of university 
life.283 The NCAA's insistence on denoting college athletes as "student-
athletes" is a clear attempt to camouflage their true function as 
employees in the commercial college sports entertainment industry. 
Academic ability is independent of athletic talent.284 Consequently, a 
Georgetown University for four years helped generate a forty-seven percent increase in the number 
of applications and a forty-point increase in its freshman SAT scores); Laura Freedman, Note, Pay 
or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 699-702 (2003) (documenting significant increases in donations and 
applications at the University of Maryland following particularly successful seasons in football and 
men's basketball). 
281. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 5, 2004 WL 1588744, at *7 (July 13, 
2004). 
282. See Part III.B.2.b. 
283. The demands of the classroom are commonly viewed by coaches as "secondary" and as an 
inconvenient distraction from the real purpose, winning on the field. Interview with anonymous 
employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); 
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). 
284. This lack of correlation is the reason why some great athletes lack intellectual ability while 
others are extremely intelligent. 
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university program that screens admissions applications based upon 
potential academic success necessarily excludes many talented athletes, 
leaving a team on the playing field with diminished athletic potential. As 
former NCAA Executive Director Byers remembered: 
The big timers-building a national entertainment business-
wanted the great players on the field, whether or not they met 
customary academic requirements. In the new open-door era, [in 
which virtually all high school seniors were academically 
"eligible" for college athletics because of the wholesale 
abrogation of academic entrance requirements,285 ] victory-
minded coaches sensed a potential recruiting paradise.286 
To avail themselves of the best potential players, irrespective of 
academic ability, colleges and universities have created academic 
programs in name only.287 These programs foster the illusion that 
athletes are true students without subjecting them to a genuine academic 
experience-one that would interfere with practice or playing schedules 
or one that would disqualify some of the best athletes from the school 
and, thus, from the team. In favoring commercial success over academic 
standards, colleges and universities have minimized academic entrance 
requirements for athletes, 288 weakened academic standards, 289 diluted 
curricula,290 assigned responsibilities to athletes that would conflict with 
any meaningful academic program/91 and stood by as wave after wave 
fails to graduate or even to leam.292 Consequently, the label "student-
285. In 1973, NCAA members completely abolished minimum academic standards for entering 
students by repealing the so-cal\ed "1.600 rule" at its annual convention. See BYERS, supra note 6, 
at 165, 297, 339; Timeline-1940 to 1979, supra note 182. The 1.600 rule had been a modest 
attempt to ensure entering athletes were minimal\y prepared to do col\ege-level work. Under the 
rule, the athlete had to obtain a minimum high school grade point average (GPA) in combination 
with a minimum SAT or ACT score, which together would predict his ability to earn a 1.600 (or C-) 
GPA during his freshman year ofcol\ege. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 165, 158-59; Time/ine-1940 
to 1979, supra note 182. 
286. BYERS, supra note 6, at 340. 
287. See infra Part lli.B.2.b.(4). "[N]either the NCAA nor the student-athlete pursues [the 
NCAA's academic goals]." Chin, supra note 3, at 1234. 
288. See infra Part III.B.2.b.(l). 
289. See infra Parts lli.B.2.b.(l), (4)-(7). 
290. See infra Part III.B.2.b.(4). 
291. See supra Part liLA. I; infra Part III.B.2.b.(2), (3). 
292. See infra Parts III.B.2.b.( I )-(8). Allowing aid to be granted on the basis of athletic ability 
rather than academic potential or financial need, and relaxing entrance requirements for athletes, 
meant giving up hope that "athletes be genuine students, capable of profiting from higher 
education." BYERS, supra note 6, at 153. 
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athlete" is mere window dressing for individuals who, in substance, are 
employees. 
(1) Special Admissions Practices and NCAA Admissions Policies 
Serve Universities' Commercial Interests and Allow 
Enrollment of Athletes Who Are Not Bona Fide Students 
The erosion of the college athlete's academic experience begins prior 
to enrollment. Many athletes lack the academic preparation or ability 
required to benefit from a university educational program. The system 
by which universities admit athletes despite inadequate academic 
credentials is commonly known as "special admissions."293 Utilized 
originally to grant admission to children of some alumni and other 
donors, it has become an important tool of athletic departments to enroll 
promising athletes with inadequate academic training or potential. 294 
The proportion of special admissions students, or "special admits," on 
revenue-generating teams like football and men's basketball is 
dramatically higher than for non-revenue sports and for the student body 
as a whole.295 Indeed, some talented athletes have been admitted despite 
being unable to read.296 Not surprisingly, special admissions athletes 
293. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 602; Chin, supra note 3, at 1239--40. 
294. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 14.1.7.1.1 (allowing Division I programs to engage in 
special admissions practices); see also DUDERSTADT, supra note 24, at 193-95; SACK & 
STAUROWSKY, supra note 14; SCHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 224, at 49 (documenting the 
divergence of athletes' SAT scores from student averages at Division I-A private and public 
universities, with greatest divergence among men's basketball and football players at private 
schools, and among football, wrestling, and men's basketball players at public schools); ZIMBALIST, 
supra note 14, at 16--53; Lynch, supra note 24, at 602-{)3, 610; Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 (noting 
that special admissions programs are considered the only means for obtaining sufficient numbers of 
superior athletes because many are not academically qualified); Derek Bok, The Purely Pragmatic 
University: The Costs of Commercializing the Academy, HARV. MAG., May-June 2003, at 28, 28-
30; Jim Naughton, Athletes Lack Grades and Test Scores of Other Students, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., July 25, 1997, at A43. 
295. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1239--40. "It is estimated that over thirty percent of football and 
men's basketball players are special admissions students, compared with just four percent of the 
regular student body." Riggs, supra note 151, at 141 (citing Jonathan Marshall, Studies Say that 
Colleges Exploit Athletes, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1993, at El). "At some schools, sixty percent of 
special admissions [students] are athletes," and their concentration among some other sports teams 
is even greater. Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 & n.224 (citing Craig Smith, UW Tops in "Special 
Admits "--85% of Athletes Enter with Low Standards, SEATTLE TIMES, May 20, 1991, at Bl). "[I]n 
1989 over 85% of the University of Washington's football and men's basketball recruits were 
special admits." Id. at 1240 n.224 (citing Smith, supra). 
296. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240; see also 135 CONG. REc. 18,028-29 (1989) (statement of 
Sen. Simon) (describing how star football player Dexter Manley could not read beyond a second 
grade level after four years as a student at Oklahoma State University); BYERS, supra note 6, at 299 
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consistently underperform their peers in their college classes. 297 Because 
colleges and universities so frequen~ly offer admission to star athletes298 
who are not prepared to do academic work,299 such athletes often enroll 
with no real chance to benefit from the universities' educational 
programs. 
Recent amendments to NCAA legislation weaken initial academic 
eligibility requirements for potential athletes, thus exalting athletic 
promise over intellectual preparedness. Enacted in 1992, Proposition 16 
sets forth the initial minimum academic requirements for a Division I 
athlete to be considered a "qualifier" and therefore eligible to play, 
practice, and receive financial aid during his freshman year.300 Under the 
legislation, a sliding scale is used to calibrate a required minimum grade 
point average (GPA) and standardized test score (e.g., SAT) so the 
higher an athlete's GPA, the lower his minimum SAT score may be to 
achieve qualifier status.301 Prior to 2003, athletes could not be qualifiers 
unless they earned a minimum combined verbal and math score of 820 
on the SAT.302 Recently, however, the NCAA relaxed the standard, 
making it possible for athletes earning a combined verbal and math score 
of 400 on the SAT to be qualifiers. 303 A score of 400 is the result if the 
(describing how Kevin Ross claimed not to have learned to read despite having spent four years as a 
basketball player at Creighton University). 
297. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240--41. Realizing they can gain university admission with sub-
par academic, but elevated athletic, credentials often prompts athletes to underperform academically 
in high school as well. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 300-01; Chin, supra note 3, at 1242. 
298. Universities admit star athletes with inadequate academic training or ability, not to be 
students, but to form superior, semi-professional athletic teams in their revenue-generating sports. 
More than a decade ago, economist Robert W. Brown estimated that "each football player recruited 
by 'special admissions' earns major NCAA schools an average of $155,000 in additional revenues." 
Riggs, supra note !51, at 141 (citing Marshall, supra note 295). Patrick Ewing alone generated an 
estimated $12.3 million in value for Georgetown University in the 1980s. See id. at 142 (citing Pat 
Ewing Made Money for His College Team Too, JET, Jan. 20, 1986, at 49). 
299. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 299. "Isn't it really academically indefensible to grant 
admission to UCLA to someone with a 700 on his SAT and a 2.000 grade-point average? I can't see 
why we put ourselves in these positions." Thoughts of the Day, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999, 
available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/ 19991220/active/3626n26.html (quoting Charles E. 
Young, Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., L.A., 1990). 
300. Dtv. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 14.3.1, 14.3.l.l(a)-{b), 14.3.1.1.1; see also Kay Hawes, 
Opportunity vs. Exploitation?: Concerns Over Standards and Higher-Education Access Sparked 
Debates in '90s, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 20, 1999, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/ 
19991220/active/3626n28.html. 
301. Conversely, the higher the athlete's SAT score, the lower his GPA may be without losing 
"qualifier" status. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, at 141, art. 14.3.1.1.1 (former qualifier index). 
302. See id. 
303. See id. at 143, art. 14.3.1.1.1 (current qualifier index); Tom Farrey, It's All Academic Now, 
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applicant gets every question on those two parts of the test wrong. 304 
Under the new NCAA rule, a high school senior who misses every 
question on the SAT, but who has a GPA of 3.55, may be admitted to an 
NCAA member school where he will be eligible to compete as a 
freshman in intercollegiate athletics. 305 Thus, the NCAA requires no 
demonstration of any objective academic ability whatsoever under the 
SAT as long as the athlete meets the subjective GPA element. And while 
the 3.55 GPA requirement might appear to be academically demanding, 
grades have notoriously been subject to manipulation by high school 
teachers and administrators. 306 Moreover, special high schools primarily 
for athletes have begun to proliferate. 307 They appear to play the major 
role of ensuring that athletes receive the grades needed to make them 
ESPN.COM, Oct. 31, 2002, http://espn.go.com/columns/farrey_tom/1453693.html; see also Jeffrey 
M. Waller, A Necessary Evil: Proposition I6 and Its Impact on Academics and Athletics in the 
NCAA, I DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 193-94 (2003) (identifying the new 
sliding scale as having evolved from the 1992 Proposition 16 legislation). 
304. See Farrey, supra note 303; College Board, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.collegeboard.com/student/testing/sat/about/sat/FAQ.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) 
(noting in "What do SAT scores look like?" that each part of the SAT is scored on a scale of200 to 
800); id. (noting in "Is it true that you get a 200 on the SAT just for signing your name?" that 200 is 
the lowest score the college board reports for each SAT test (verbal and math)). 
305. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, at 143, art. 14.3.1.1.1 (current qualifier index). The SAT 
provides an objective measure of academic ability because it is not manipulable and can be used to 
compare one student with all others who took the SAT nationally, while high school GPA, by 
contrast, is only a subjective measure of academic achievement. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 158-
59. 
306. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 159; see also infra notes 307-08 and accompanying text. High 
school grades are often enhanced to assist exceptional athletes gain college admission. It is easy to 
understand why high school teachers might inflate the grades of an economically disadvantaged 
student who happens to be a gifted athlete. Speaking of students at Philadelphia's Franklin High 
School, where only about twenty percent of all seniors attend college but where fifty to seventy-
seven percent of athlete-seniors do so, Dr. Norman Spencer, Franklin's principal, noted that "[o]ur 
kids, if they don't get the [athletic] scholarships, they don't go to college." BYERS, supra note 6, at 
303 (quoting Dr. Spencer). In many disadvantaged communities, sports are considered to be the 
only ticket out of poverty, and teachers inflate grades to enable athletes to obtain the GPAs needed 
to make them eligible to play sports in NCAA colleges. "Admiring teachers and principals often 
'help' star high school athletes by lowering their grading standards for those individuals." Chin, 
supra note 3, at 1240 n.226 (citing Mark lvey, How Educators Are Fighting Big-Money Madness in 
Athletics, Bus. WK., Oct. 27, 1986, at 138); see also BYERS, supra note 6, at 303; Steve Wilstein, 
Graduation Rates Sour Sweet 16: Study Shows Blacks Less Likely to Get Degree, J. GAZETTE (Ft. 
Wayne, Tex.), Mar. 25, 2003, at I ('"There are a lot of people in our schools, too many, who think 
they're doing young people a favor by promoting them from grade to grade, believing the dream 
that this kid is so talented that he's going to make it into the pros. The odds remain staggeringly 
against a high school athlete getting a college scholarship, let alone a career in the pros."' (quoting 
Professor Lapchick)). 
307. See Farrey, supra note 303. 
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eligible under NCAA rules for intercollegiate competition.308 
(2) The Freshman Eligibility Rule Is a Barrier to Academic 
Success and Helps Coaches Staff Better Teams 
For most of its history, the NCAA forbade freshmen from competing 
in varsity sports.309 This prohibition reflected the idea that athletes 
should devote their first year of college to academic life, unhampered by 
the demands of their sports. Becoming successful students in their new 
environment was the goal.310 "Freshman ineligibility ... had been 
accepted as a benchmark of sound management for almost 50 years"311 
when the NCAA adopted a proposal to eliminate that rule at its 1972 
Convention. 312 In an important and radical departure from settled prior 
policy, that legislation permitted freshmen to play in varsity football and 
basketball games for the first time. 313 
If the NCAA and its member institutions were genuinely interested in 
players' academic achievements, a requirement like the freshman 
ineligibility rule would permit athletes a period to adjust academically to 
university life, free from most athletic responsibilities.314 By choosing to 
308. See id. ("[A] small industry of prep schools ... serve[s] as eligibility factories for college 
prospects. Abuse of the system has become so accepted that in New York City, several 
academically troubled basketball players over the past decade have bolstered their GPAs by re-
taking classes at one unaccredited school, Christopher Robin Academy in Queens, to get high 
grades with little or no work as part-time students."); see also Pete Thamel & Duff Wilson, Poor 
Grades Aside, Top Athletes Get To College on $399 Diploma, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at I 
(describing an unaccredited correspondence school in Florida that in the past two years "polished" 
at least twenty-eight athletes' high school grades, enabling many of them to compete in Division I 
football programs). 
309. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 102, 109. 
310. See id. at 162. 
311. /d. at 161. 
312. Seeid. at 161-63; Timeline-1940to 1979,supranote 182. 
313. Although the NCAA had previously waived the freshman ineligibility rule, it did so only 
during wartime, when a low supply of college athletes required supplementation by including 
freshmen. At the end of each war, however, the rule rendering freshmen ineligible to play was 
reinstated. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 162. 
314. Former University of Virginia coach Terry Holland advocates reinstating a freshman 
ineligibility rule as a means of addressing low graduation rates among athletes. He notes that 
"partial qualifiers" graduated at higher rates in four years than did "full qualifiers" in six-year 
periods. "Partial qualifiers" were athletes under now-repealed NCAA legislation who were 
considered academically marginal or at-risk and were, therefore, precluded from competing or 
traveling with the team during their first academic year. Outside the Lines: Zero Percent-College 
Basketball's Graduation Crisis (ESPN television broadcast Mar. I, 2002) (on file with authors) 
(interviewing Terry Holland). 
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repeal the freshman ineligibility rule, the NCAA, colleges, and 
universities exalted their commercial interests-fielding the best 
possible teams-over the educational advancement of athletes.315 
(3) Demanding Playing Schedules Effectively Bar Athletes from 
Functioning as True Students 
Many other aspects of the athletes' college experience are also 
structured to serve the universities' commercial interests and are at odds 
with academic considerations. For example, the players' extensive 
practice and playing schedules monopolize their lives/ 16 leaving little 
time or energy for academic pursuits.317 This time commitment was not 
always so onerous. At one time, NCAA restrictions safeguarded an 
athlete's study time to some degree.318 But because winning games 
generates enormous revenues,319 coaches sought means of evading the 
training limitations. They required athletes, for example, "to enroll in 
weight-training courses outside the permissible practice season"320 and 
eventually prevailed upon the NCAA to legalize the practice.321 
Similarly, because each game represented additional revenue in ticket 
sales, television payments, and concession earnings, the NCAA 
lengthened the football and men's basketball seasons over time.322 
In 1991, the NCAA limited the number of hours players could be 
315. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1247-48. 
316. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 629 (recommending restrictions on travel to permit athletes 
more time as students); Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 (characterizing heavy athletic schedules as 
unrealistic for students and as geared towards winning and making money for universities); see also 
supra Part III.A.I. 
317. See supra note I 27. 
318. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 109 (describing the limit to the number of football and men's 
basketball games per season to nine and twenty-one, respectively); id. at I 02 (noting that the 
football season could not commence before classes did); cf id. at 102---03, 109 (describing limitation 
by some conferences of training time to two hours per day). 
3 I 9. See Frank, supra note I 87 ("In view of the enormous revenues that can accrue to the most 
successful programs, the incentives to compete for the limited number of positions at the top of the 
college athletics hierarchy are strong."); supra Part III.B.2.a. 
320. BYERS, supra note 6, at 103. 
32 I. See id. 
322. The in-season schedule was increased by permitting "special-exception games," and the 
post-season football schedule was expanded to eighteen games. !d. at 340. The NCAA and various 
conferences also increased the number of games to be played in their post-season tournaments. See 
id.; MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING 
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 38 (2000) (noting that football players participating in bowl games 
must practice during their final exam period). 
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required to practice to four per day and twenty per week, 323 but soon 
permitted coaches to hold "voluntary" practices, thereby inviting evasion 
of the hour limit.324 Although coaches cannot technically require 
attendance at these "voluntary" practices, an athlete who does not wish 
to risk offending the coach or losing his athletic scholarship must attend. 
Thus, even at "voluntary" practices, attendance is expected. 325 
Unlike attendance at athletic activities, attendance in class is not 
always expected. In fact, coaches do not permit athletes to attend classes 
that conflict with practice, travel to away games, or tournaments.326 
"Where else ... does the college officially require the student to skip 
classes for a college-scheduled function or risk loss of financial 
assistance?"327 In fact, athletes report not always being able to select the 
major they desire because of course conflicts with team practice 
schedules. 328 
Many athletes hardly resemble the students dedicated to "learning, 
323. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 17.1.5.1. 
324. See id. art. 17.02.13; see also BYERS, supra note 6, at 103, 109 (noting that the hour limits 
were unenforceable). 
325. See BYERS, supra note 6, at I 03. Athletes themselves believe "voluntary" practices are 
mandatory, as every athlete whom we interviewed confirmed. See SPERBER, supra note 322, at 31 
(describing coaches' use of voluntary workouts to determine starting rosters); Lynch, supra note 24, 
at 604 (noting that coaches consider such "voluntary" workouts when determining "an athlete's 
status on the team"); Wendel, supra note 24 (acknowledging the expectation that athletes will work 
out on their own); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Nov. I 0, 2003); Interview with 
anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 
25, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). 
That "voluntary" workouts are, in fact, mandatory is broadly understood: "[Lesley] Stahl: But 
athletes know if they don't show up, they'll have no shot at playing. Huma: They're pretty much 
mandatory. Stahl: It's a charade. Huma: Yeah. I mean they call it 'volandatory' a lot of times, 
because you don't know the difference." 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 17. 
326. See Suggs, supra note 137 (describing the experience of star tailback Robert Smith, who had 
to quit the Ohio State University football team to be able to attend his chemistry class, which 
conflicted with morning practice); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Nov. 10, 2003) 
(stating that athletes are not allowed to enroll in courses that conflict with practice time); Interview 
with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003) (same); Interview with anonymous employee-
athlete (Sept. 25, 2003) (same); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) (same). 
But see DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 17.1.5.6.1, 17.1.5.6.1.1 (indicating that member 
institutions must not require athletes to skip classes to attend practice except during NCAA 
championships or for practice associated with away games). 
327. BYERS, supra note 6, at 103. 
328. AM 870 Sports Talk with Earle Robinson, supra note 129 (university professor calling in and 
reporting that an athlete requested permission to miss half of his scheduled classes and that his 
coach had suggested he change his major because the classes conflicted with practice); Interview 
with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003); see also SPERBER, supra note 322, at 244-45. 
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education, and academic pursuits"329 that the Brown Board envisioned. 
Because of their demanding practice and game schedules, these athletes 
lack the time and energy for studying, and their obligations to the 
athletic department force them to miss classes regularly. An employee-
athlete's academic experience during college could hardly be more 
different than that of the ordinary student. 
(4) Sham Curricula Demonstrate that Athletes Are Not Bona Fide 
Students 
Weak curricula also characterize many athletes' college experiences. 
Universities have created light academic schedules to enable athletes to 
devote maximum time to their sports. 330 Schools regularly devise 
academic majors with minimal academic requirements. 331 Courses of 
dubious academic value have also become commonplace.332 For the 
Summer 1986 term, the University of Nevada at Las Vegas approved a 
six-credit course called "Contemporary Issues in Social Welfare," 
known to students as "Palm Trees 101." The course was not listed in any 
catalog and was taken only by basketball team members during their 
nine-game participation in a sixteen-day, international tournament.333 
Similarly, basketball players at Ohio University were awarded four 
credits for taking a course offered during the team's fourteen-day 
summer trip to Europe.334 
Academic advisors employed in the athletic department commonly 
arrange for academically unchallenging courses and schedules335 for the 
329. Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 42, slip op. at 6, 2004 WL 1588744, at *9 (July 13, 2004) 
(describing the meaning of "student"). 
330. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 604; Chin, supra note 3, at 1242. More recently, universities 
have been increasing course loads to encourage higher graduation rates. See infra Part III.B.2.b.(7). 
331. See SPERBER, supra note 160, at 283-84; Lynch, supra note 24, at 604. 
332. Universities offer many such courses. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 300 (Squad Participation; 
Theory of Track and Field); id. at 305 (History of American Sport); Goldman, supra note 37, at 206 
n.IO (citing Notebook, SPORTING NEWS, Apr. 3, 1989, at 42) (describing courses used to enable star 
Temple University football player Paul Palmer to remain academically eligible); Telander, supra 
note 39, at 97 (Bowling; Racquetball; Basketball; Leisure; Adjusting to a University); Hockensmith, 
supra note 138 (Coaching Football; Issues Affecting Student-Athletes); Hockensmith, supra note 
160 (Officiating Basketball; Officiating Softball; Power Volleyball); Outside the Lines: Zero 
Percent, supra note 314 (describing courses offered in the past at Duke University, including 
Theory and Practice of Coaching; History of the Atlantic Coast Conference Basketball; Ethics of 
Sports; Sports Marketing of Collegiate Athletic Events). 
333. BYERS, supra note 6, at 308. 
334. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 n.227 (citing Gup, supra note 127, at 59). 
335. See Friend, supra note 160; Hockensmith, supra note 138; Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, 
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athletes in their charge.336 Many of these undemanding courses are 
populated primarily by athletes.337 Athletes report passing classes they 
rarely attended.338 Independent studies and summer courses are regularly 
employed to give athletes needed credits without requiring much, if any, 
academic work. 339 Athletes have claimed that tutors and professors from 
the university sometimes do their schoolwork for them340 and tell them 
in advance which version of a final exam will be administered.341 
Athletes have described receiving special treatment from professors, 
such as being allowed to take an oral retest after leaving during the 
regular written final examination.342 Moreover, at some top sports 
universities, many courses are so devoid of academic value that if an 
athlete transfers to another school, most of the credits do not transfer.343 
supra note 314. See also id. for a discussion of weak majors most often selected by athletes. 
336. See Friend, supra note 160; Tom Friend & Ryan Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, Cars 
Among Benefits, ESPN.COM, Nov. 9, 2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn!print?id=l919059 
&type=story [hereinafter Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash]; Hockensmith, supra note 
160; Hockensmith, supra note 138. 
337. See Friend, supra note 160 (describing classes in which approximately thirty of the forty 
enrolled students were football players); Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314. 
338. See Mike Freeman, When Values Collide: Clarett Got Unusual Aid in Ohio State Class, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, § 8, at I (stating that a teaching assistant reported that football players 
forged names of absent teammates on the class attendance roster); Harrick Steps Down as Coach of 
Georgia, supra note 160 (reporting that a player received an "A" in a course he never attended); 
Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 336; Friend, supra note 160. 
339. See Suggs, supra note 137 (describing the case of star linebacker Andy Katzenmoyer who 
retained eligibility at Ohio State only by passing Golf and AIDS-Awareness classes during a 
summer session); Friend, supra note 160; Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 
336; Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314 (asserting that summer school has a diluted 
educational value and that Carlos Boozer, a former Duke University basketball player, was away 
from campus for half of one summer session to play basketball games while he was enrolled in four 
on-campus summer-school classes). 
340. See Freeman, supra note 338 (reporting allegations of a teaching assistant and an associate 
professor that academic tutors sometimes did homework for players); Friend & Hockensmith, 
Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 336; Friend, supra note 160; accord Freeman, supra note 338 
(reporting a football player's allegations that counselors who work with the university's Office of 
Student Athlete Support Services do the players' homework for them). 
341. See Friend, supra note 160. 
342. See id.; Freeman, supra note 338 (reporting that two graduate assistants corroborated this 
allegation, and stating that the athlete was the only student out of eighty in the class allowed such 
special treatment); see also Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314 (describing statement 
of former Duke University basketball player William Avery that one of his professors "didn't 
believe in grading on the test" but would simply grade him orally). 
343. See Friend & Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, supra note 336; Hockensmith, supra note 
160; Hockensmith, supra note 138. '"What kind of degree can you get from Ohio State if none of 
your classes count at other colleges?"' !d. (quoting Sammy Maldonado, a football player who 
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In 2004, eleven universities in the Associated Press pre-season top 
twenty-five football poll awarded athletes academic credit for playing 
footbal1.344 Football players at Ohio State University may repeat coach 
Jim Tressel's two-credit "Varsity Football" class "as many as five times 
for a total of 10 credits."345 Nearly three dozen Division I-A universities 
award academic credit simply for participating in varsity sports.346 Most 
sport-specific classes have no syllabus or exam, require no written work, 
and are graded on a pass/fail basis.347 One basketball course offered to 
varsity players at the University of Georgia did have a twenty-question 
final examination. Among the questions were: "How many halves are in 
a college basketball game?" and "How many points does a 3-point field 
goal account for in a Basketball Game?"348 
Schools have diluted their curricula because many athletes lack 
academic ability and time to study?49 Enrolling such athletes in marginal 
courses allows universities to maintain their athletes' eligibility for 
competition under NCAA rules.350 The universities' creation of weak, 
academically bankrupt curricula serves their commercial interests in 
recruiting and building winning sports programs, but abrogates their 
academic mission.351 Given this widespread phenomenon, the NCAA's 
effort to characterize many of these athletes as "students" is 
disingenuous. Division I schools admit many athletes primarily to bring 
transferred to the University of Maryland with only seventeen of forty Ohio State University credits 
after having been "recruited over" by OSU Coach Jim Tressel). 
344. Schlabach, supra note 224. Such awarding of credit violates NCAA rules prohibiting special 
benefits to athletes that are not available to the student body generally. See supra note 224. Among 
the universities awarding credits for participating on the football team were: Brigham Young; 
Florida State; Georgia; Nebraska; Ohio State; and Penn State. Schlabach, supra note 224. 
345. Schlabach, supra note 224. 
346. !d. For example, Ohio State University awards academic credit for participating in twenty-
one varsity sports, including ice hockey, lacrosse, and pistol and riflery. While those courses count 
towards the NCAA's credit-per-term requirements, they nevertheless do not count towards the 
athletes' degree requirements. !d. 
347. ld. Some athletics participation courses, however, such as the Kansas State Varsity Football 
course, use letter grades, and the vast majority of the athletes enrolled received "A"s.ld. 
348. ld.; see also Lexus Halftime Show: Michigan-Notre Dame Game, supra note 224. 
349. See supra Part III.B.2.b.(l). Athletes are routinely admitted to Division I schools despite the 
relative weakness of their academic records compared to those of the general student body. 
350. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 299 (arguing that schools "exploit the athlete 
by ... providing ... him or her course work of minimum quality" to allow the athlete to meet 
minimum eligibility standards). 
351. '"The purpose isn't to educate and graduate,' says Drake Group associate director David 
Ridpath. 'They're eligibility mills.'" Hockensmith, supra note 138. 
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athletic and, therefore, commercial success to their schools, not for real 
leaming.352 As one athlete reported, some of his classes were devoid of 
academic rigor. The goal is not to educate the athletes, he said, but to 
ensure their eligibility. 353 
(5) Sub-Standard Academic Performance Among Some Athletes 
Is Further Evidence that They Do Not Function Primarily as 
Students. 
Athletes' performance in the classes in which they do enroll further 
confirms they are in school to perform on the field, not in the classroom. 
"Over 40% of black football and basketball players at major Division I 
schools report having been on academic probation" during their college 
careers.354 Temple University certified star football running back Paul 
Palmer as academically eligible to play even though he "flunk[ed] 
remedial reading four times, [and] complet[ed] no classes in his 
major."355 More recently, Miles Simon led the University of Arizona to 
an NCAA national basketball championship in 1997, winning most 
valuable player honors, despite having been on academic probation for 
three years-almost his entire playing career. 356 The toll of demanding 
practice schedules, coupled with special admission for academically 
unprepared athletes who would likely face difficulty handling academic 
responsibilities under the best of circumstances, virtually guarantee that 
many athletes will be markedly unsuccessful as students. 
352. Arkansas basketball player Dwight Stewart noted in this regard: "They recruited me, you 
know, to come play basketball. They didn't recruit me to go to school. ... Our degree, that's a plus 
for us." Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314. Darnell Robinson, also from Arkansas, 
believed the same: "In the gym it was way more serious than it was off the court because that was 
what I was here for, you know, and, for me to act like that otherwise, I would be missing my 
mission." Jd. Asked about low graduation rates, Coach Nolan Richardson defended his university's 
zero percent graduation rate among African-American basketball players: "Now let's be straight up 
and honest. Our livelihood depends on whether we win, and that's the bottom line." Id.; accord 
SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 101 (quoting a college athlete who stated that "in college 
the coaches be a lot more concerned on winning and the money co min' in. If they don't win, they 
may get the boot, and so they pass that pressure onto us athletes."). To be sure, some highly talented 
athletes do come to college seeking an education. While this is laudable, it is not the primary reason 
universities admit them; universities enroll these athletes to field winning teams. 
353. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). 
354. Goldman, supra note 37, at 206-07 n.IO. 
355. !d. at 207 n.I 0 (citing Notebook, supra note 332, at 42). 
356. See Arizona Denies Report Simon Got Special Favors, STUART NEWS (Fla.), Oct. II, 1997, 
at 88; Mike McGraw, Bending the Rules to Win: MVP Made Grade Only on the Court, KAN. CITY 
STAR, Oct. 10, 1997, at AI. 
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(6) Athletes and Institutions Alike Engage in Academic Fraud to 
Maintain Athletes' Eligibility to Compete 
To perpetuate the myth that these athletes are primarily students, 
many schools have essentially abandoned their own standards to make 
an athlete's academic performance appear better than it actually is. As a 
result, academic fraud has often taken place at NCAA member 
schools.357 Notably, administrators in athletic departments, not faculty 
members, monitor compliance with NCAA academic regulations. 358 
Because of the financial incentive to win championships, many coaches 
and administrators also have a strong incentive to falsifY compliance 
with academic requirements, thereby derogating the academic well-
being of the athlete.359 For example, from 1994 through 1999 at the 
University of Minnesota, a university secretary and a tutor, with the 
knowledge of the head men's basketball coach, completed four hundred 
assignments and forty-eight papers for athletes on the basketball team.360 
Even college administrators refuse to enforce rules when doing so would 
implicate athletes. 361 It is not unusual for athletes to get credit for, and 
good grades in, courses they neither attended nor for which they 
studied. 362 
357. See Lynch, supra note 24, at 610 (describing the practice of universities "relax[ing]" 
academic standards to ensure an athlete's academic eligibility). Former NCAA Executive Director 
Byers notes that academic cheating has long been widespread. See BYERS, supra note 6, at II, 178. 
A common violation was students not showing up for class but still getting high "grades vital to 
their [continued] eligibility." !d. at 178. '"[U]nearned [academic] credits, falsified transcripts and 
unwarranted intrusion' of athletics interests into the 'academic processes' of ... universities" have 
also been typical. !d. at 179 (citing Media Release, Pac-1 0 Conference, Aug. II, 1980). In a recent 
case, Memphis-area high school football coach Lynn Lang arranged for a third party to take the 
SAT for high-school All-American defensive lineman Albert Means. See Schlabach, supra note 21. 
Means testified he was afraid he would not score well enough on the exam. Woody Baird, Ex-Prep 
Coach Says Michigan State Offered Money for Player, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 26, 2005, 
available at http://www .freep.com/news/latestnews/pm2502_20050 126.htm. 
358. See Robert Sullivan, A Study in Frustration, SPORTS ILLUS., June 19, 1989, at 94; see also 
Chin, supra note 3, at 1231 n.l50. 
359. See Sullivan, supra note 358; Telander, supra note 39, at 101. 
360. Infractions Case: University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 6, 2000, 
available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20001106/active/3723nl8.html; Mark Clayton, 
Welcome to College, Mr. Jones!, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2001, at II, available at 
http://scmweb2.emcweb.com/durable/2001/02/06/p II s l.htm. 
361. See, e.g., Telander, supra note 39, at 101 (describing Florida State University President 
Bernard Sliger as refusing to enforce class attendance rules against Deion Sanders); McGraw, supra 
note 356 (suggesting that University of Arizona officials made exceptions to academic standards to 
keep Miles Simon eligible to play basketball). 
362. See BYERS, supra note 6, at 178-79, 200; Freeman, supra note 338 (noting the allegations of 
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Academic fraud becomes commonplace when powerful financial 
incentives to win athletic contests exist.363 Under these circumstances, 
academic achievement becomes secondary to athletic success. Schools 
"compete on the field with athletes who are sometimes not qualified to 
keep up in the classroom, "364 and as a result, the pressure to breach 
academic standards and to mask cheating is enormous both for the 
athlete and the university. 
(7) NCAA Progress Requirements Serve Members' Commercial 
Interests but Frequently Permit Athletes to Fall Short of 
Acquiring a Degree 
The inordinate time required for athletes to practice means that even 
academically qualified athletes find it difficult to meet course 
requirements. 365 Not surprisingly, athletes who are not academically well 
prepared do not keep up with their course work. This problem 
undermines the identity of athletes as students and has forced the NCAA 
to enact legislation tying progress towards a degree to continuing athletic 
eligibility. 366 
An examination of NCAA rules on academic progress, however, 
reveals little actual concern for athletes' academic achievement. In 1991, 
the NCAA adopted legislation requiring athletes to make satisfactory 
progress towards a degree to remain eligible to engage in intercollegiate 
competition.367 Although the NCAA described these rules as being 
motivated by a desire to improve graduation rates, 368 they have 
contributed to a state of affairs in which athletes cannot graduate 
both a teaching assistant and an associate professor that academic tutors sometimes did homework 
for players); id. (noting a football player's allegation that Student Athlete Support counselors do 
players' homework for them); id. (stating that a teaching assistant reported that football players 
forged names of absent teammates on the class attendance roster); Staudt on Sports (WILX 
television broadcast Dec. 8, 2002) (including statement of former college quarterback Bill Burke 
that players who do well in classes during the semester need not take a final examination). 
363. See supra Part III.B.2.a (describing the immense direct and indirect financial benefits for 
universities of winning athletic contests); see also Frank, supra note 187, at 22-23 ("[T]hese 
institutions are often forced by competition to operate close to the margins of allowable conduct."). 
364. Freeman, supra note 338. 
365. Telephone interview with Warren D. Gower (Sept. 2, 2003) (describing his son's experience 
as a college baseball player at Kansas State University). 
366. See DIY. I MANUAL, supra note 3, at 154, art. 14.4.3.2 (former eligibility requirements); id. 
at 160, art. 14.4.3.2 (current eligibility requirements). 
367. See id. at 152-58, art. 14.4.3; Chin, supra note 3, at 1240-41 n.228. 
368. See Riggs, supra note 151, at 141. 
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because their eligibility for financial aid often lapses long before they 
complete their degree requirements. In that situation, many athletes 
provide their services over a period of four seasons, but never receive 
the anticipated college degree in return. 369 
NCAA progress requirements currently call for an athlete finishing 
his fourth year of college to have completed at least eighty percent of the 
courses required for his degree.370 In the meantime, the athlete's 
eligibility to compete may not exceed four seasons in a given sport,371 
and the institution has no obligation to continue a scholarship beyond 
that period.372 Thus, an athlete who begins competing in his first year of 
college is viewed as having made satisfactory progress towards his 
degree if he successfully completes only four-fifths of his required 
courses by the end of his four seasons of competition. Having exhausted 
his eligibility, his scholarship aid may end.373 Thus, although his 
progress towards degree completion was deemed "satisfactory," and 
although his scholarship was called a "full-ride," his school will not have 
provided a completed college degree.374 
369. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003) (describing having 
experienced this outcome personally); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003) 
(describing having witnessed this outcome for numerous athletes); see also infra Part III.B.2.b.(8) 
(documenting low graduation rates among athletes in revenue-generating sports). 
370. See DIY. I. MANUAL, supra note 3, at 160, art. 14.4.3.2 (current eligibility requirements). 
371. See id. art. 14.2. 
372. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1240 n.228. 
373. Given the limitation by sport on the number of scholarships available, see DIY. I MANUAL, 
supra note 3, arts. 15.5.4.1, 15.5.5.1, an athlete who has exhausted his playing eligibility will likely 
Jose his scholarship. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with 
anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). 
374. Of course the athlete may continue to take classes, meeting his degree requirements and 
eventually graduating, if he can pay for college after his scholarship ends. Doing so is extremely 
difficult for the many athletes who come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Interview 
with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete 
(Sept. 25, 2003); Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 7, 2003). Instead, those players 
usually leave school. See id.; Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Oct. 15, 2003); 
Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003). 
In its public relations campaigns, the NCAA constantly emphasizes the "student" in "student-
athlete," but if its concern were truly academic, universities would agree to be required to continue 
financial aid long enough to enable athletes to graduate. See Chin, supra note 3, at 1247. The 
NCAA could achieve this outcome by mandating the continuation of aid for a reasonable period 
beyond the period of eligibility in the sport. See id. Extending scholarships in this manner would 
allow these often academically unprepared athletes not only to complete their degrees, but might 
also permit them the additional time needed for those degrees to confer real value. Put differently, 
the athletes might actually have the time needed to learn from their studies. The NCAA has never 
seriously considered such a reform. 
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One of the players we interviewed said basketball "gave [him] a 
chance to go to college" and "there were some good times," but he was 
unable to complete his degree requirements by the time his eligibility, 
and therefore his scholarship, expired. He dropped out of school, got a 
job, and returned several years later to complete his degree. 375 Given 
NCAA requirements on academic progress, it cannot be said that 
athletes regularly receive a college degree in exchange for their athletic 
services. 376 These low standards permit athletes with little academic 
ability to remain eligible to play, thereby enhancing the economic value 
of the college sports industry. Thus, the NCAA has structured its own 
academic rules more to serve members' economic interests than to 
safeguard the players' academic needs. Clearly, this choice reveals the 
economic, not primarily academic, nature of the university-athlete 
relationship. 
(8) Low Graduation Rates Show Athletes Are Not Primarily 
Students 
The NCAA's claim that scholarship athletes are predominantly 
students and, therefore, not employees is further belied by appallingly 
low graduation rates among athletes in revenue-generating sports. The 
NCAA claims athletes are like regular students, pointing to graduation 
rates among Division I scholarship athletes that exceed those of the 
general student body. In this regard, it emphasizes statistics released in 
2004 showing that the graduation rate for all scholarship athletes377 was 
sixty-two percent, while that for students generally was only sixty 
percent. 378 
375. Interview with anonymous employee-athlete (Sept. 25, 2003). In eventually returning to 
school, this particular athlete is the exception rather than the rule. Most athletes who leave school 
without graduating never return to complete their degree. Interview with anonymous employee-
athlete (Sept. 7, 2003 ). 
376. Not all athletes fail to complete their degree requirements, of course, but those who do-
those who probably should not have been initially admitted for academic reasons-are being 
exploited. They provide valuable services which genemte great revenues for their universities, but 
they get no degree in return. And if they are among the ninety-eight to ninety-nine percent of 
college football and men's basketball players who do not later play professionally, see NCAA, 
Estimated Probability, supra note 30, their prospects can be bleak. 
377. Scholarship athletes are those "who received athletics aid from the college or university for 
any period of time during their entering year." NCAA, Information About the Gmduation-Rates 
Report: Division I, http://www.ncaa.org/gmd_mtes/2004/dl/information.html (last visited Feb. 5, 
2006) [hereinafter NCAA, Information About Report]. 
378. NCAA, 2004 NCAA Gmduation Rates Report Data, Division I, http://www.ncaa.org/ 
gmd_mtes/2004/di/Dl.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) [hereinafter NCAA, Gmduation Rates 
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Two defects, however, flaw this comparison. First, the comparison is 
not between similarly situated groups. By definition, those in the 
scholarship athlete group all have at least some degree of athletically 
based financial assistance, with many receiving "full rides."379 By 
contrast, many fewer individuals in the overall student population 
receive waivers for tuition, room, board, and books. Thus, many regular 
students who leave school without graduating do so because of financial 
challenges that make it difficult to pay for school.380 Given this sizeable 
built-in financial advantage for athletes, were all other factors equal, 
athletes should graduate at much higher rates than the student body 
overall. Yet they do not. 
Second, the sixty-two percent graduation rate for scholarship athletes 
is inflated because it includes individuals in non-revenue-generating 
sports who are not the subject of our thesis and who typically graduate at 
such high rates that they camouflage the much lower graduation rates 
that persist for scholarship athletes in the revenue-generating sports. 
These outliers include female scholarship athletes who graduate at the 
stunningly high rate of seventy percent.381 When such groups are 
excluded, leaving only scholarship athletes from the revenue-generating 
sports, the athlete graduation rate for Division I universities plummets. 
It is the Division I grant-in-aid athlete in revenue-generating sports, 
however, who is an employee?82 Therefore, most germane to our inquiry 
is a comparison of the graduation rates of football and men's basketball 
players on the one hand, and all students on the other. The 2004 data 
Report]. This inquiry examined students entering college in the fall of 1997. Students who were 
freshmen in the fall of 1997 and the spring of 1998 are the most recent group for which the six-year 
graduation rate data exist. NCAA, Information About Report, supra note 377. 
379. See NCAA, Information About Report, supra note 377. 
380. See. e.g., Stephen L. DesJardins et al., Simulating the Longitudinal Effects of Changes in 
Financial Aid on Student Departure from College, J. HUM. RESOURCES, Summer 2002, at 653, 653-
55, 669, 671-74 (demonstrating that the availability of scholarships for undergraduate students 
reduces attrition rates compared to students receiving loans or those receiving no financial aid at 
all); Stanley I. lwai & William D. Churchill, College Attrition and the Financial Support Systems of 
Students, REs. IN HIGHER EDUC., 1982, at 105, I 05-06 (stating that in sixteen of twenty-one 
attrition studies, financial difficulty was among the top three most important factors); Lydia 
Kalsner, Issues in College Student Retention, HIGHER EDUC. EXTENSION SERV. REV., Fall 1991, at 
3, 3, 6 (noting that financial difficulties play a "central role" in student attrition and that the 
availability of grants can significantly ameliorate the problem). 
381. See NCAA, Graduation Rates Report, supra note 378. 
382. It is the athlete in the revenue sports, not the others, who meets the Brown requirements of 
not being primarily a student and of having primarily an economic, not educational, relationship 
with his university. See supra Parts III.B.l, III.B.2.a-b. 
151 
HeinOnline -- 81 Wash. L. Rev. 152 2006
Washington Law Review Vol. 81:71,2006 
show football players at all Division I universities graduating at a rate of 
fifty-five percent and men's basketball players at forty-four percent, both 
far below the sixty percent graduation rate for all students. 383 
Graduation rates are particularly problematic for those athletic 
programs with the most success on the field or court. In football, for 
example, the graduation rates for the eight teams that played in the four 
2004-05 BCS bowl games were significantly lower than the rates for the 
overall student bodies at those schools. 384 At the University of Texas, for 
example, the graduation rate for football players was only thirty-four 
percent while that of the overall student body was seventy percent; at the 
University of Pittsburgh, the respective rates were thirty-one and sixty-
three percent.385 At both universities, the graduation rate for football 
players was less than half that for students overall. 386 
The same pattern occurred in men's basketball. Of the sixteen teams 
advancing to the "Sweet Sixteen" in March 2004, team graduation rates 
were available for only eleven. Of those eleven, every team but one had 
a graduation rate significantly lower than that for the student population 
overall at their universities.387 Indeed, consistent with the general 
pattern, the greater the athletic success, the worse graduation rates tend 
to be. Thus, the two teams with by far the lowest graduation rates were 
the same two that advanced the furthest-to the coveted NCAA 
championship game. They were the University of Connecticut and the 
Georgia Institute of Technology, each with a mere twenty-seven percent 
graduation rate for their men's basketball players. In each case, the 
graduation rates for the student bodies as a whole at those universities, 
sixty-nine and sixty-eight percent respectively, were more than two and 
one-half times greater than those of the basketball teams. 388 This large 
disparity is consistent with the conclusion that these athletes are not 
383. These football and basketball athletes also trailed the fifty-seven percent graduation rate for 
all male students. See NCAA, Graduation Rates Report, supra note 378. 
384. See INST. FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHICS IN SPORT, UNIV. OF CENT. FLA., KEEPING SCORE 
WHEN IT COUNTS: ASSESSING THE 2004-05 BOWL-BOUND COLLEGE FOOTBALL TEAMS-
GRADUATION RATES, http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/media/ides/Table%20-%20 
Graduation%20rates%202004-05%20bowl-bound%20teams.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
385. See id. 
386. See id. 
387. See INST. FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHICS IN SPORT, UNIV. OF CENT. FLA., KEEPING SCORE 
WHEN IT COUNTS: THE 2004 MEN'S SWEET 16 TEAMS-GRADUATION RATES, TRANSFERS AND 
RACIAL BREAKDOWN OF ROSTER PLAYERS, http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/downloads/medial 
ides/table_04.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006). 
388. See id. 
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primarily students, a showing required under Brown to demonstrate their 
employee status. 
In 2002, ESPN released a report that scandalized the college 
basketball world. It documented a zero percent graduation rate among 
African-American basketball players at thirty-six different Division I 
universities over the five-year period from 1990 through 1994.389 Out of 
concern about the public relations problem created by its claim that 
employee-athletes are primarily students when so many never graduate, 
the NCAA has undertaken a campaign to improve those rates. 390 To 
address the problem, the NCAA has recently passed legislation 
rewarding programs that meet minimum scholastic requirements and 
punishing those that do not.391 
While this "Academic Performance Program" will undoubtedly 
encourage some universities to improve athlete graduation rates, the 
legislation itself is likely to have a smaller impact than recent media 
reports would suggest. The major penalties, such as warnings, loss of 
scholarships, ineligibility for post-season play, and reclassification to 
restricted status, are imposed on a progressive basis, 392 allowing most 
universities to avoid sanctions for a number of years. With regard to 
these major penalties, no punishment at all may be imposed on schools 
389. See Outside the Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314; see also Study: Many Don't Make 
Grade on Graduation: Blacks Lag Whites; Men Lag Women, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at 4C 
(describing the continuing graduation rate crisis among African-American men's basketball 
players). 
390. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 23.01.2 (noting the NCAA's commitment to improve 
graduation rates). While NCAA efforts to improve graduation rates may be laudable, they bypass 
the most direct means of increasing them-ending special admissions, ceasing the monopolization 
of virtually all the athletes' time to allow for academic pursuits, and providing scholarship aid for a 
sufficient period to permit graduation. If universities were to take these three actions with respect to 
their revenue-generating sports, graduation rates among athletes could soar, and actual education 
could take place. The relationship between athletes and their universities could become more 
academic than economic. But universities have not taken these simple steps precisely because to do 
so would harm their economic interests-their ability to dominate on the playing field, and thus to 
generate tens of millions of dollars. See infra Part III.B.2.a (describing how financially lucrative it 
can be for universities to win in Division I athletics); see also Joe Drape, College Football at a 
Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at Dl (quoting Scott S. Cowen, President of Tulane, 
lamenting that the football and basketball programs with some of the worst graduation rates are 
permitted to participate in profitable post-season play). 
391. See DIV.l MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 15.01.9, 23.01.2. Under the legislation, first effective 
in the fall of 2004, teams with low graduation rates could lose scholarships and be excluded from 
postseason play. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 23.2.1.2.2-.3. Teams with exemplary 
academic performance, on the other hand, could earn additional revenue from the NCAA and gain 
more scholarships. See Drape, supra note 390. 
392. See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 23.2.1.2. 
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until data have been collected for three years. 393 
Of greater concern than the delay in implementation of sanctions is 
that the Academic Performance Program's academic requirements have 
been set so low that most institutions will never be found to have 
violated the rules.394 The NCAA Division I Board of Directors recently 
set the minimum acceptable rate at a level that "is roughly equivalent to 
an expected 50 percent graduation rate."395 NCAA data show that under 
this new program, only approximately 7.4% of teams in all Division I 
sports would fall below this standard.396 Given this low standard, most 
universities will be able to continue recruiting athletes with minimal 
academic ability without experiencing any sanctions whatsoever. Only 
those institutions with the most academically marginal athletes will run 
the risk of violating these new rules and of incurring sanctions. 397 
How much, if at all, this reform will actually improve athletes' 
graduation rates remains to be seen. And, of course, such reform 
guarantees nothing regarding whether a graduate has actually learned 
anything from his college experience.398 Whether reform packages such 
as the Academic Performance Program will actually improve athletes' 
education, or whether they are only more window dressing, a mere fifty 
percent graduation rate belies the assertion that these athletes are 
genuine students, enrolled in the university for an education. 
In the end, the fact that so many athletes fail to graduate undermines 
the NCAA's assertion that those athletes are students and, therefore, not 
employees of their universities. We have already described numerous 
factors that contribute to this phenomenon: the admission of some 
athletes who are not intellectually prepared to succeed in college; the 
monopolization of their time; the bone-crushing and exhausting series of 
393. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 3, at 38. 
394. See NCAA, NCAA Division I Board of Directors Sets Cutlines for Academic Reform 
Standards, January 10, 2005, http://www2.ncaa.org/media_and_events/press_room/2005/january/ 
20050110_dl_bod.html [hereinafter NCAA, Cutlines] (announcing the NCAA Board's 
determination of minimum standards). 
395. /d. 
396. /d. 
397. NCAA estimates show that for 79.9% of Division I men's basketball teams and for 69.3% of 
Division I football teams, not even one player will be below the standard. See id. (claiming that for 
20.1% of men's basketball and 30.7% of football programs, at least one player would fail the 
standard). This demonstrates that the new program should be a relatively easy standard for 
universities to meet. 
398. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 39, 46-48 (noting that graduation rates say nothing about 
the quality of education); Lynch, supra note 24, at 602. 
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practice and game schedules; prevailing attitudes about college athletics 
being a prelude to a professional career rather than a way to attend 
college;399 and the fact that scholarships often end prior to completion of 
degree requirements. Unacceptably low graduation rates demonstrate 
that universities and the NCAA are being dishonest when they 
characterize these particular individuals as full-fledged students. 
Universities' commercial interests have prevailed over the academic 
interests of their athletes,400 rendering the university-athlete relationship 
a commercial, not an academic, one. As a result, employee-athletes 
rarely obtain a real education. As former Washington Redskin and 
Northwestern University Athletic Director Mark Murphy has 
commented: "Money has blurred the line, and makes some schools 
ignore things when the revenues are going up. . . . Schools are not 
insisting that their athletes get an education."401 
CONCLUSION 
NCAA athletes in Division I revenue-generating sports are employees 
under the NLRA. They meet both the common law and statutory 
standards for that classification. They are common law employees 
because they are compensated for their services with athletic 
scholarships that are unquestionably a quid pro quo for athletic services 
rendered, and they are subject to a pervasive level of control by their 
employers on which they are also economically dependent. They are 
also statutory employees under Brown because their relationships with 
their universities are not primarily academic; they are overwhelmingly 
commercial. In fact, intercollegiate athletics has become a dazzlingly 
commercial activity. It is managed and generates revenue like a highly 
399. See SPERBER, supra note 160, at 8; Lynch, supra note 24, at 609, 619. Many athletes 
indicate they do not attend college for an education. When asked if he wanted to be in college, 
Deion Sanders responded, "No .... But I have to be." Telander, supra note 39, at 96. Stephon 
Marbury, a point guard from Georgia Tech, admitted college was "to position myself for the [NBA] 
draft." ZIMBALIST, supra note 14, at 39. Andy Katzenmoyer said he attended Ohio State University 
"to play football, not to attend class." Suggs, supra note 137. Coaches, too, believe many athletes 
are in school for one reason only-to transition into the professional leagues. "'They come here not 
actually wanting a degree .... The number one thing in their mind is, is the NBA. "' Outside the 
Lines: Zero Percent, supra note 314 (quoting Nolan Richardson, former Arkansas basketball 
coach); see also Peter Alfano, Basketball's 2 Stressful Worlds Offer Coaches a Tough Choice, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 28, 1989, at 8 (revealing Larry Brown's wish as a college coach for all his players to 
feel they could play professionally). 
400. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 162. 
401. Drape, supra note 390 (quoting Mark Murphy). 
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successful business and has become a professional enterprise, 
abandoning amateurism in all respects save one: the treatment of its 
players. Bobby Bowden, the most successful coach in the history of 
college football, has candidly conceded: "The boys go out and earn 
millions for their university. Everyone benefits except the players.'.4°2 
Although players devote extraordinary energy, time, and dedication to 
their "jobs" as athletes, they have none of the protections of "employee" 
status. They are not paid a negotiated wage for their services and are not 
regarded as eligible for workers' compensation in the event of injury. 
Their employers provide limited health or injury insurance, and, most 
important to our thesis, they are not eligible to bargain collectively with 
their employers. 
The parties to this employment relationship hardly share equal 
bargaining power.403 And unfortunately for these athletes, their voices 
are not nearly so powerful as those of the forces that oppose them. 
Naturally, those with the greatest pecuniary stake in this question-the 
universities, the NCAA that represents them, the corporations,404 and the 
many other beneficiaries that profit from college sports405-will likely 
decry our thesis as blasphemy. Their opposition to this truth, however, is 
simply a reflection of the profit that so richly rewards them. 
To call NCAA Division I athletes in revenue-generating sports 
402. Riggs, supra note 151, at 142 (citing Bob Oates, In the Never-Ending Scramble to Uphold 
the So-Called Amateur Code by Catching and Punishing Great Universities, the Student-Athlete has 
Become the Forgotten Man, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at C3); see Drape, supra note 127. "You see 
all the money changing hands over what you do and then you go home and-and you struggle to 
make ends meet." 60 Minutes, supra note 24, transcript at 14 (statement of former UCLA linebacker 
Ramogi Huma). 
403. See generally Daniel Neste!, Athletic Scholarships: An Imbalance of Power Between the 
University and the Student-Athlete, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401 (1992) (describing the athletes' lack of 
bargaining power). Given the gross disparity in bargaining power, the substance of the contract 
cannot be considered fair. "Freedom of contract begins where equality of bargaining power begins." 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 229 (Pocket Books 
1968). For many reasons, employee-athletes have no real power to exact an appropriate bargain for 
their labors. They are young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-three, not competent in 
the arts of negotiation or deal making. Moreover, NCAA rules preclude any bargain exceeding the 
cost of attending the university and, indeed, prohibit professional bargaining representation 
altogether. DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 15.01.2 (prohibiting unauthorized aid); id. art. 12.3.1 
(prohibiting the use of agents). "Against such an array of power stands the young athlete, 
unorganized and a part of the system for only four to six years before he or she moves on to be 
replaced by another 18- or 19-year-old." BYERS, supra note 6, at 371. 
404. See supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text (discussing corporate sponsors' marketing 
opportunities and earnings of broadcast networks). 
405. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing exorbitant coaching salaries). 
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amateurs is farcical. The NCAA's droning insistence on labeling them 
"student-athletes" is done simply to shore up the fiction that they are 
something other than employees. NCAA rules, promulgated by the 
university-employers themselves, bar these athletes from earning 
compensation representing their true worth. Unaware of their market 
value, constrained by NCAA strictures, and raised in the myth of the 
student-athlete, they enter into servitude by the thousands every year. 
Thus, this fiction has worked to convince even the players themselves to 
bask in the bright, but brief, glow of their status as campus heroes, and 
has nurtured their unrealistic dreams of glory, obscuring the reality of 
their exploitation. 
The power of myth is undeniable.406 It has served the economic 
interests of the NCAA and many other participants in major college 
sports richly. But the power of the law is also great, and a society that 
respects the law looks through the myth and the propaganda to facts. The 
rule of law eschews a "tyranny of labels"407 and seeks truth. And the 
truth is that these athletes are employees under the law. 
406. See generally JOSEPH CAMPBELL & BILL MOYERS, THE POWER OF MYTH (Betty Sue 
Flowers ed. 1988) (describing the power of myth throughout human history). 
407. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 705 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). 
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